ORCID Profile
0000-0003-1199-340X
Current Organisation
UNSW Sydney
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Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-2020
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Date: 04-2009
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Date: 02-02-2022
DOI: 10.1086/718852
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-2020
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2017
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3024631
Publisher: arXiv
Date: 2022
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Date: 08-2011
DOI: 10.1086/661511
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 11-12-2017
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 11-2012
DOI: 10.1093/QJE/QJS026
Abstract: We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations . First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we prove that any extensive form mechanism is fragile in the sense that if a non-Maskin monotonic social objective can be implemented with this mechanism, then there are arbitrarily small information perturbations under which an undesirable sequential equilibrium also exists. Finally, we argue that outside options can help improve efficiency in asymmetric information environments, and that these options can be thought of as reflecting ownership of an asset.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2017
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2916394
Publisher: American Economic Association
Date: 03-2008
DOI: 10.1257/AER.98.1.113
Abstract: Standard intuitions for optimal gerrymandering involve concentrating one's extreme opponents in “unwinnable” districts (“packing”) and spreading one's supporters evenly over “winnable” districts (“cracking”). These intuitions come from models with either no uncertainty about voter preferences or only two voter types. In contrast, we characterize the solution to a problem in which a gerrymanderer observes a noisy signal of voter preferences from a continuous distribution and creates N districts of equal size to maximize the expected number of districts she wins. Under mild regularity conditions, we show that cracking is never optimal—one's most ardent supporters should be grouped together. Moreover, for sufficiently precise signals, the optimal solution involves creating a district that matches extreme “Republicans” with extreme “Democrats,” and then continuing to match toward the center of the signal distribution. (JEL D72)
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 26-09-2018
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 27-02-2012
Publisher: American Economic Association
Date: 11-2005
DOI: 10.1257/089533005775196688
Abstract: During the 1990s, the structure of pay for top corporate executives shifted markedly as the use of stock options greatly expanded. By the early 2000s, as the dot-com boom ended and the Nasdaq stock index melted down, these modern executive incentive schemes were being sharply questioned on many grounds—for encouraging excessive risk-taking and a short-run orientation, for being an overly costly and inefficient method of providing incentives, and even for tempting managers of firms like Enron, WorldCom and Tyco to commit fraud in order to ensure a high stock price at the time of exercise. This article examines executive incentive schemes developed by Du Pont and General Motors in the 1920s —the original incentive schemes linking executive compensation to stock prices. The author argues that these plans were well-designed to pre-empt and address many of the criticisms of modern-day executive stock option plans.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 18-03-2010
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 24-08-2018
DOI: 10.1093/JEEA/JVX026
Publisher: American Economic Association
Date: 05-2011
DOI: 10.1257/JEP.25.2.181
Abstract: Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart used the theory of incomplete contracts to develop answers to the question “What is a firm, and what determines its boundaries?” in their path-breaking paper on “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration” (Journal of Political Economy, 1986, vol. 94, no. 4). Perhaps the central issue is that economic actors are only boundedly rational and cannot anticipate all possible contingencies. It might well be that certain states of nature or actions cannot be verified by third parties after they arise, like certain qualities of a good to be traded in the future, and thus cannot be written into an enforceable contract. When contracts are incomplete, and consequently not all uses of an asset can be specified in advance, any contract negotiated in advance must leave some discretion over the use of the assets and the “owner” of the firm is the party to whom the residual rights of control have been allocated at the contracting stage. The optimal allocation of property rights—or governance structure—is one that minimizes efficiency losses. This produces a theory of ownership and vertical integration as well as a theory of the firm. First we spell out Grossman and Hart's argument using a simple numerical ex le. Then we show how the incomplete contracts approach can be used to analyze the firms' internal organization the firms' financial decisions the costs and benefits from privatization and the organization of international trade between inter- and intrafirm trade. We discuss several criticisms of the incomplete contracts roperty rights methodology and review recent developments of the incomplete contracts approach.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 11-2012
DOI: 10.1093/QJE/QJS033
Abstract: We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of firms, each consisting of a party who can reduce production cost and a party who can discover information about demand. Both parties can make specific investments at private cost, and there is a machine that either party can control. As in incomplete-contracting models, different governance structures (i.e., different allocations of control of the machine) create different incentives for the parties’ investments. As in rational-expectations models, some parties may invest in acquiring information, which is then incorporated into the market-clearing price of the intermediate good by these parties’ production decisions. The informativeness of the price mechanism affects the returns to specific investments and hence the optimal governance structure for in idual firms meanwhile, the governance choices by in idual firms affect the informativeness of the price mechanism. In equilibrium, the informativeness of the price mechanism can induce ex ante homogeneous firms to choose heterogeneous governance structures.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 07-2021
DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWAB004
Abstract: We study an agent’s incentives to discover where her talents lie before putting them to productive use. In our setting, an agent can specialize and learn about the same type of talent repeatedly, or experiment and learn about different types of talent. While experimentation is efficient for a range of distributions of talent and initial signals, labor-market institutions play a crucial role for in idual incentives to experiment. Institutions that give the agent sufficiently large bargaining power, provide incentives for experimentation, but for weak bargaining power, agents specialize. We also look at how competition in the labor market, human capital accumulation, and correlation across talents affect incentives to experiment. (JEL codes: D83 J24 J42)
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2020
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3644911
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 13-07-2019
DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWZ012
Abstract: This article explores the problem of assembling capital for projects. It can be difficult to assemble capital, when it is disaggregated, for a project that exhibits increasing returns. Small investors may be reluctant to participate, as they may question the ability of the project owner to raise the additional capital he requires. This suggests the possibility that agents with blocks of capital (capital that is already aggregated) might earn rents. Similarly, agents with “network capital”—that is, an ability to aggregate the capital of others—may earn rents. In this article, we develop a simple theory of capital assembly and discuss the implications for investment and rent distribution.
Publisher: Annual Reviews
Date: 27-10-2016
DOI: 10.1146/ANNUREV-LAWSOCSCI-110615-084704
Abstract: This article discusses recent developments in the study of voting and elections. How people end up voting in an election depends on (a) how effective voting power is distributed among voters and (b) the strategic interactions between voters and other interested parties. These are, in turn, affected by institutional arrangements, such as the composition of voting districts, c aign finance laws, and constitutional restrictions on vote dilution. In recent years, new social science–based approaches, both theoretical and empirical, from economists, political scientists, and legal scholars have shed new light on the democratic process.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2017
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3093879
Publisher: MDPI AG
Date: 04-01-2017
DOI: 10.3390/G8010004
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2019
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3339242
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 12-06-2016
DOI: 10.1093/QJE/QJW021
Abstract: Most projects, in most walks of life, require the participation of multiple parties. While it is difficult to unite in iduals in a common endeavor, some people, who we call “movers and shakers,” seem able to do it. The article specifically examines moving and shaking of an investment project, whose return depends on its quality and the total capital invested in it. We analyze a model with two types of agents: managers and investors. Managers and investors initially form social connections. Managers then bid to buy control of the project, and the winning bidder puts effort into making investors aware of it. Finally, a subset of aware investors are given the chance to invest and they decide whether to do so after receiving private signals of the project’s quality. We first show that connections are valuable since they make it easier for a manager to “move and shake” the project (i.e., obtain capital from investors). When we endogenize the network, we find that while managers are identical ex ante, a single manager emerges as most connected he consequently earns a rent. In extensions, we move away from the assumption of ex ante identical managers to highlight forces that lead one manager or another to become a mover and shaker. Our theory sheds light on a range of topics, including entrepreneurship, venture capital, and anchor investments.
Publisher: The Econometric Society
Date: 2021
DOI: 10.3982/QE1296
Abstract: Using data on essentially every U.S. Supreme Court decision since 1946, we estimate a model of peer effects on the Court. We estimate the impact of justice ideology and justice votes on the votes of their peers. To identify the peer effects, we use two instruments that generate plausibly exogenous variation in the peer group itself, or in the votes of peers. The first instrument utilizes the fact that the composition of the Court varies from case to case due to recusals or absences for health reasons. The second utilizes the fact that many justices previously sat on Federal Circuit Courts, and justices are generally much less likely to overturn decisions in cases sourced from their former “home” court. We find large peer effects. For ex le, we can use our model to predict the impact of replacing Justice Ginsburg with Justice Barrett. Under the the assumption that Justice Barrett's ideological position aligns closely with Justice Scalia, for whom she clerked, we predict that her influence on the Court will increase the Conservative vote propensity of the other justices by 4.7 percentage points. That translates into 0.38 extra conservative votes per case on top of the impact of her own vote. In general, we find indirect effects are large relative to the direct mechanical effect of a justice's own vote.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2014
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 25-11-2013
DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWT016
Location: United States of America
No related grants have been discovered for Richard Holden.