ORCID Profile
0000-0002-5066-4839
Current Organisations
University of Sydney
,
The University of Auckland
,
The University of Notre Dame Australia - Sydney Campus Broadway
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Publications
Hal Brands and Francis J. Gavin (eds) (2020) COVID-19 and World Order: The Future of Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation
Publisher: Bristol University Press
Date: 02-2022
Aristotelian Practical Wisdom in Business Ethics
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-11-2018
Maurice Hamington and Ce Rosenow, Care Ethics and Poetry
Publisher: Brill
Date: 14-12-2020
Caring Actions
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2020
DOI: 10.1017/HYP.2020.12
Abstract: Though the literature on care ethics has mushroomed in recent years, much remains to be said about several important topics therein. One of these is action. In this article, I draw on Anscombean philosophy of action to develop a kind of meta- or proto-ethical theory of caring actions. I begin by showing how the fragmentary philosophy of action offered by care ethicists meshes with Elizabeth Anscombe's broader philosophy of action, and argue that Anscombe's philosophy of action offers a useful scaffold for a theory of caring actions. Following this, I defend an account of caring actions as those that aim to meet needs. I argue that care aims at satisfying eudaimonistic needs, those things without which one cannot flourish. I then consider the place of caring actions in care ethics. I suggest that if caring actions are to be a starting point for an ethical theory, we ought to reject the notion that a caring action must bring about its intended consequences, and I show how the concept of practice better equips us to evaluate caring actions.
A Care Ethical Theory of Right Action
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 23-09-2020
DOI: 10.1093/PQ/PQAA063
Abstract: One of the most striking and underexplored points of difference between care ethics and other normative theories is its reluctance to offer a theory of right action. Unlike other normative ethical frameworks, care ethicists typically either neglect right action or explicitly refuse to provide a theory thereof. This paper disputes that stance. It begins with an examination of right action in care ethics, offering reasons for care ethicists not to oppose the development of a care ethical theory thereof. It then considers some potential formulations of a first premise of a theory of right action, both demonstrating the ersity of possible first premises and arguing for a monistic subset of these. It subsequently presents some potential second premises, arguing that a care ethical theory of right action ought to adopt a eudaimonistic approach to care. The paper thereby makes several inroads into a care ethical account of moral evaluation.
Mana whenua engagement in Crown and Local Authority‐initiated environmental planning processes: A critique based on the perspectives of Ngāi Tahu environmental kaitiaki
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 08-2021
DOI: 10.1111/NZG.12304
Abstract: In New Zealand, the Crown and Local Authorities are required to engage with iwi in resource management matters, yet iwi engagement is a widely recognised weakness in many resource management professionals' skillsets. Coloniality permeates many interactions with iwi, and reflects a profession where practitioners' skillsets have not kept pace with developments in resource management legislation that better recognise the rights and interests of mana whenua. This article explores the real‐life impacts of this skill paucity on Ngāi Tahu environmental kaitiaki, and, through a Braided River methodological approach comprised of Kaupapa Māori research and Narrative Inquiry, offers recommendations for best practice mana whenua engagement. The article concludes by discussing the coloniality of planning, and how this impacts practitioners' ability to implement these best practice recommendations.
Learning From My Daughter: The Value and Care of Disabled Minds
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 10-09-2020
DOI: 10.1093/PQ/PQAA062
The Virtue of Care
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2019
DOI: 10.1111/HYPA.12481
Abstract: There have been many attempts to define care in terms of the virtues, but meta‐analyses of these attempts are conspicuously absent from the literature. No taxonomies have been offered to situate them within the broader care ethical and virtue theoretical discourses, nor have any substantial discussions of each option's merits and shortcomings. I attempt to fill this lacuna by presenting an analysis of the claim that care is a virtue (what I call the “virtue thesis” about care). I begin by distinguishing weaker and stronger versions of the virtue thesis, arguing that the weaker version is an orthodox view among care ethicists. I then go on to develop a taxonomy of approaches available to care ethicists seeking to flesh out the virtue thesis. The three I identify are analogical approaches, according to which care is analogous to some existing virtue supplementalist approaches, according to which care is a novel virtue and cardinalist approaches, according to which care is a cardinal virtue. Following this, I defend the virtue thesis from some foreseeable objections and argue that its most promising version is analogical.
What Can Virtue Ethics Offer Pacifists?
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2018
Abstract: Though warfare has been a popular subject of inquiry in Aristotelian virtue ethics since antiquity, pacifism has almost never been afforded sympathetic study. This paper helps to fill that lacuna by asking whether and how secular virtue ethics can provide a theory of pacifism, whether and how it might defeat some common/foreseeable objections, and what additional work needs to be done in order for virtue ethicists to provide a philosophically robust account of pacifism. I begin by translating a pacifist argument from suffering into an argument from the virtue of compassion. Compassionate agents, sensitive as they are to others’ plights, will be highly averse to lethal warfare. In the second section, I argue that cases for pacifism like this one, which are rooted in in idual virtues, cannot constitute a complete argument for pacifism because of the commonly held view that the virtues are reciprocal/unified, and that such an argument will therefore require supplementation in order to be action-guiding. The third section elaborates on what I call the impracticality objection. Any convincing account of pacifism will have to respond to this objection, and I argue that virtue ethical pacifism is especially vulnerable to it. In the fourth section, I highlight two avenues available to the virtue ethicist who defends pacifism from the impracticality objection. Neither of these avenues is viable without further research, however, so while I insist that virtue ethical pacifism is not defeated by the impracticality objection, I maintain also that this form of pacifism requires further scholarly work.
Related Organisations
The University Of Notre Dame Australia - Sydney Campus Broadway
Location: Australia
Related Funding Activities
No related grants have been discovered for Steven Steyl.