ORCID Profile
0000-0002-9332-9416
Current Organisations
Flinders University
,
University of Oxford
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Publisher: University of Illinois Press
Date: 10-2017
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2015
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 08-2023
DOI: 10.1007/S12115-023-00878-1
Abstract: How would Isaiah Berlin assess the current wave of authoritarian populism? The question is worth asking both for the light it casts on populism and for what it tells us about Berlin. In several respects, his view of populism is ambivalent: he is surprisingly sympathetic to the Russian populists of the nineteenth century, sharing their concern for genuine democracy and their reservations about elite leadership he is especially troubled by the possibility of rule by scientific experts, although he does not reject elite judgement entirely and his assessment of successful political judgement is not as clearly opposed to the kind of charismatic leadership favoured by many populists (for ex le, the leadership of Donald Trump) as one might expect. It is only in his treatment of in idual liberty and value pluralism that Berlin provides anti-populists with more emphatic arguments, especially when his value pluralism is developed as “liberal pluralism.” Overall, the application of Berlin’s ideas to populism highlights some of his familiar themes but also shows how his work can be extended in interesting ways. In particular, his sympathy with the Russian populists suggests that he is more of a democrat than is often assumed, and the application to populism of his famous thesis about the dangers of positive liberty can be extended to negative liberty too.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 1998
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2014
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 06-1994
DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-9248.1994.TB01913.X
Abstract: Meta-ethical pluralism, as developed in the work of writers like Isaiah Berlin, is the idea that ethical values cannot be reduced to a single hierarchy or system but are irreducibly multiple. It has often been argued that simply to recognize this fact is to have a reason to favour liberal institutions. On the contrary, the plurality of values in itself gives us no reason to support liberalism, indeed no reason to prefer any particular political arrangement to any other. If pluralism is true, the liberal's best defence may lie in appealing, in the manner of writers like Walzer and Rorty, to the de facto limitations on moral commitments imposed by the existing political culture.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 04-2007
Abstract: Is the liberal state entitled to intervene in the internal affairs of its nonliberal minorities to promote in idual autonomy as a public ideal, or should it tolerate the nonliberal practices of such groups in the name of legitimate ersity? This problem can be fruitfully approached from the perspective of Isaiah Berlin's notion of “value pluralism.” According to William Galston, value pluralism privileges a form of liberalism that is maximally accommodating of nonliberal groups and their practices. I agree that pluralism fits best with a liberal political framework, but I depart from Galston's interpretation of what liberal pluralism involves. Taking value pluralism seriously, I argue, implies a form of liberalism in which personal autonomy is a central public ideal.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 02-2009
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2013
DOI: 10.1017/S003467051200109X
Abstract: It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to respond to Alex Zakaras's thoughtful and stimulating article. Although Zakaras takes my work (together with that of William Galston) as a critical target, much of what he says is common ground between us. That includes his basic understanding of value pluralism, his evident support for that idea, and his broadly liberal approach to politics. Moreover, I think that he makes a significant contribution by drawing attention to the relation between pluralism and fallibility, and by focusing on Isaiah Berlin's treatment of Mill in that connection. Zakaras is right that Berlin's essay on Mill has not until now been carefully examined as a resource for the debate about the way pluralism relates to liberalism, and his suggestions about what the essay may tell us in that regard are valuable.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 27-03-2008
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 20-09-2014
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 03-2014
DOI: 10.1111/AJPH.12048
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-04-2019
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 17-12-2018
DOI: 10.1017/S0034670518000943
Abstract: Jeremy Waldron claims that Isaiah Berlin wrongly neglects, and is hostile to, constitutional and democratic institutions. I argue that although Berlin offers no extended discussion of constitutionalism or democracy, he is not hostile to them. Moreover, the logic of Berlin's value pluralism is strongly supportive of these ideas—for ex le, it fits well with constitutionalist notions such as the separation of powers and checks and balances. On the other hand, Waldron's rejection of judicial review on the ground of democracy is questionable in these same pluralist terms. Here I argue that Berlinian pluralism supports democracy as long as this is inclusive in its outcomes. But contemporary democracy cannot be relied upon to be sufficiently inclusive, in part because of the effects of the war on terror and the rise of populism. Under these conditions it is unwise for pluralists to dispense with judicial review.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 07-09-2014
