ORCID Profile
0000-0003-0709-3943
Current Organisation
Griffith University
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Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 13-10-2020
Abstract: This flowchart gives an indication of the kinds of factors that influence the application of international law to uncrewed maritime vehicles. It sets out some of the requirements imposed by treaties in order to access certain rights. As many of the treaties assume there will be people on-board the device, it is unclear if and how UMVs will be able to meet these treaty requirements. There is debate amongst international and maritime lawyers about how strictly the treaties should be read.
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 18-03-2023
Abstract: States have long trespassed on the territory of other States to carry out surveillance. However, new technology is changing the stakes of these incursions: uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and uncrewed maritime vehicles (UMVs) used for surveillance can trespass in the territory of another State without risk to the lives of the agents of the deploying State. In addition, States appear to be more willing to capture or destroy trespassing uncrewed vehicles. This paper assesses whether these developments suggest there is a basis to denying trespassing uncrewed devices sovereign immunity from the enforcement jurisdiction of territorial States. It argues that while uncrewed devices (like other forms of military property used for non-commercial purposes) are entitled to sovereign immunity, they can lose that immunity through their conduct, including by trespassing on the territory of another State. This allows for the territorial State to exercise enforcement jurisdiction, including the destruction of the device, over the UAV or UMV.
Publisher: Brill
Date: 26-05-2023
DOI: 10.1163/22116001-03701008
Abstract: On 16 September 2021, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US), announced the AUKUS arrangement, a security agreement which provides a framework for nuclear-powered submarine technology to be shared by the US and the UK with Australia, as well as other forms of new military technology. This article explores the legal im-plications of this alliance and the increase in technological sharing and maritime cooperation it promises. It first provides an overview of the AUKUS arrangement, situating it within the long history of cooperation be-tween these three countries. It then considers how international law regu-lates the sharing of maritime military technology, contrasting the significant constraints on sharing nuclear technology with the minimal restrictions on sharing non-nuclear technology. Lastly, the legal implications of States working closely together on the ocean are addressed. While there might be military and strategic advantages to this close collaboration, when and how States might be complicit in the international wrongs of partner States and the challenge that can be posed by legal interoperability are explored.
Publisher: Brill
Date: 26-10-2021
DOI: 10.1163/18781527-BJA10036
Abstract: The obligations of international humanitarian law are not limited to the attacker the defender is also required to take steps to protect civilians from harm. The requirement to take precautions against the effects of attack requires the defender to minimize the risk that civilians and civilian objects will be harmed by enemy military operations. At its most basic, it obliges defenders to locate military installations away from civilians. Furthermore, where appropriate, the status of objects should be clearly marked. It is – somewhat counterintuitively – about making it easier for the attacker to select lawful targets by making visible the distinction between civilian objects and military objectives. The increasing importance of digital infrastructure to modern life may make complying with these precautionary obligations more complicated. Maintaining separation between military and civilian networks is challenging as both operate using at least some of the same infrastructure, relying on the same cables, systems, and electromagnetic spectrum. In addition, the speed at which operations against digital infrastructure can occur increases the difficulty of complying with the obligation – particularly if such operations involve a degree of automation or the use of artificial intelligence ( ai ). This paper sets out the source and extent of the obligation to take precautions against hostile military operations and considers how they might apply to digital infrastructure. As well as clarifying the extent of the obligation, it applies the obligation to take precautions against hostile military operations to digital infrastructure, giving ex les of where systems designers are taking these obligations into account, and other ex les of where they must.
Publisher: Centre for Defence Research
Date: 07-2022
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 08-06-2023
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 08-11-2020
Publisher: Brill
Date: 10-05-2023
DOI: 10.1163/15718107-BJA10062
Abstract: States have long trespassed on the territory of other States to carry out surveillance. However, new technologies are changing the stakes of these incursions: uncrewed aerial vehicles ( uav s) and uncrewed maritime vehicles ( umv s) used for surveillance can trespass in on foreign territory without risk to their operators. In addition, States appear to be more willing to capture or destroy trespassing uncrewed vehicles. This paper assesses whether these developments suggest there is a basis to denying trespassing uncrewed devices sovereign immunity from the enforcement jurisdiction of territorial States. It argues that while uncrewed devices (like other forms of military property used for non-commercial purposes) are entitled to sovereign immunity, they can lose that immunity through their conduct, including by trespassing on the territory of another State. This allows for the territorial State to exercise enforcement jurisdiction, including the use of force, over the uav or umv .
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 20-10-2022
Abstract: On 16 September 2021, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US), announced the AUKUS arrangement: ‘an enhanced trilateral security partnership’ with a focus on the Indo-Pacific, which, most significantly, provides a framework for nuclear-powered submarine technology to be shared by the US and UK with Australia. This paper will explores some of the legal implications of the increase in technological sharing and enhanced maritime cooperation promised by the AUKUS alliance. It discusses some of the legal risks of the close cooperation envisaged by the AUKUS arrangement. It considers how international law regulates (or fails to regulate) the sharing of military technology used on and in the ocean. It will set out the significant constraints on sharing nuclear technology and consider how this applies to the nuclear submarines promised to Australia. In contrast, it will show that international law has very little to say about the sharing by States of non-nuclear technology relating to other seafaring and undersea military activities, such as those enabled by autonomous technologies, equipped with quantum sensors or computing, and supported by cyber technology. The paper also addresses the legal implications of States working closely together on the ocean. The AUKUS deal seems to envisage much closer operational cooperation between the three countries: not only relying on the same raw intelligence to make decisions (as they do now) but leveraging new maritime technologies to operate seamlessly alongside one another. While there might be military and strategic advantages to this close collaboration, there are legal risks and States might be complicit in the international wrongs of partner States
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2021
DOI: 10.1017/S2044251321000011
Abstract: The development of uncrewed maritime vehicles [UMVs] has the potential to increase the scale of military maritime surveillance in the exclusive economic zones of foreign coastal states. This paper considers the legal implications of the expanded use of UMVs for this purpose. It shows how features of the legal regime—namely how its application depends on determining the intent of a vessel's operation (to distinguish marine scientific research from military surveillance), as well the obligation to have due regard—have a “dynamic” quality that will pose a challenge to UMVs operated by autonomous technology. The legal obligations will require equipping UMVs with the capacity to communicate something about their identity, the purpose of their mission, and to be able to have some capacity to be responsive to the economic and environmental interests of the coastal state.
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 17-11-2022
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 11-08-2020
Abstract: [Law and the Future of War Research Paper No 3] Armed forces around the world are rapidly developing un-crewed maritime vehicles (UMVs) for use in military operations. Key to the strategic value of UMVs is that they will have no people on board, and instead be remotely controlled or, in the future, will be able to carry out some or all of their mission autonomously. But will they fit into the existing categories of the law of the sea set out in the in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)? This paper considers whether two of the basic classifications of this body of law – being categorised as a ‘ship’ or ‘vessel’ and being a ‘warship’ – require people to be on board the vehicle and thus exclude UMVs. These categories are critical for the distribution of rights and obligations in the UNCLOS. Failing to qualify as a ship would significantly limit the strategic value of UMVs, restricting their navigational rights and possibly preventing states claiming sovereign immunity. Along with the important practical implications of these definitional challenges, they also serve as an ex le of when an evolutionary interpretation of international treaty law should be preferred. The paper shows that the better interpretation of ship in UNCLOS is capacious enough to include both remotely controlled and autonomous UMVs. However, the more restrictive definitional requirements of warship in UNCLOS will be more difficult for UMVs to meet.
No related grants have been discovered for Simon McKenzie.