ORCID Profile
0000-0002-4603-1406
Current Organisation
University of New South Wales
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Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 07-2013
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-1999
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 2004
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 04-1986
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819100021094
Abstract: The whole numbers and the chemical elements vary discretely : 5 is the next number to 4 and there is no number between them silver is next to gold in the atomic table and there is no element between them. On the other hand, colours vary continuously : between red and yellow there is another colour, orange, between orange and yellow there is another colour, and so on. Between any two colours, no matter how close, there is an intermediate colour–indeed, an infinite number of intermediate colours. A surface may change gradually over time from red to yellow, assuming all the colours in between. Or again, a surface may be red at one edge and yellow at the other, changing gradually (over space) and assuming all the colours in between.
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2011
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 11-2000
DOI: 10.1080/713657734
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 31-03-2008
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-04-2016
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 1998
DOI: 10.1109/72.712149
Abstract: Natural language understanding involves the simultaneous consideration of a large number of different sources of information. Traditional methods employed in language analysis have focused on developing powerful formalisms to represent syntactic or semantic structures along with rules for transforming language into these formalisms. However, they make use of only small subsets of knowledge. This article will describe how to use the whole range of information through a neurosymbolic architecture which is a hybridization of a symbolic network and subsymbol vectors generated from a connectionist network. Besides initializing the symbolic network with prior knowledge, the subsymbol vectors are used to enhance the system's capability in disambiguation and provide flexibility in sentence understanding. The model captures a ersity of information including word associations, syntactic restrictions, case-role expectations, semantic rules and context. It attains highly interactive processing by representing knowledge in an associative network on which actual semantic inferences are performed. An integrated use of previously analyzed sentences in understanding is another important feature of our model. The model dynamically selects one hypothesis among multiple hypotheses. This notion is supported by three simulations which show the degree of disambiguation relies both on the amount of linguistic rules and the semantic-associative information available to support the inference processes in natural language understanding. Unlike many similar systems, our hybrid system is more sophisticated in tackling language disambiguation problems by using linguistic clues from disparate sources as well as modeling context effects into the sentence analysis. It is potentially more powerful than any systems relying on one processing paradigm.
Publisher: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science
Date: 2010
DOI: 10.5096/ASCS200939
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 06-2012
DOI: 10.1093/LPR/MGS007
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 1980
DOI: 10.2307/2219382
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2004
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819104000075
Abstract: The imperviousness of mathematical truth to anti-objectivist attacks has always heartened those who defend objectivism in other areas, such as ethics. It is argued that the parallel between mathematics and ethics is close and does support objectivist theories of ethics. The parallel depends on the foundational role of equality in both disciplines. Despite obvious differences in their subject matter, mathematics and ethics share a status as pure forms of knowledge, distinct from empirical sciences. A pure understanding of principles is possible because of the simplicity of the notion of equality, despite the different origins of our understanding of equality of objects in general and of the equality of the ethical worth of persons.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 06-2006
DOI: 10.1093/LPR/MGL017
Publisher: Educational Development Unit, University of Greenwich
Date: 08-2006
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2008
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 1983
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 1991
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 09-2003
DOI: 10.1093/LPR/2.3.191
Publisher: University of Windsor Leddy Library
Date: 15-03-2013
Abstract: Both the traditional Aristotelian and modern symbolic approaches to logic have seen logic in terms of discrete symbol processing. Yet there are several kinds of argument whose validity depends on some topological notion of continuous variation, which is not well captured by discrete symbols. Ex les include extrapolation and slippery slope arguments, sorites, fuzzy logic, and those involving closeness of possible worlds. It is argued that the natural first attempts to analyze these notions and explain their relation to reasoning fail, so that ignorance of their nature is profound.
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 1988
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 2000
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Elsevier
Date: 2009
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 2013
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 2000
Publisher: Claremont Colleges Library
Date: 07-2017
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 22-07-2012
DOI: 10.1111/J.1539-6924.2012.01871.X
Abstract: Extreme risks in ecology are typified by circumstances in which data are sporadic or unavailable, understanding is poor, and decisions are urgently needed. Expert judgments are pervasive and disagreements among experts are commonplace. We outline approaches to evaluating extreme risks in ecology that rely on stochastic simulation, with a particular focus on methods to evaluate the likelihood of extinction and quasi-extinction of threatened species, and the likelihood of establishment and spread of invasive pests. We evaluate the importance of assumptions in these assessments and the potential of some new approaches to account for these uncertainties, including hierarchical estimation procedures and generalized extreme value distributions. We conclude by examining the treatment of consequences in extreme risk analysis in ecology and how expert judgment may better be harnessed to evaluate extreme risks.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 12-2005
DOI: 10.1093/LPR/MGL007
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 07-1991
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819100064913
Abstract: Like Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics, or Communism in California, scepticism about the external world is a doctrine that maintains its health not by being held by many, but by being attacked often. Though there were actual sceptics in ancient times, in various degrees, the history of scepticism in medieval and modern times has been entirely a history of arguments, not of schools.
Publisher: IEEE
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Date: 1996
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 08-10-2014
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 09-1989
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Date: 1993
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2012
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 1997
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 1986
DOI: 10.2307/2219311
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 1988
DOI: 10.2307/2220270
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2016
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 10-1994
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2011
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 1998
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-1994
Publisher: JSTOR
Date: 06-1984
DOI: 10.2307/2107616
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 10-2002
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819102000487
Abstract: The winning entry in David Stove's Competition to Find the Worst Argument in the World was: “We can know things only as they are related to us/insofar as they fall under our conceptual schemes, etc., so, we cannot know things as they are in themselves.” That argument underpins many recent relativisms, including postmodernism, post-Kuhnian sociological philosophy of science, cultural relativism, sociobiological versions of ethical relativism, and so on. All such arguments have the same form as ‘We have eyes, therefore we cannot see’, and are equally invalid.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-1991
DOI: 10.1007/BF03024064
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 1989
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 06-02-2017
DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199607617.013.3
Abstract: The history of the evaluation of uncertain evidence before the quantification of probability in 1654 is a mass of ex les relevant to current debates. They deal with matters that in general are as unquantified now as ever – the degree to which evidence supports theory, the strength and justification of inductive inferences, the weight of testimony, the combination of pieces of uncertain evidence, the price of risk, the philosophical nature of chance, and the problem of acting in case of doubt. Concepts similar to modern “proof beyond reasonable doubt” were developed especially in the legal theory of evidence. Moral theology discussed “probabilism”, the doctrine that one could follow a probable opinion in ethics even if the opposite was more probable. Philosophers understood the difficult problem of induction. Legal discussion of “aleatory contracts” such as insurance and games of chance developed the framework in which the quantification of probability eventually took place.
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
No related grants have been discovered for James Franklin.