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 06-2018
Abstract: Vittorio Hösle’s reply helpfully clarifies his ethical position but raises three questions from a value-pluralist point of view. First, is the Kantian starting point he proposes a monist position that undercuts the value pluralism to which he says he is committed? Second, in what sense does he accept the central pluralist idea of the incommensurability of values? In particular, what kind of constraint does he believe this places on the rank ordering of values? The formulations he offers are ambiguous between allowing contextual ordering, which is widely endorsed by pluralists, and permitting a comprehensive order that applies in all cases, which most pluralists would reject. Third, Hösle’s commitment to the cause of progress is admirable, but how can this be squared with pluralism? Here, I return to the broad approaches to the problem of pluralist ranking that I identified in my original reply to Hösle.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 07-10-2014
DOI: 10.1017/S1755048314000595
Abstract: How far can monotheism be reconciled with the pluralism characteristic of modern societies? In this article, I focus on the “value pluralism” of Isaiah Berlin, which I suggest captures a deeper level of plurality than Rawls's more familiar version of pluralism. However, some critics have objected that Berlinian pluralism is too controversial an idea in which to ground liberalism because it is profoundly at odds with the monotheism professed by so many citizens of a modern society. I argue that monotheists can be value pluralists as long as they do not insist that their faith is superior to all others. This pluralist position is exemplified by elements of the interfaith movement, according to which many religions are recognized as having roughly equal value. I also argue that a value-pluralist approach to religious accommodation, if it can be achieved, may be more stable than the uneasy combination of disapproval and restraint involved in the more orthodox solution to conflict among religions, toleration.
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 11-2019
Abstract: Discussing the crucifix case, Beata Polanowska-Sygulska concludes that the decision on appeal fits with Berlinian value pluralism, while the initial judgement was ethically monist. Her assumption is that pluralism favours cultural ersity against uniform law. This assumption is too simple and needs to be qualified by several considerations. First, we should be clear that, under pluralism, a moral question may have ‘one right answer’ if this is contextual. Second, so far as pluralism connects with cultural ersity, this has multiple dimensions, applying not just among societies but within them as well. Third, pluralists ought to be concerned primarily with promoting a ersity of values rather than cultures. When these matters are properly taken into account, it can be seen that a uniform law may be more pluralist than a multiplicity of local laws, depending on the circumstances.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 12-1988
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 11-2017
Abstract: Vittorio Hösle’s evaluation of the Soviet Revolution on the ground of the philosophy of history can be usefully examined from the value-pluralist perspective of Isaiah Berlin. Although Berlinwould agree with most ofHösle’s judgements on the Revolution, he would do so for very different reasons. Most importantly, Berlin would not accept the teleology that lies at the heart of the philosophy of history. For Berlin, the notion of a human telos to be realized at the end of history is a species of moral monism, and so falsified, indeed rendered incoherent, by the deeply pluralist reality of human values. However, Berlin’s pluralism also seems to present a problem for the justification of liberalism, and I consider a range of responses to this difficulty.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 11-2002
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 10-2008
Abstract: Brian Trainor argues that the current hostility of political theorists towards the idea of the common good is in part due to the influence of Isaiah Berlin's concept of `value pluralism', or the incommensurability of basic human values. I agree with Trainor's opposition to the `agonistic' interpretation of pluralism, associated with thinkers like Chantal Mouffe. However, it is not the case that the only alternative to the pluralism— agonism thesis is the monist defence of a thick common good advocated by Trainor. Between these extremes there is a middle way that accepts the deep plurality of values in Berlin's sense, but recognizes a case for a thin conception of the common good — that is, a liberal political framework.
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
No related grants have been discovered for George Crowder.