ORCID Profile
0000-0003-1804-8654
Current Organisations
Auburn University
,
Deakin University
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Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 09-07-2016
Abstract: If an organization’s management is caught in the act of misconduct, it may call for a changing of the guard. Surprisingly, though, there is little empirical evidence examining the presumed benefits of executive turnover in the aftermath of wrongdoing. In this study, we explore investor reactions to CEO turnover following financial misrepresentation. We theorize and find that firms can be successful at managing investor reactions to organizational misconduct by either scapegoating or signaling change, but middle-ground approaches that do not commit to one or the other are less successful. We test our ideas in a firm-level event study of market reactions to CEO successions following a material financial statement restatement. We discuss the results, which generally support our predictions, and their implications for development of the scapegoating and signaling literatures and research on both executive succession and restoring corrupt organizations.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 22-12-2015
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 25-10-2010
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2021
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 26-05-2020
Abstract: We propose that CEOs are more likely to engage in financial misconduct after the media names them as being among the best business leaders. We theorize this occurs because winning such an award is a meaningful event that increases the CEO’s self-worth but also increases the CEO’s sense of psychological entitlement, including the freedom to break rules. We test our ideas by examining scenarios where award-winning CEOs feel especially entitled and therefore are most likely to commit misconduct. Using a s le of award-winning CEOs from Chinese publicly listed firms, we find that award-winning CEOs are more likely to commit financial misconduct in the post-award period than in the pre-award period. In addition, the effect of winning a CEO award on financial misconduct is stronger when CEOs are underpaid or from industries in which awards are rare and therefore more special. We also validate aspects of our theory that are difficult to observe. First, we use bivariate probit models with partial observability to confirm that our results hold when accounting for unobserved misconduct. Second, we use survey data that capture the psychological entitlement of a subs le of CEOs to confirm the mediating effect of psychological entitlement on the relationship between winning an award and committing financial misconduct.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 20-12-2011
Abstract: Signaling theory is useful for describing behavior when two parties (in iduals or organizations) have access to different information. Typically, one party, the sender, must choose whether and how to communicate (or signal) that information, and the other party, the receiver, must choose how to interpret the signal. Accordingly, signaling theory holds a prominent position in a variety of management literatures, including strategic management, entrepreneurship, and human resource management. While the use of signaling theory has gained momentum in recent years, its central tenets have become blurred as it has been applied to organizational concerns. The authors, therefore, provide a concise synthesis of the theory and its key concepts, review its use in the management literature, and put forward directions for future research that will encourage scholars to use signaling theory in new ways and to develop more complex formulations and nuanced variations of the theory.
Publisher: MDPI AG
Date: 29-12-2018
DOI: 10.3390/SU11010156
Abstract: Universities that sign the Talloires Declaration signify their commitment to education for sustainable development. This research explores whether the signification is a strategic desire to be seen to be doing the right thing, or a genuine commitment to enhancing sustainability and helping the environment. This semi-structured interview research involves communication with the sustainability managers in the majority of Talloires signified universities in Australia. Since Australia has a comparably high rate of commitment to the Talloires Declaration, the findings represent rich and deep insight into reasons and motivations that can inform the adoption process around the world. Applying institutional theory and related concepts of structuration, isomorphism, and signaling, the findings are analyzed to reveal the range of environmental initiatives and the underlying explanation of themes. Current strategies and future directions for universities are indicated. Findings are that higher education is a key mechanism in business and society for finding and harnessing knowledge-based solutions. The challenge is that institutionalization has created resistance to change through coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism, along with rhetoric. Structuration factors should be considered in the context of making positive changes for sustainability in the university sector.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 26-05-2022
Abstract: We theorize about board decision making by introducing image theory, a descriptive theory of selection for decisions of more than routine importance, to research on CEO successor selection. We contend that directors’ current and future images of the firm typically revolve around their main responsibility, maximizing shareholder wealth. However, following discovery of misconduct, those images shift to the misconduct and to how it might be prevented. As such, ethical leadership dominates their criteria for a CEO successor. Evaluating candidates’ moral principles is nontrivial there are few observable indicators. We develop arguments that, following organizational wrongdoing, directors are more likely to choose a CEO successor with a degree from a religiously affiliated university than they would under other conditions. We also find their intuition is correct: Choosing a CEO with a degree from a religious university reduces the likelihood of misconduct. In moderating analyses, we uncover a hidden irony: Directors in industries where misconduct is common are the least likely to choose, but the most likely to need, a CEO with a degree from a religious university. Results from analyses of S& P 1500 firms and a policy capturing study of actual directors support our hypotheses.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 08-02-2022
DOI: 10.1111/CORG.12429
Abstract: This study attempts to uncover a hidden benefit of shareholders' excess control rights in family firms by examining whether excess control rights can reduce the likelihood of financial misconduct in family firms, compared with nonfamily firms. We argue that excess control rights are especially useful for family‐owned firms, compared with firms with other types of ownership, in preventing financial misconduct. They afford family owners the ability to guard against misconduct that can damage the founder's legacy and reduce the family's socioemotional wealth. We also investigate two boundary conditions, the presence of a family member as the board chair and the family's public visibility, that validate our proposed theoretical mechanism. In these scenarios, the family owner's socioemotional wealth is particularly high and could be impacted severely by misconduct. Results from a s le of 2516 publicly traded firms in China support our theory. Our study challenges traditional agency theory about excess control rights by exploring the potential of excess control rights to mitigate principal–agent problems and prevent financial misconduct in family firms. Regulators who make decisions to forbid or permit excess shareholder control in publicly listed firms must be aware that excess shareholder control could deter financial misconduct in family firms.
