ORCID Profile
0000-0003-1825-4167
Current Organisation
Monash University
Does something not look right? The information on this page has been harvested from data sources that may not be up to date. We continue to work with information providers to improve coverage and quality. To report an issue, use the Feedback Form.
In Research Link Australia (RLA), "Research Topics" refer to ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes. These topics are either sourced from ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes listed in researchers' related grants or generated by a large language model (LLM) based on their publications.
Comparative Government and Politics | Political Science | International Relations | Communication Studies | Australian Government and Politics
Political Systems | Civics and Citizenship | The Media | International Political Economy (excl. International Trade) | International Organisations |
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 06-06-2017
DOI: 10.1111/AJPS.12313
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 11-07-2014
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 02-2003
DOI: 10.1177/1043463103015001071
Abstract: Two approaches to research on policy implementation are compared in this article. In the first approach, corresponding with the multi-stage view, implementation is understood as a sub-process requiring specific tools of analysis such as principal-agent theory. In the other approach, which we label the political bargaining view, implementation is seen as an integral part of the policy debate that occurs when political decisions are taken. Using data on the implementation of decisions taken in three Dutch local authorities, we show how the different views can be tested using models. We compare the predictions of agency performances made by bargaining models with those made by implementation models. The results show that the models of political bargaining produce significantly less accurate predictions of agency performances than the implementation models, suggesting that implementation is best understood as a distinct stage of the policy process.
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2016
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 10-07-2016
Abstract: Party cohesion in legislatures is a topic of longstanding concern to political scientists because cohesion facilitates democratic representation. We examine the cohesion of transnational party groups in the European Parliament, which is part of the EU’s bicameral system, and study the oftentimes competing pressures to which MEPs are subject from their EP party groups and national governments. Our explanation focuses on the conditions under which MEPs take policy positions that differ from those of their party groups. We propose that national governments lobby their national MEPs more intensely on issues of high national salience and on which they are in a weak bargaining position in the Council. The analyses offer a unique approach to the study of party cohesion that is based on the policy positions taken by each national delegation of MEPs in each of the three main party groups and national governments on specific controversial issues.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 06-2010
Abstract: What impact do leaders in the European Parliament’s (EP) committees have on the EP’s opinions? This study formulates and tests expectations about the conditions under which rapporteurs influence the EP’s opinions and also about what factors motivate that influence. In line with the informational theory of legislative committees, the most important factor affecting the EP’s opinion is the policy position of the median MEP, not a characteristic of the rapporteur. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that rapporteurs influence the EP’s opinions when legislative proposals are subject to early agreements under the co-decision procedure and when the consultation procedure applies. Rapporteurs’ influence is motivated primarily by national interests, rather than by the interests of their EP party groups.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 09-03-2017
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 02-2003
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 10-2001
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 02-2003
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 25-02-2004
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 31-10-2008
Abstract: This article examines the conditions under which the policy positions of an international organization correspond to the positions of relevant national actors. The commission of the European Union (EU) is often portrayed as an autonomous supranational actor, insulated from national interests. Recent analyses question this view, arguing that the commission is an agent in a principal—agent relationship with member states. The author formulates hypotheses on the conditions under which commissioners' nationalities affect the relative level of agreement between the commission and different member states' positions. The hypotheses are tested with more than 2,000 observations relating to 70 controversial proposals for legislation introduced by the commission from 1996 to 2000. In line with one of the hypotheses, under qualified majority voting in the council, there is relatively high agreement between the commission's positions and the positions of the home member states of the commissioners primarily responsible for drafting the legislative proposals.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 03-2004
Abstract: Although shifts in policy positions are a fundamental feature of the European Union (EU) bargaining process they have not yet been studied systematically. This article provides evidence on the extent to which position shifts occur and tests alternative models of the bargaining process that predict such shifts. We examine a subset of the DEU data set that contains information on shifts in actors’ positions on issues raised by 28 Commission proposals. The three bargaining models presented here posit alternative mechanisms that drive actors’ position shifts during the EU bargaining process. Our research shows that position shifts occur frequently during the EU bargaining process and these shifts in actors’ policy positions are best understood in terms of compromise and exchange among actors.
