ORCID Profile
0000-0002-2291-8897
Current Organisation
University of Tokyo
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Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 11-2013
Publisher: Springer Japan
Date: 2007
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 24-04-2013
DOI: 10.1093/SSJJ/JYT003
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-07-2019
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 06-2022
DOI: 10.1093/SSJJ/JYAC010
Abstract: Nearly 30 years have passed since the government of Japan unveiled its first Official Development Assistance Charter. Although it sets forth fundamental guidelines for the government’s foreign aid policy, previous studies have downplayed the influence of the ODA Charter. By contrast, this study argues that the ODA Charter changed Japan’s aid allocation behavior in relation to a number of issues. First, regarding military matters: since the introduction of the 1992 ODA Charter, testing of weapons of mass destruction by developing nations, as well as military expenditures for conventional weaponry by developing nations outside of Asia, have had a negative effect on aid from Japan. Non-military cooperation with military personnel was newly introduced as a principle in the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter, and that type of cooperation increased from 2015 on, a clear indication of the influence of the Charter. Foreign aid designed to serve Japan’s own interests was first discussed in the 2003 Charter, and the proportion of that type of aid has since increased. The aims of avoiding military force and returning economic benefits to Japan, which have long had strong domestic support in postwar Japan, were seamlessly incorporated into the ODA Charter. By contrast, the aims of promoting democratization and protecting the vulnerable—international norms for foreign aid, imported from abroad—are duly set forth in the ODA Charter, which ostensibly guides Japan’s foreign aid policy, but they have had no impact on its actual aid allocation behavior.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 19-06-2014
DOI: 10.1093/CDJ/BST039
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 09-2020
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 20-09-2010
DOI: 10.1093/SSJJ/JYQ046
Publisher: Pacific Affairs
Date: 09-2009
DOI: 10.5509/2009823385
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 06-07-2022
DOI: 10.1177/20578911221108798
Abstract: This study discusses the relationship between the time pressure faced by policymakers when an international military-security crisis breaks out and the consequences of the crisis. If a policy is decided too quickly, decision-makers do not have the ability to consider enough alternatives and information, which lowers the chances of averting a crisis. Moreover, if too much time is taken in deliberating, an international crisis may heat up and the chance to potentially come up with an optimal policy at the right time may be missed. The article takes a mixed methods approach using quantitative data and three case studies. The International Crisis Behavior (ICB, version 13) dataset was used to identify the time spent in making policy decisions to respond to an international crisis and the consequences of the crisis, for the period 1918–2013. Also, three actual international crises were analyzed: Russia's annexation of Crimea and Donbas, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Korean War. The quantitative results and the case analyses indicate that a third alternative, a medium time span, allows for careful deliberation and sufficient information gathering to occur, and decision-makers may thereby avoid an international crisis.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 08-02-2022
DOI: 10.1017/S1468109922000019
Abstract: There is a consensus that the post-war Japanese foreign policy is based on the Yoshida Doctrine or Yoshida Line , which refers to the strategies of former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who relied upon US military security, and maintained limited defense forces while focusing on economic recovery and growth. This paper reconsidered the Yoshida Doctrine, referencing multiple related arguments and evidence, reaching a conclusion that post-war Japanese foreign policy should not be called the Yoshida Doctrine or Yoshida Line. The Yoshida Doctrine is an analytical concept created by researchers in the 1980s to justify Japanese foreign policy. This was done in response to the domestic and foreign criticism of low-level military spending, despite the flourishing economy. The Yoshida Doctrine differs from other foreign policy doctrines and has no merit for being called a doctrine. Furthermore, the ideas supporting this doctrine are not based on definitive proof rather, they merely represent Yoshida's image, and a spurious correlation, drawn between limited defense spending and high-economic growth. The analysis carried out in this study reveals that the Yoshida Doctrine is fundamentally flawed. As a result, this study insists that it is necessary to abandon the Yoshida Doctrine as a base for future research on Japanese diplomacy.
No related grants have been discovered for Hiroyuki Hoshiro.