ORCID Profile
0000-0002-5092-8419
Does something not look right? The information on this page has been harvested from data sources that may not be up to date. We continue to work with information providers to improve coverage and quality. To report an issue, use the Feedback Form.
In Research Link Australia (RLA), "Research Topics" refer to ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes. These topics are either sourced from ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes listed in researchers' related grants or generated by a large language model (LLM) based on their publications.
Philosophy | Metaphysics | Philosophy Of Language | Metaphysics | Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition) | Philosophy of Language | Epistemology | History and Philosophy of Science (incl. Non-historical Philosophy of Science)
Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies | Other |
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 16-02-2023
DOI: 10.1111/PHIB.12292
Abstract: Many philosophers have become sceptical of the use of thought experiments in theorising about personal identity. In large part, this is due to work in experimental philosophy that appears to confirm long‐held philosophical suspicions that thought experiments elicit inconsistent judgements about personal identity and hence judgements that are thought to be the product of cognitive biases. If so, these judgements appear to be useless at informing our theories of personal identity. Using the methods of experimental philosophy, we investigate whether people exhibit inconsistent judgements and, if they do, whether these judgements are likely to be the source of cognitive bias or, instead, sensitivity to some relevant factor. We do not find that people's judgements are sensitive to any of the factors we investigate (relevant or irrelevant), nor that people have inconsistent judgements across cases. Rather, people's judgements are best explained by them having a very minimal account of what it takes for a person to survive. Since this pattern of judgements is no reason to think that we are subject to cognitive bias, we see no reason, as things stand, to be sceptical of our judgements.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 28-09-2020
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 26-11-2018
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 21-12-2016
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-2021
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 22-07-2022
DOI: 10.1111/PHPR.12819
Abstract: Philosophers vigorously debate the rationality of hedonic bias toward the future : a systematic preference for pleasurable experiences to be future and painful experiences to be past. The debate over future bias is distinctive in philosophy because arguments made on both sides concern descriptive and empirically tractable claims about patterns of preferences and the psychological mechanisms that could explain these patterns. Most notably, philosophers predict that this bias is strong enough to apply to unequal payoffs : people often prefer less pleasurable future experiences to more pleasurable past ones, and more painful past experiences to less painful future ones. They also predict that future‐bias is restricted to first‐person preferences, and that people’s third‐person preferences are time‐neutral. These claims feature in arguments both for and against the rational permissibility of future bias. Thus, we aimed to test whether these claims are descriptively accurate. Among our discoveries, we found that the predicted asymmetry between first‐ and third‐person conditions is absent, and so cannot support arguments against the rationality of future‐bias. We also uncovered an asymmetry between positive and negative events that might ground a new argument in favour of time‐neutralism.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-2023
DOI: 10.1007/S11229-023-04045-1
Abstract: Empirical evidence shows that people have multiple time-biases. One is near-bias another is future-bias. Philosophical theorising about these biases often proceeds on two assumptions. First, that the two biases are independent : that they are explained by different factors (the independence assumption). Second, that there is a normative asymmetry between the two biases: one is rationally impermissible (near-bias) and the other rationally permissible (future-bias). The former assumption at least partly feeds into the latter: if the two biases were not explained by different factors, then it would be less plausible that their normative statuses differ. This paper investigates the independence assumption and finds it unwarranted. In light of this, we argue, there is reason to question the normative asymmetry assumption.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 27-11-2019
DOI: 10.1007/S11098-019-01374-1
Abstract: What distinguishes causation from grounding? One suggestion is that causation, but not grounding, occurs over time. Recently, however, counterex les to this simple temporal criterion have been offered. In this paper, we situate the temporal criterion within a broader framework that focuses on two aspects: locational overlapping in space and time and the presence of intermediaries in space and time. We consider, and reject, the idea that the difference between grounding and causation is that grounding can occur without intermediaries. We go on to use the fact that grounding and causation both involve intermediaries to develop a better temporal criterion for distinguishing causation from grounding. The criterion is this: when a cause and effect are spatially disjoint, there is always a chain of causal intermediaries between the cause and the effect that are extended in time. By contrast, when the grounds and the grounded are spatially disjoint, there is always a chain of grounding intermediaries, but the chain need not be extended in time, it can be purely spatial. The difference between grounding and causation, then, is that causation requires time for chaining in a way that grounding does not.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 26-11-2013
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2020
Abstract: It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that most people unambiguously have a phenomenology as of time passing, and that this is a datum that philosophical theories must accommodate. Moreover, it has been assumed that the greater the extent to which people have said phenomenology, the more likely they are to endorse a dynamical theory of time. This paper is the first to empirically test these assumptions. Surprisingly, our results do not support either assumption. One experiment instead found the reverse correlation: people were more likely to report having passage phenomenology if they endorsed a non-dynamical theory of time. Given that people do not have an unambiguous phenomenology as of time passing, we conclude that this is suggestive evidence in favor of veridical non-dynamism—the view that our phenomenology is veridical, and that it does not unambiguously represent that time passes. Instead, our phenomenology veridically has some quite different content.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-01-2021