Publisher: Academy of Management
Date: 10-2016
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 30-03-2022
DOI: 10.1111/JBL.12275
Abstract: Little is known about the underlying product recall process that food companies go through to identify and remove tainted products from the supply chain or why this process varies. To help fill this void in the literature and close the gap between what we know and what we need to know about product recalls, we use a grounded theory approach to develop mid‐range theorizing about food recalls. In doing so, our findings reveal that two manifestations of complexity—upstream and downstream—introduce recall uncertainty , which is the driving force behind why the recall process varies. Our study is also the first to propose that managers use recall options when trying to manage recall uncertainty. Furthermore, our study reveals that product recalls may not cleanly fall into recall categories as previously thought, but rather take the form of recall layering—that is, nested recalls or a recall within a larger recall. Overall, our mid‐range theorizing (a) offers key insights about why the recall process varies within a massive industry that affects every person (b) provides a detailed agenda to guide subsequent research and (c) suggests practical steps managers can take to better manage future recalls.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 05-06-2019
Abstract: Capital market investors have limited information about the motives, exchange terms, and expected outcomes of corporate estitures. Thus, when a firm announces a estiture, capital markets may have difficulty distinguishing estitures that are likely to be beneficial and investment worthy from those that signify hidden problems. Drawing on screening theory, we argue that one way investors might overcome their information disadvantages is to use screens to identify investment-worthy esting firms. We test this logic using one such screen: change in blockholding equity stakes prior to a estiture announcement. Data from 858 European Union estitures occurring in 13 Western European Countries show that investors’ reaction to a estiture announcement is positively associated with pre- estiture changes in blockholdings in the esting firm. Furthermore, investors’ valuations were more positive in higher performing esting firms that had increases in blockholding equity stakes before the estiture than those that had reductions in these owners’ equity stakes. The findings extend our understanding of how outsiders, such as investors, navigate incomplete information about estitures. We describe how our study offers a range of implications for estiture research.
Publisher: Academy of Management
Date: 02-2019
Publisher: Academy of Management
Date: 10-2018
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-07-2016
DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.2400
Publisher: Academy of Management
Date: 04-2018
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 27-10-2017
DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.2560
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 04-2011
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 20-06-2019
DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.3050
Abstract: A number of studies examine the extent to which boards compensate CEOs for their firm's performance (i.e., pay‐for‐performance), but these studies typically do not incorporate what CEOs actually do to bring about those performance outcomes. We suggest that directors will make stronger internal attributions about firm performance when the CEO engages in high levels of corporate strategic investment. CEOs that invest in firm growth essentially “place their bets,” so the pay‐for‐performance relationship is stronger for them than it is for CEOs who do not invest as much in firm growth. We also theorize and find that directors make internal attributions about firm performance more for prestigious, but not less prestigious, CEOs and more when the directors collectively exhibit conservative, but not liberal, political ideologies. Shareholders and other stakeholders often demand that CEOs should be paid for performance. In other words, CEOs should be paid well when the company is performing well and paid less when the company is not performing well. We add an additional dimension: boards might also consider what CEOs actually do to bring about performance outcomes. Our findings suggest that when CEOs make heavy corporate investments, they essentially “place their bets.” In this scenario, boards attribute performance to the CEO so that CEO compensation rises and falls with company performance. When CEOs make fewer corporate investments, their compensation is not as strongly associated with company performance. This primary relationship is particularly true when CEOs have high social recognition or when the directors are collectively conservative.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 22-05-2022
DOI: 10.1177/01492063221080431
Abstract: In recent years, executives and their employees have faced a wide range of threats to, and within, their organization. We put forward a framework that organizational scholars can use to position their ideas within the literature on threats and responses. We delineate different types of threats that firms often face. We also develop a set of constructs that, taken together, can be useful for describing how managers assess threats and how they might react to them. In addition, we identify several theories that explain organizational threats and responses, including two (protection motivation theory and integrated threat theory) that have proven useful in other disciplines but have yet to take hold in management studies. Lastly, we offer ex les of how to expand extant theories to the domain of organizational threats and conclude with a call for research on threats and responses in organizational research.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 10-10-2013