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2008
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 03-2004
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-2008
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 11-2013
Publisher: Cogitatio
Date: 08-09-2016
Abstract: We examine the negotiations held under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change in Paris, December 2015. Prior to these negotiations, there was considerable uncertainty about whether an agreement would be reached, particularly given that the world’s leaders failed to do so in the 2009 negotiations held in Copenhagen. Amid this uncertainty, we applied three different methods to predict the outcomes: an expert survey and two negotiation simulation models, namely the Exchange Model and the Predictioneer’s Game. After the event, these predictions were assessed against the coded texts that were agreed in Paris. The evidence suggests that combining experts’ predictions to reach a collective expert prediction makes for significantly more accurate predictions than in idual experts’ predictions. The differences in the performance between the two different negotiation simulation models were not statistically significant.
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2008
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 14-09-2006
Abstract: European legislation affects countless aspects of daily life in modern Europe but just how does the European Union make such significant legislative decisions? How important are the formal decision-making procedures in defining decision outcomes and how important is the bargaining that takes place among the actors involved? Using a combination of detailed evidence and theoretical rigour, this volume addresses these questions and others that are central to understanding how the EU works in practice. It focuses on the practice of day-to-day decision-making in Brussels and the interactions that take place among the Member States in the Council and among the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. A unique data set of actual Commission proposals are examined against which the authors develop, apply and test a range of explanatory models of decision-making, exemplifying how to study decision-making in other political systems using advanced theoretical tools and appropriate research design.
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Date: 2011
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 11-2007
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 14-09-2006
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 14-09-2006
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 14-09-2006
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 12-2010
Abstract: Are member states less likely to transpose a European Union directive correctly if they disagreed with the directive at the decision-making stage? Existing research provides mixed answers to this question. Most of this research does not consider the role of the enforcement agent, the European Commission, and uses aggregate measures. By contrast, this study considers the impact of the Commission, and focuses on specific provisions in directives. It combines detailed information on states’ disagreement with each provision at the decision-making stage and the quality of national transposition of each provision. The descriptive analysis shows that protracted non-compliance in national transposition is a rare event. The explanatory analysis indicates that states’ policy preferences significantly affect the likelihood of transposition problems, and that this is conditioned by the behaviour of the Commission.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 05-2012
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 29-06-2011
Abstract: When the chambers of a bicameral legislature must negotiate to reach a decision outcome, the bargaining strength of each side is affected by the composition of its negotiating delegations. We examine some of the implications of this proposition for legislative negotiations between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers. We develop and test hypotheses on how the bargaining success of the EP is affected by the choice of its chief negotiator, the rapporteur. Our findings support the argument that negotiators in a bicameral setting play a ‘two-level game’, where bargaining strength is shaped by the degree to which negotiators can credibly claim to be constrained by their parent chamber.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 27-10-2021
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 27-10-2021
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 05-2008
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-2013
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-11-2021
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 25-02-2016
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 26-06-2018
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 18-09-2007
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123407000373
Abstract: What impact does the negotiation stage prior to the adoption of international agreements have on the subsequent implementation stage? We address this question by examining the linkages between decision making on European Union directives and any subsequent infringements and delays in national transposition. We formulate a preference-based explanation of failures to comply, which focuses on states' incentives to deviate and the amount of discretion granted to states. This is compared with state-based explanations that focus on country-specific characteristics. Infringements are more likely when states disagree with the content of directives and the directives provide them with little discretion. Granting discretion to member states, however, tends to lead to longer delays in transposition. We find no evidence of country-specific effects.
