ORCID Profile
0000-0001-7081-4390
Current Organisation
Boise State University
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Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2004
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2019
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2009
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 09-04-2020
DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198852407.003.0009
Abstract: Sackris and Beebe show that many people seem willing to attribute knowledge in the absence of justification. Their results provide some reason to claim that the folk concept of knowledge does not treat justification as necessary for its deployment. This chapter provides some support for this claim. It does so by addressing an alternative account of Sackris and Beebe’s results—the possibility that the observed knowledge attributions stemmed from protagonist projection , a linguistic phenomenon in which the speaker uses words that the relevant protagonist might use to describe her own situation and the listener interprets the speaker accordingly. That said, caution is recommended. There are alternative possibilities regarding what drives knowledge attributions in cases of unjustified true belief that must be ruled out before much confidence is given to the claim that the folk concept of knowledge does not take justification to be necessary for its use.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2021
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 04-2009
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X09000570
Abstract: Carruthers argues that an integrated faculty of metarepresentation evolved for mindreading and was later exapted for metacognition. A more consistent application of his approach would regard metarepresentation in mindreading with the same skeptical rigor, concluding that the “faculty” may have been entirely exapted. Given this result, the usefulness of Carruthers' line-drawing exercise is called into question.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 29-09-2012
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2016
DOI: 10.1017/APA.2016.16
Abstract: It is argued that core areas of philosophy can benefit from reflection on cross-disciplinary research (CDR). We start by giving a brief account of CDR, describing its variability and some of the ways in which philosophers can interact with it. We then provide an argument in principle for the conclusion that CDR is philosophically fecund, arguing that since CDR highlights fundamental differences among disciplinary research worldviews, it can be used to motivate new philosophical problems and supply new insights into old problems. We close by providing an argument by ex le that uses the epistemology of peer disagreement to establish the potential of CDR for core philosophical areas. With this argument, we aim to demonstrate how the complex research contexts that CDR affords can point the way toward important avenues of epistemological research by highlighting potential limitations of key epistemological components, such as peerage and uniqueness.
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2012
DOI: 10.5840/EIP201213115
Abstract: The practice of appealing to intuitive judgments concerning esoteric cases, long standard in analytic philosophy, has recently fallen on hard times. Various recent empirical results have suggested that philosophers are not currently able to distinguish good intuitions from bad. This paper evaluates one possible type of approach to this problematic methodological situation: calibration. Both critiquing and building on an argument from Robert Cummins, the paper explores what possible avenues may exist for the calibration of philosophical intuitions. It is argued that no good options are currently available, but leaves open the real possibility of such a calibration in the future.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 04-2016
DOI: 10.1016/J.SHPSC.2015.10.003
Abstract: Meeting grand challenges requires responses that constructively combine multiple forms of expertise, both academic and non-academic that is, it requires cross-disciplinary integration. But just what is cross-disciplinary integration? In this paper, we supply a preliminary answer by reviewing prominent accounts of cross-disciplinary integration from two literatures that are rarely brought together: cross-disciplinarity and philosophy of biology. Reflecting on similarities and differences in these accounts, we develop a framework that integrates their insights-integration as a generic combination process the details of which are determined by the specific contexts in which particular integrations occur. One such context is cross-disciplinary research, which yields cross-disciplinary integration. We close by reflecting on the potential applicability of this framework to research efforts aimed at meeting grand challenges.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 13-09-2012
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 03-2016
DOI: 10.1002/ECS2.1291
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 20-06-2013
DOI: 10.1002/ASI.22874
Publisher: University of California Press
Date: 03-2005
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 11-2020
Start Date: 2008
End Date: 2012
Funder: Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences
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