Jingjing Zhang

Do the Number of Appropriators from the Commons Matter in Controlled Laboratory Environments?

Publisher: Elsevier BV

Date: 2017

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2988949

Same process, different outcomes: group performance in an acquiring a company experiment

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Date: 22-09-2015

DOI: 10.1007/S10683-015-9467-7

HOW GROUPS REACH AGREEMENT IN RISKY CHOICES: AN EXPERIMENT

Publisher: Wiley

Date: 08-02-2011

DOI: 10.1111/J.1465-7295.2010.00362.X

Defaults and cognitive effort

Publisher: Elsevier BV

Date: 08-2023

DOI: 10.1016/J.JEBO.2023.05.020

Noisy Introspection in the 11–20 Game

Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)

Date: 07-08-2017

DOI: 10.1111/ECOJ.12479

Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Date: 02-03-2017

DOI: 10.1007/S10683-017-9519-2

The WSPC Reference on Natural Resources and Environmental Policy in the Era of Global Change

Publisher: WORLD SCIENTIFIC

Date: 2016

DOI: 10.1142/9747

Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Date: 03-12-2009

DOI: 10.1007/S00355-009-0434-0

Communication & competition

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Date: 08-10-2013

DOI: 10.1007/S10683-013-9376-6

THREE‐PLAYER TRUST GAME WITH INSIDER COMMUNICATION

Publisher: Wiley

Date: 28-03-2013

DOI: 10.1111/ECIN.12018

Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games

Publisher: Elsevier BV

Date: 09-2012

DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2012.05.001

The Effects of Communication on the Partnership Solution to the Commons

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Date: 22-03-2017

DOI: 10.1007/S10640-017-0124-9

One man, one bid

Publisher: Elsevier BV

Date: 2017

DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2016.10.003

Improving on Simple Majority Voting by Alternative Voting Mechanisms

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Date: 30-01-2020

DOI: 10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.473

Abstract: Majority voting is the predominant mechanism for collective decision making. It is used in a broad range of applications, spanning from national referenda to small group decision making. It is simple, transparent, and induces voters to vote sincerely. However, it is increasingly recognized that it has some weaknesses. First of all, majority voting may lead to inefficient outcomes. This happens because it does not allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences. As a result, an indifferent majority may win over an intense minority. In addition, majority voting suffers from the “tyranny of the majority,” i.e., the risk of repeatedly excluding minority groups from representation. A final drawback is the “winner-take-all” nature of majority voting, i.e., it offers no compensation for losing voters. Economists have recently proposed various alternative mechanisms that aim to produce more efficient and more equitable outcomes. These can be classified into three different approaches. With storable votes , voters allocate a budget of votes across several issues. Under vote trading , voters can exchange votes for money. Under linear voting or quadratic voting , voters can buy votes at a linear or quadratic cost respectively. The properties of different alternative mechanisms can be characterized using theoretical modeling and game theoretic analysis. Lab experiments are used to test theoretical predictions and evaluate their fitness for actual use in applications. Overall, these alternative mechanisms hold the promise to improve on majority voting but have their own shortcomings. Additional theoretical analysis and empirical testing is needed to produce a mechanism that robustly delivers efficient and equitable outcomes.

Intra-articular injection of orthobiologics in patients undergoing high tibial osteotomy for knee osteoarthritis is safe and effective – a systematic review

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Date: 27-09-2021

DOI: 10.1186/S40634-021-00387-2

Abstract: To qualitatively evaluate the current evidence reporting outcomes of intra-articular injection of orthobiologics in patients undergoing high tibial osteotomy (HTO) for osteoarthritis of the knee. A systematic search methodology of the PUBMED, EMBASE, and CINAHL databases was conducted in July 2021. The search workflow was in adherence to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA). The following inclusion criteria were adopted: clinical trials of any level of evidence, reporting outcomes following intra-articular injection of orthobiologics during high tibial osteotomy for knee osteoarthritis, with a minimum number of 10 patients treated. Duplicate data, studies on implanted orthobiologics and articles not written in English were excluded from this review. Eight studies were included in this review, with a total of 585 patients. Outcomes were discussed based on the types of orthobiologics used: (i) Platelet-Rich Plasma (PRP), (ii) Bone Marrow Aspirate Concentrate (BMAC), and (iii) Injected Mesenchymal Stem Cells (MSCs). Two studies utilised PRP, 4 studies utilised BMAC and 4 studies utilised injected MSCs.. Three studies provided Level II evidence and five studies provided Level III evidence. Statistically significant improvements in outcomes were documented in multiple trials, with few patients experiencing adverse events. Intra-articular injection of orthobiologics in patients undergoing HTO is safe and effective with good outcomes reported. Due to the lack of high-level evidence, further research is required before this can be considered standard of care. III

Sealed-bid versus ascending spectrum auctions

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Date: 26-05-2023

DOI: 10.1007/S10683-023-09805-X

Abstract: We compare the first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auction and the simultaneous multiple-round auction (SMRA) in an environment based on the recent sale of 900 MHz spectrum in Australia. Three bidders compete for five in isible items. Bidders can win at most three items and need to obtain at least two to achieve profitable scale, i.e. items are complements. Value complementarities, which are a common feature of spectrum auctions, exacerbate the “fitting problem” and undermine the usual logic for superior price discovery in the SMRA. We find that the FPSB outperforms the SMRA across a range of bidding environments: in terms of efficiency, revenue, and protecting bidders from losses due to the exposure problem. Moreover, the FPSB exhibits superior price discovery and almost always results in competitive (“core”) prices unlike the SMRA, which frequently produces prices that are too low because of demand-reduction or too high because of the exposure problem. We demonstrate the robustness of our findings by considering two-stage variants of the FPSB and SMRA as well as environments in which bidders know their own values but not the distributions from which values are drawn.

University Of Technology Sydney

Location: Australia

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RMIT University

Location: Australia

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Discovery Projects - Grant ID: DP190103475

Start Date: 2019

End Date: 12-2023

Amount: $174,000.00

Funder: Australian Research Council