ORCID Profile
0000-0003-0629-6626
Current Organisation
Hasselt University
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Publisher: Amsterdam University Press
Date: 02-08-2017
Abstract: Conscientious objection and the limits of vertical toleration in the liberal state Liberal states tend to tolerate certain conscientious objectors, but not others. They tolerate doctors who conscientiously refuse to perform abortions, but do not extend the same toleration to civil servants who conscientiously refuse to register same-sex marriages. In this article, I analyse the attitude of liberal states to different claims of conscience in terms of vertical toleration, and its limits. Contrary to a prevailing political theoretical argument, I submit that there is space for vertical toleration – that is, toleration by the state – in the contemporary liberal state. Yet, this space is limited. It only opens up when in iduals’ practices prima facie contravene core liberal values. Whenever that is not the case, as with conscientious objection to military service, the lens of vertical toleration is not the appropriate one. But in relation to other claims of conscience, such as of doctors against abortion, the attitude of liberal states can be described in terms of vertical toleration. The practice finally reveals that certain conscientious objectors, particularly civil servants who refuse to register same-sex marriages, are not tolerated by the liberal state. Their practices exceed the limits of vertical toleration. This article explains why the prevailing practice in liberal states, as described, gets it right.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 03-2019
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 02-06-2022
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 19-05-2022
Abstract: Bringing together scholars of migration and constitutional law, this volume analyses the problematic relationship between the rise of populism, restrictions of migrants' rights and democratic decay in Europe. By offering both constructive and critical accounts, it creates a nuanced debate on the possibilities for and limitations of legal resilience against populist erosion of migrants' rights. Crucially, it does not merely diagnose the causes of restrictions of migrants' rights, but also proposes how the law might be used as a solution. In this volume, the law is considered as both a source of resilience and part of the problem at three distinct levels: the legal-theoretical, the European, and the national level. It is a major contribution to the literature on migrants' rights, offering a nuanced account of how legal resilience might be used to safeguard migrants' rights against further erosion in populist times. This book is available as Open Access.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 06-2019
DOI: 10.1017/ILM.2019.23
Abstract: In E.S. v. Austria , the European Court of Human Rights ruled that a criminal conviction for making disparaging comments about the Prophet Muhammad, intimating in particular that he was a pedophile, did not violate the speaker's right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 10-06-2021
DOI: 10.1093/ICON/MOAB051
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 02-2019
DOI: 10.1093/OJLR/RWZ004
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 23-01-2011
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 06-2009
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 07-2020
DOI: 10.1017/S0020589320000196
Abstract: When adjudicating religious disputes, constitutional courts often resort to a particular discursive register. The notions ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’ are an integral part of this religion-specific constitutional register. But what do judges mean when they deploy the language of tolerance and respect? And what substantive role, if any, do both notions play in the constitutional interpretation of religious freedom? This article seeks to answer these conceptual and substantive questions by comparing constitutional case law on religious freedom from India, Israel and the United States. It also provides linkages to ongoing processes of (alleged) constitutional retrogression in the three jurisdictions.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 10-07-2017
DOI: 10.1093/HRLR/NGX016
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Date: 29-09-2023
Publisher: Brill
Date: 14-06-2016
DOI: 10.1163/18710328-12341301
Abstract: When civil servants conscientiously refuse to register same-sex marriages, a clash arises between freedom of religion and same-sex equality. The scholarly world is ided on the optimal way to tackle this human rights clash. States, however, are not. Courts and legislators in the us , the uk and the Netherlands—among others—have decisively and unequivocally sided with same-sex equality. This article contributes to the debate by presenting an alternative to existing scholarly analyses, which the author finds wanting. The primary aim is to offer a coherent account of the relevant practice in the uk and the Netherlands. The article’s core argument is that this practice is best understood in terms of the limits of toleration in liberal States. The author argues, in particular, that the uk courts and Dutch legislators have drawn those limits at the point where civil servants cause same-sex couples expressive harm.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 06-08-2013
DOI: 10.1093/HRLR/NGT020
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 21-10-2016
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 02-06-2022
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 02-2023
DOI: 10.1093/OJLR/RWAC010
Abstract: The principle of state neutrality vis-à-vis religion and belief is contested and illusive. Some scholars even label it an impossible principle. Nevertheless, the meanings and functions assigned to neutrality are often determinative of, among others, the scope of the right to manifest one’s religion in public institutions. Focusing on recent developments in Europe, this article makes two claims: one conceptual and the other doctrinal. The conceptual claim is that neutrality can be deployed either as a shield to protect freedom of religion and belief or as a sword to strike religious claims down. Given that lawmakers and policymakers in Europe are increasingly relying on the second function of neutrality, the article goes on to evaluate how the courts have responded. The doctrinal claim of the article is that courts can engage—and have engaged—with the neutrality argument in three ways: (i) through deference to other interpreters of neutrality (ii) through substantive interpretation of the neutrality principle and (iii) through circumvention of the neutrality argument. The article suggests that the third approach may well be preferable.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 2019
DOI: 10.1093/OJLS/GQZ007
No related grants have been discovered for Stijn Smet.