ORCID Profile
0000-0002-3031-732X
Does something not look right? The information on this page has been harvested from data sources that may not be up to date. We continue to work with information providers to improve coverage and quality. To report an issue, use the Feedback Form.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 08-02-2022
DOI: 10.1111/CORG.12429
Abstract: This study attempts to uncover a hidden benefit of shareholders' excess control rights in family firms by examining whether excess control rights can reduce the likelihood of financial misconduct in family firms, compared with nonfamily firms. We argue that excess control rights are especially useful for family‐owned firms, compared with firms with other types of ownership, in preventing financial misconduct. They afford family owners the ability to guard against misconduct that can damage the founder's legacy and reduce the family's socioemotional wealth. We also investigate two boundary conditions, the presence of a family member as the board chair and the family's public visibility, that validate our proposed theoretical mechanism. In these scenarios, the family owner's socioemotional wealth is particularly high and could be impacted severely by misconduct. Results from a s le of 2516 publicly traded firms in China support our theory. Our study challenges traditional agency theory about excess control rights by exploring the potential of excess control rights to mitigate principal–agent problems and prevent financial misconduct in family firms. Regulators who make decisions to forbid or permit excess shareholder control in publicly listed firms must be aware that excess shareholder control could deter financial misconduct in family firms.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 09-2021
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 22-05-2022
DOI: 10.1177/01492063221080431
Abstract: In recent years, executives and their employees have faced a wide range of threats to, and within, their organization. We put forward a framework that organizational scholars can use to position their ideas within the literature on threats and responses. We delineate different types of threats that firms often face. We also develop a set of constructs that, taken together, can be useful for describing how managers assess threats and how they might react to them. In addition, we identify several theories that explain organizational threats and responses, including two (protection motivation theory and integrated threat theory) that have proven useful in other disciplines but have yet to take hold in management studies. Lastly, we offer ex les of how to expand extant theories to the domain of organizational threats and conclude with a call for research on threats and responses in organizational research.
Location: United States of America
Location: United States of America
No related grants have been discovered for Wei Shi.