Abstract: Management researchers have long been concerned with the antecedents and consequences of managerial compensation. More recently, scholarly and popular attention has turned to the gap in pay between workers at the highest and lowest levels of the organization, or “pay dispersion.” This study investigates the performance implications of pay dispersion on a longitudinal (10-year) s le of publicly traded firms from multiple industries. We combine explanations based on tournament theory and equity theory to develop a model wherein pay dispersion has opposing effects on a firm’s short-term performance and their trend in performance over time. We also show that ownership is a key antecedent of pay dispersion. Specifically, transient institutional investors (who have short time horizons and equity stakes in a wide variety of firms) positively influence pay dispersion whereas dedicated institutional investors (who have longer investment time horizons and equity stakes in fewer firms) negatively influence pay dispersion. We discuss the wide-ranging implications of these findings for scholars, managers, and policy makers alike.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 05-04-2021
DOI: 10.1177/01492063211002622
Abstract: Many companies prominently espouse their virtuous character in communications with investors, with a view toward influencing investor perceptions about the firm’s standards of behavior. While there are benefits to investors perceiving an organization to be virtuous, what happens if the firm violates those standards by engaging in unethical behavior? In this study, we use expectancy violations theory to argue that virtue rhetoric sets investors up for disappointment. When an organization claims to be virtuous but then acts unethically, investors respond to the ethics violation more negatively than they would otherwise. We also theorize about scenarios where investors may overlook unethical behavior or intensify their disapproval of it. To test our ideas, we assemble a unique s le of unethical events committed by S& P 500 companies over a 12-year period, combined with analysis of the virtue rhetoric found in their annual letters to shareholders. Our main finding is that investor reaction to unethical behavior is more negative for companies that claimed to be virtuous prior to the violation than for those that did not make such claims. This relationship is less strong when the company has high expected future value.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 22-04-2011
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 27-07-2015
Abstract: Trust is an important factor for managing transaction costs within interorganizational relationships (IORs). Research on trust indicates that separate dimensions of trust arise from a partner’s competence (i.e., technical skills, experience, and reliability) and integrity (i.e., motives, honesty, and character), and that these dimensions have potentially unique effects. Because scholars rarely apply this distinction within IOR research, past studies may have masked important relationships involving competence- and integrity-based trust. In response, we build and test theory that explains how competence- and integrity-based trust have asymmetric effects on different kinds of transaction costs. In particular, we build on theory that describes how parties process positive and negative information about others’ behavior to predict that integrity-based trust in IORs is more potent for reducing transaction costs than is competence-based trust. We also theorize that building strong IORs requires more up-front investment with competence-based but not with integrity-based trust. By applying meta-analytic structural equation modeling to data on 37,366 IORs drawn from 150 s les, we find that integrity-based trust is about 10 times more effective at reducing these costs. A key implication is that managers seeking to improve the efficiency of their IORs may do well by performing competently, but they can do even better by building perceptions of integrity.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 30-05-2019
Abstract: In this study, we theorize about how different types of institutional investors influence firms’ choice of exploration versus exploitation for their joint ventures (JVs). Exploratory JVs engender risk, uncertain outcomes, and ex post contractual updating, whereas exploitative JVs allow for ex ante contracts. We argue that dedicated institutional investors (DIIs), who maintain concentrated holdings over time regardless of current earnings, offer tolerance for failure and reward for long-term success that encourages managerial choice of exploratory JVs. Transient institutional investors (TIIs), who trade frequently based on near-term performance metrics, prefer ex ante contracts and use exit to discipline managers who do not meet their short-term performance objectives. This suggests that TIIs may influence managers to reduce the extent to which they choose exploratory (as opposed to exploitative) JVs. Furthermore, we argue that the transactional governance of TIIs gives way to the relational monitoring of DIIs when both types of shareholders are present. As a result, the likelihood of choosing exploration, versus exploitation, as a JV formation strategy is greatest in the presence of high DII and TII ownership. We examine JVs among S& P 500 firms over the years 2000 to 2010, and results largely support our theory.
