ORCID Profile
0000-0002-4526-9535
Current Organisations
Monash University
,
Zhejiang University
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Publisher: AIP Publishing
Date: 27-02-2023
DOI: 10.1063/5.0140725
Abstract: This work studies the conductivity modulation in the vertical GaN-on-GaN PiN diode (PND) under high current density and its impact on surge current capability. Thanks to the direct-bandgap of GaN, the junction temperature at different current densities could be characterized by both photo-luminescence and electro-luminescence measurements. The junction temperature rises from 300 K at ∼0.1 kA/cm2 to 620 K at ∼9.0 kA/cm2 with emission peaks shifted from 3.38 to 3.21 eV. Meanwhile, the electro-thermal behavior of the vertical GaN PND shows that the hole concentration in p-GaN is increased due to self-heating, leading to enhanced conductivity modulation and negative temperature-dependence of ON-resistance, which is desirable for surge current capability. The heat accumulation in GaN under surge current condition could be suppressed by the enhanced conductivity modulation. The surge energy density can reach ∼200 J/cm2 in the GaN PND, showing the potential of vertical GaN-on-GaN power devices in the high electro-thermal-ruggedness application.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-08-2022
DOI: 10.1007/S13164-022-00653-X
Abstract: In consciousness science, theories often differ not only in the account of consciousness they arrive at, but also with respect to how they understand their starting point. Some approaches begin with experimentally gathered data, whereas others begin with phenomenologically gathered data. In this paper, I analyse how the most influential phenomenology-first approach, namely the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness, fits its phenomenologically gathered data with explanatory hypotheses. First, I show that experimentally driven approaches hit an explanatory roadblock, since we cannot tell, at the present stage, which model of consciousness is best. Then, I show that IIT’s phenomenology-first approach implies a self-evidencing explanation according to which consciousness can be explained by starting from consciousness itself. I claim that IIT can take advantage of the virtuous circularity of this reasoning, but it also faces a data-fitting issue that is somehow similar to that faced by experiment-driven approaches: we are not given enough information to decide whether the explanatory hypotheses IIT employs to explain its phenomenological data are in fact best. I call this problem “the self-evidencing problem” for IIT, and after introducing it, I propose a possible way for IIT to solve it.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 11-06-2020
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 04-2023
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 14-10-2022
DOI: 10.1007/S10670-022-00612-Z
Abstract: The integrated information theory (IIT) is an ambitious theory of consciousness that aims to provide both a neuroscientific and a metaphysical account of consciousness by identifying consciousness with integrated information. In the philosophical literature, IIT is often associated with a panpsychist worldview. In this paper, I show that IIT can be considered, instead, as a form of emergentism that is incompatible with panpsychism. First, I show that the panpsychist interpretation of IIT is based on two properties of integrated information: intrinsicality and fundamentality. I show that the way IIT deals with these two properties, however, aligns better with emergentism than panpsychism. Then, after plugging some anti-panpsychist assumptions into IIT’s structure, I analyse different philosophical options for interpreting the formal result of causal emergence of integrated information in terms of dependence on and autonomy from its physical substrate. The upshot is that integrated information can be seen as dependent upon the fusion of the cause-effect powers of a physical substrate, and as autonomous in virtue of global-to-local determination. According to this interpretation, consciousness is the constraining power of the system as a whole upon itself, when this power emerges from the fusion on the cause-effect powers of the system’s components.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2022
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X2100193X
Abstract: Merker et al. argue that integrated information theory (IIT) is not a theory of consciousness because the IIT formalism does not match phenomenology. I argue that the authors ultimately fail to articulate the problem of the inference of the postulates from the axioms. I suggest a different version of this problem, and argue that this can help rethink IIT's potential for consciousness science.
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
No related grants have been discovered for Shu Yang.