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
Date: 2019
DOI: 10.3998/MPUB.9796088
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 06-2006
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 15-09-2011
Abstract: How does the EU resolve controversy when making laws that affect citizens? How has the EU been affected by the recent enlargements that brought its membership to a erse group of twenty-seven countries? This book answers these questions with analyses of the EU's legislative system that include the roles played by the European Commission, European Parliament and member states' national governments in the Council of Ministers. Robert Thomson examines more than 300 controversial issues in the EU from the past decade and describes many cases of controversial decision-making as well as rigorous comparative analyses. The analyses test competing expectations regarding key aspects of the political system, including the policy demands made by different institutions and member states, the distributions of power among the institutions and member states, and the contents of decision outcomes. These analyses are also highly relevant to the EU's democratic deficit and various reform proposals.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 10-12-2019
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 25-02-2016
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 21-10-2019
Abstract: We assess the impact of the United Kingdom’s 2016 decision to leave the European Union on the Council of the European Union, where Brexit is likely to have the clearest observable implications. Using concepts and models from the spatial model of politics and network analysis, we formulate and test expectations regarding the effects of Brexit. We examine two of the most prominent datasets on recent decision-making in the European Union, which include data on cooperation networks among member states before and after the 2016 referendum. Our findings identify some of the political challenges that Brexit will bring, but also highlight the factors that are already helping the European Union’s remaining member states to adapt to Brexit.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 22-09-2015
DOI: 10.1111/GOVE.12119
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 14-11-2017
Abstract: We test two of the main explanations of the formation of political ties. The first states that political actors are more likely to form a relationship if they have similar policy preferences. The second explanation, from network theory, predicts that the likelihood of a tie between two actors depends on the presence of certain relationships with other actors. Our data consist of a unique combination of actors' policy positions and their network relations over time in the Council of the European Union. We find evidence that both types of explanations matter, although there seems to be variation in the extent to which preference similarity affects network evolution. We consider the implications of these findings for understanding the decision-making in the Council.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 19-03-2018
Abstract: The principle that parties should make policy commitments during election c aigns and fulfil those commitments if elected is central to the idea of promissory representation. This study examines citizens’ evaluations of promise keeping and breaking. We focus on two aspects of trust as explanations of citizens’ evaluations. When trust is defined in terms of mistrust, it implies that vigilant and well-informed citizens base their evaluations on what governments deliver. When trust is defined in terms of distrust, it implies that citizens use heuristic thinking when evaluating governing parties’ performance, regardless of what those parties do. Our evidence is from a survey experiment in the British Election Study, which asked respondents to evaluate whether governing parties fulfilled specific election pledges made during the previous election c aign. The findings indicate that both mistrust and distrust affect citizens’ evaluations.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-2009
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 03-09-2011
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123410000268
Abstract: Three perspectives on delegation in the European Union are presented in this article. The transaction-costs perspective focuses on information asymmetries between policy makers and implementers. According to the commitment perspective, policy makers delegate authority as a solution to commitment problems. The consensus-building perspective views the decision to delegate as a trade-off between decisiveness and inclusiveness during the bargaining process. Hypotheses are derived from these perspectives regarding the amount of delegation to both the European Commission and to member states in legislation. From detailed information on eighty-six EU laws, there is some evidence for the transaction-costs perspective as an explanation of delegation to the Commission. With respect to delegation to member states, there is some evidence for both the transaction-costs perspective and the consensus-building perspective.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 2009
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 10-07-2022
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 2001
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2008
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 18-09-2013
Abstract: Previous studies found that models emphasising legislative procedures make less accurate predictions of decision outcomes in the EU than the compromise model, a computationally simple variant of the Nash Bargaining Solution. In this journal, Slapin (2014) argues that this and other findings may be the result of measurement error. While acknowledging the importance of measurement error, we disagree with several assumptions in Slapin’s analysis, and show that his results are driven by an unrealistic assumption about how policy preferences are distributed among EU decision makers. We construct simulated data that more accurately reflect the distributions of policy preferences found in existing empirical evidence and suggested by theory, and demonstrate that measurement error is unlikely to have biased previous findings. If real-world decision-making took place according to the procedural model, then it would have made the most accurate predictions, even with data containing large amounts of measurement error. While this strengthens our confidence in previous studies’ findings, we explain why we should not discard procedural models.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 22-09-2009
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 05-09-2022
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Start Date: 05-2021
End Date: 05-2024
Amount: $254,017.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2020
End Date: 09-2023
Amount: $192,662.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded Activity