Publisher: Academy of Management
Date: 02-2012
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 10-2016
DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.2430
Publisher: Emerald
Date: 10-04-2007
DOI: 10.1108/00251740710745016
Abstract: This paper proposes a methodology for governing expatriate assignments in the context of corporate‐level objectives. The approach taken is to envisage expatriate managerial assignments within the theoretical framework of agency theory and the knowledge‐based view of the firm. The paper begins with the view that knowledge acquisition and integration is a primary goal for most expatriate assignments. The relationship between expatriate managers and multinational corporation (MNC) headquarters from an agency perspective are considered and the notion of a “knowledge contract” as a means of governing that relationship is discussed. Four corporate‐level international strategies available to MNCs (global, international, transnational, and multidomestic) are then examined and the extent of agency problems under each strategy is discussed. The paper makes specific predictions about the type of knowledge contract that is most likely to address agency problems for each corporate strategy. This research extends agency theory by introducing the knowledge contract as a means of managing agency concerns. This offers a broader range of contract alternatives, moving researchers beyond traditional agency theoretic prescriptions. The research also contributes to the literature on expatriate management by integrating assignment success with research on corporate‐level international strategy. Few authors have recognized organizational strategy as an important unit of study in international human resource management. Doing so, however, has yielded a unique set of contingency relationships that would otherwise be obscured.
Publisher: Academy of Management
Date: 12-2021
Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Date: 06-2011
Abstract: This study explores the competing influences of different types of board interlocks on diffusion of a strategic initiative among a population of firms. We examine a broad social network of interlocking directors in U.S. firms over a period of 17 years and consider the likelihood that these firms will adopt a strategy of expansion into China. Results show that ties to adopters that unsuccessfully implement this strategy have a nearly equal and opposing effect on the likelihood of adoption as do ties to those that successfully implement the strategy. Ties to those that do not implement the strategy also have a suppressive effect on the likelihood of adoption. Furthermore, we examine a firm's position in the core-periphery structure of the interlocking directorate, finding that ties to adopters closer to the network core positively affect the likelihood of adoption. We discuss the implications of our study for social network analysis, governance, and internationalization research.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 12-2006
Abstract: Pursuit of international markets and resources from foreign sources has increased dramatically during the past two decades, and the academic study of international ersification has increased concurrently. Reviewing the literature in management and related disciplines, the authors discuss recent findings of research on international ersification. A conceptual model groups key relationships, including antecedents, environmental factors, performance and process outcomes, moderators, and the characteristics of international ersification. The authors synthesize intellectual contributions, highlight unresolved issues, and provide recommendations for future research.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2020
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3529683
Publisher: Emerald Publishing Limited
Date: 29-09-2021
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 05-2009
DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.747
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 2010
DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-6520.2009.00316.X
Abstract: This study summarizes and analyzes average statistical power and effect sizes in empirical entrepreneurship research. Results show that statistical power was higher than expected, and was particularly high in studies employing archival measures. Statistical power has also increased over time. Effect sizes were higher than expected, a finding that remained consistent for different levels of analysis and across multiple subdomains. We discuss these findings, compare them to related disciplines, and draw implications for the design of future studies.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 09-2012
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 09-2021
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 15-05-2018
DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.2901
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 11-07-2016
DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.2541
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 26-10-2016
DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.2582
Publisher: Academy of Management
Date: 08-2010
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 15-09-2014
DOI: 10.1111/JOMS.12097
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 15-07-2020
DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.3190
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 08-08-2014
Abstract: Tournament theory is useful for describing behavior when reward structures are based on relative rank rather than absolute levels of output. Accordingly, management scholars have used tournament theory to describe a wide range of inter- and intraorganizational competitions, such as promotion contests, innovation contests, and competition among franchisees. While the use of tournament theory has gained considerable momentum in recent years, the ideas that underlie the theory have become blurred and potentially useful insights remain trapped within disciplines. We, therefore, provide a synthesis of the theory’s foundational concepts, review its use in the management literature, identify advancements from related disciplines that may be imported to management research, and delineate the steps likely to be critical to moving the theory forward. Our hope is this review will make tournament theory more accessible and salient to management researchers with a view toward developing more nuanced versions of the theory and applying it in a wider range of contexts.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 03-2008
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 25-10-2011
DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.974
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 14-10-2021
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 05-05-2018
DOI: 10.1111/DECI.12275
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 11-08-2010
No related grants have been discovered for Brian Connelly.