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 10-01-2022
DOI: 10.1111/PHIB.12258
Abstract: This article introduces a non‐cognitivist account of metaphysical explanation according to which the core function of judgements of the form ⌜x because y⌝ is not to state truth‐apt beliefs. Instead, their core function is to express attitudes of commitment to , and recommendation of the acceptance of certain norms governing interventional conduct at contexts.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 08-2021
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 24-06-2022
DOI: 10.1111/PHC3.12859
Abstract: All else being equal, most of us typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future rather than the past and negative experiences in the past rather than the future. Recent empirical evidence tends not only to support the idea that people have these preferences, but further, that people tend to prefer more painful experiences in their past rather than fewer in their future (and mutatis mutandis for pleasant experiences). Are such preferences rationally permissible, or are they, as time‐neutralists contend, rationally impermissible? And what is it that grounds their having the normative status that they do have? We consider two sorts of arguments regarding the normative status of future‐biased preferences. The first appeals to the supposed arbitrariness of these preferences, and the second appeals to their upshot. We evaluate these arguments in light of the recent empirical research on future‐bias.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 26-09-2019
DOI: 10.1111/PHPR.12637
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 26-07-2019
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 18-02-2020
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 23-02-2018
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 11-01-2022
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 04-08-2022
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 24-07-2015
DOI: 10.1111/PHC3.12244
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2013
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819112000526
Abstract: This paper seeks to differentiate negative properties from positive properties, with the aim of providing the groundwork for further discussion about whether there is anything that corresponds to either of these notions. We differentiate negative and positive properties in terms of their functional role, before drawing out the metaphysical implications of proceeding in this fashion. We show that if the difference between negative and positive properties tabled here is correct, then negative properties are metaphysically contentious entities, entities that many philosophers will be unwilling to countenance.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 27-09-2017
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 18-03-2019
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 13-08-2019
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-07-2019
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 22-10-2021
DOI: 10.1111/SJP.12441
Abstract: This article empirically investigates the contention that the folk concept of time is a functional concept: a concept according to which time is whatever plays a certain functional role or roles. This hypothesis could explain why, in previous research, surprisingly large percentages of participants judge that there is time at worlds that contain no one‐dimensional substructure of ordered instants. If it seems to participants that even in those worlds the relevant functional role is played, then this could explain why they judge that there is time in those worlds. While our experiment supported the finding that participants are reticent to judge that there is actually no time, we found no evidence that this is because they deploy a functionalist concept, at least of the kind proposed in recent research. Our findings are, however, consistent with the folk deploying a much more minimal functionalist concept according to which time is just whatever it is—regardless of its nature—that plays the role of grounding our temporal phenomenology.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 04-2019
DOI: 10.1111/META.12352
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 22-03-2020
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 22-07-2021
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2015
DOI: 10.1111/HYPA.12150
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-12-2014
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2019
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19000384
Abstract: Hoerl & McCormack (H& M) posit two systems – the temporal updating system and the temporal reasoning system – and suggest that they explain an inherent contradiction in people's naïve theory of time. We suggest there is no contradiction. Something does, however, require explanation: the tension between certain sophisticated beliefs about time, and certain phenomenological states or beliefs about those phenomenological states. The temporal updating mechanism posited by H& M may contribute to this tension.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 17-04-2020
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 25-08-2017
DOI: 10.1111/PHIB.12105
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-2022
DOI: 10.1007/S11229-022-03514-3
Abstract: People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we might conclude that they are irrational. This paper investigates one hypothesis, according to which future-bias is (at least partially) explained by our having a phenomenology that we describe, or conceive of, as being as of time robustly passing. We empirically tested this hypothesis and found no evidence in its favour. Our results present a puzzle, however, when compared with the results of an earlier study. We conclude that although robust passage phenomenology on its own probably does not explain future-bias, having this phenomenology and taking it to be veridical may contribute to future-bias.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-09-2023
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-03-2014
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 30-08-2019
DOI: 10.1111/PHIB.12165
No related organisations have been discovered for Kristie Miller.
Start Date: 07-2017
End Date: 06-2023
Amount: $901,056.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 07-2011
End Date: 12-2017
Amount: $575,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 07-2006
End Date: 03-2009
Amount: $223,020.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 02-2009
End Date: 12-2013
Amount: $109,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 06-2018
End Date: 04-2024
Amount: $200,232.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded Activity