ORCID Profile
0000-0003-0425-7711
Current Organisation
UNSW Sydney
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Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 23-05-2022
DOI: 10.1093/ISQ/SQAC018
Abstract: Pacifism in its purest form condemns all war without exception. Military abolitionism, by contrast, is the view that it is morally impermissible for states to create and maintain war-making institutions. One might assume that any moral objection to the existence of war-making institutions must, in the final analysis, be based on some moral objection to war itself. Against this, I show that that there are in fact several distinct types of military abolitionism. One of them—which I label pacifistic abolitionism—does indeed derive the wrongness of war preparation from a logically prior generalization that states are morally prohibited from everwaging war. All of the other types, however, are either silent on whether war can ever be justified, or they concede that it can be. I separate out five distinct types of non-pacifistic military abolitionism—procedural, prudential, liberal, progressive, and economic—before considering objections and devising replies. El pacifismo en su forma más pura condena todas las guerras, sin excepción. El abolicionismo militar, por el contrario, es la visión de que es moralmente inadmisible que los Estados creen y mantengan instituciones bélicas. Se podría suponer que cualquier objeción moral a la existencia de instituciones bélicas debe, en última instancia, basarse en alguna objeción moral a la propia guerra. En contra de esto, muestro que de hecho hay varios tipos distintos de abolicionismo militar. Uno de ellos, que denomino abolicionismo pacifista, se basa, en efecto, en el carácter erróneo de la preparación para la guerra de una generalización lógicamente previa de que los Estados tienen moralmente prohibido hacer la guerra. Sin embargo, todos los demás tipos no dicen nada sobre si la guerra puede estar justificada, o admiten que puede estarlo. Separo cinco tipos distintos de abolicionismo militar no pacifista (procedimental, prudencial, liberal, progresista y económico) antes de considerar las objeciones e idear las respuestas. Le pacifisme dans sa forme la plus pure condamne toutes les guerres sans exception. L'abolitionnisme militaire, en revanche, est l'opinion selon laquelle il est moralement inadmissible pour les États de créer et de maintenir des institutions de guerre. Nous pourrions supposer que toute objection morale à l'existence d'institutions de guerre devrait, au bout du compte, être impérativement fondée sur une objection morale à la guerre elle-même. Je montre au contraire qu'il existe en réalité plusieurs types distincts d'abolitionnisme militaire. L'un d'entre eux—que je qualifie d'abolitionnisme pacifiste—déduit effectivement l'immoralité de la préparation à la guerre d'une généralisation logique préalable selon laquelle il est en toute circonstance moralement interdit aux États de faire la guerre. Tous les autres types sont cependant silencieux sur la question de savoir si la guerre peut jamais être justifiée, soit ils concèdent qu'elle peut l’être. Je distingue cinq types d'abolitionnisme militaire non pacifiste—procédural, prudent, libéral, progressiste et économique—avant d'examiner les objections et d'envisager des réponses.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 18-05-2022
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2021
DOI: 10.1017/S0892679421000393
Abstract: Suppose it is foreseeable that you will soon encounter a drowning child, whom you will only be able to rescue if you learn to swim. In this scenario we might think that you have a “prospective duty” to take swimming lessons given that this will be necessary to perform the future rescue. Cécile Fabre argues that, by parity of reasoning, states have a prospective duty to build and maintain military establishments. My argument in this essay pulls in the opposite direction. First, I emphasize that learning to swim is only a prospective duty under very specific circumstances. Normally there is no such duty hence, we do not normally think that people deserve moral censure for choosing to forego swimming lessons. I then argue that, similarly, while a prospective duty to build a military can arise under some conceivable circumstances, these are not the circumstances that most states today find themselves in. I then suggest a more fitting domestic analogy to guide our thinking about this issue: Maintaining a standing army is less like learning to swim and more like keeping an assault weapon in the home “just in case.” This analogy supports a defeasible presumption against militarization.
No related grants have been discovered for Ned Dobos.