ORCID Profile
0000-0002-0109-7356
Current Organisations
ETH Zurich
,
University of Oxford
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Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 09-08-2020
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2019
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 05-2022
Publisher: ACM
Date: 27-12-2018
Publisher: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
Date: 03-04-2020
Abstract: We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the corresponding optimization problem, where the goal is to locate facilities to minimize either the total cost to all agents or the maximum cost of any agent is NP-hard. However, we show that the problem is fixed-parameter tractable, and the optimal solution can be computed in polynomial time whenever the number of facilities is bounded, or when all facilities have identical capacities. We then consider the problem from a mechanism design perspective where the agents are strategic and need not reveal their true locations. We show that several natural mechanisms studied in the uncapacitated setting either lose strategyproofness or a bound on the solution quality %on the returned solution for the total or maximum cost objective. We then propose new mechanisms that are strategyproof and achieve approximation guarantees that almost match the lower bounds.
Publisher: American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS)
Date: 2018
DOI: 10.3934/DCDS.2018071
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 11-2020
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 27-02-2023
Abstract: We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and economic security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater economic security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long—including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We show that stronger checks and balances are a double-edged sword: they slow down autocratization but may make it more likely. We discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework and its connection to real world ex les.
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
No related grants have been discovered for Barton Lee.