ORCID Profile
0000-0003-0927-1264
Current Organisation
University of Western Australia
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In Research Link Australia (RLA), "Research Topics" refer to ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes. These topics are either sourced from ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes listed in researchers' related grants or generated by a large language model (LLM) based on their publications.
Architecture And Urban Environment Not Elsewhere Classified | Philosophy | Philosophy Not Elsewhere Classified | Architectural History and Theory | Philosophy and Religious Studies not elsewhere classified | Other Built Environment and Design | Psychology | History: Australian | Industrial And Organisational Psychology | Built Environment and Design not elsewhere classified | Ethical Theory | Human Resources Management
Religion and ethics not elsewhere | Studies in human society | Business ethics | Management | Expanding Knowledge through Studies of Human Society | Expanding Knowledge in Built Environment and Design |
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 04-2005
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 1999
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 1986
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 07-1994
DOI: 10.1007/BF02800539
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-2008
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 06-1994
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 07-1984
DOI: 10.1007/BF02780845
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 09-1992
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412500021739
Abstract: Through various applications of the ‘deep structure’ of moral and religious reasoning, I have sought to illustrate the value of a morally informed approach in helping us to understand the complexity of religious thought and practice…religions are primarily moved by rational moral concerns and…ethical theory provides the single most powerful methodology for understanding religious belief. Ronald Green, Religion and Moral Reason
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2009
Publisher: White Horse Press
Date: 05-1994
DOI: 10.3197/096327194776679737
Abstract: Pantheism is a metaphysical and religious position. Broadly defined it is the view that (1) "God is everything and everything is God ... the world is either identical with God or in some way a self-expression of his nature" (H.P. Owen). Similarly, it is the view that (2) everything that exists constitutes a 'unity' and this all-inclusive unity is in some sense ine (A. MacIntyre). I begin with an account of what the pantheist's ethical position is formally likely to be (e.g. objectivist etc.). I then discuss the relationship between pantheism and ecology in the context of the search for the metaphysical and ethical foundations for an ecological ethic. It is claimed that it is no accident that pantheism is often looked to for such foundations.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 06-2018
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412500013767
Abstract: Why does the paradox (i.e. the incarnation) play such a crucial role in Kierkegaard's notion of truth as subjectivity? Richard Schacht explains it as follows: Eternal happiness is possible for a man only if it is possible for him to relate himself to God. A man, however, is a being who exists in time and it would not be possible for such a being to enter into a ‘God-relationship’ if God had not also at some point existed in time. Through the ‘leap of faith’ in which one affirms the proposition that God did exist in time, one is able to enter a ‘God-relationship’ and thereby attains ‘an eternal happiness’.
Publisher: University of Illinois Press
Date: 12-2019
DOI: 10.5406/JAESTEDUC.53.4.0071
Abstract: We live in an age of heroes. What is a hero? Why is our need for heroes and our desire to be heroic as insatiable as they are pervasive? Kierkegaard’s “Knight of Faith” and Nietzsche’s “Superman” both depict the heroic as involving a commitment to inner knowing along with a faith in one’s own abilities, despite being unable to communicate these reasons to anyone else. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche use the notion of “hero” to make a moral claim with respect to how we should lead our lives and endure—even love—the lived human experience. There is no diminishing of the modern appetite to consume and act out “reassuring” narratives about how we are all the hero of our own personal journey. Psychoanalysis gives an account as to why the appeal of the hero is inextricably tied to the human psyche. Jung explains the appeal of heroes in terms of archetypes, and Freud speaks of our orectic natures—nature driven by desire, appetite, and wish-fulfillment. Times of crisis and insecurity will always be coincident with an age of heroes, and the proliferation of heroes in film and television, as well as imaged heroes in real life, suggest these times are troubling if not dire. This paper explores why it is that heroes are always there, indeed must be there, when we need them most and considers the educative potential of such narratives.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 02-04-2016
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 06-1990
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412500020369
Abstract: In The Existence of God Richard Swinburne argues that ‘if there is a God, any experience which seems to be of God, will be genuine – will be of God.’ On the face of it this claim of the essential veridicality of any religious experience, given the existence of God, is incredible. Consider what is being claimed by looking at a particularly dramatic ex le – but one that is well within the purview of Swinburne's claim. The ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ who murdered at least thirteen women, claimed to hear voices telling him to kill. He took these voices to be ine. While it is easy enough to suspect the killer's sanity, it is not so easy to doubt his sincerity. Yet since Swinburne claims that God probably exists, he is committed to the view that the Ripper had a series of genuine religious experiences – so much for the arduous preparations sometime taken as necessary for a ‘vision’ of God.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-1989
DOI: 10.1007/BF02380697
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 02-01-2014
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 27-08-2013
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 06-1983
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412500015067
Abstract: Let us follow Robert Oakes in describing a self-authenticating experience of God as one that ‘would have the epistemic uniqueness of guaranteeing –all by itself – its veridicality to the person who had it.’ The idea that there could be self-authenticating experiences of God has been criticized often in recent years. It seems that the only experiences that could be self-authenticating are those about one's own current psychological states. Nevertheless, the in idual who claims to have such an experience of God is clearly using ‘experience’ in such a way as to suppose that one's experience of God is logically independent of the existence of God, but still self-authenticating.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 2000
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 07-1998
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 18-11-2016
Publisher: Verein zur Forderung der Fachzeitschrift European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Date: 19-09-2019
Abstract: In this essay we argue for the Janus-faced nature of hope. We show that attempts to sanitise the concept of hope either by separating it conceptually from other phenomena such as wishful thinking, or, more generally, by seeking to minimise the negative aspects of hope, do not help us to understand the nature of hope and its functions as regards religion. Drawing on functional accounts of religion from Clifford Geertz and Tamas Pataki, who both—in their different ways—see the function of religion in terms of its capacity to satisfy deep psychological needs, we demonstrate that religion uniquely positions itself with regard to hope’s two faces, simultaneously exploiting positive and negative aspects of hope.
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 26-10-2019
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 1986
DOI: 10.1007/BF00136704
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 12-1987
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412500019041
Abstract: Philosophers often distinguish in some way between two (or more) senses of life's meaning. Paul Edwards terms these a ‘cosmic’ and ‘terrestrial’ sense. The cosmic sense is that of an overall purpose of which our lives are a part and in terms of which our lives must be understood and our purposes and interests arranged. This overall purpose is often identified with God's ine scheme, but the two need not necessarily be equated. The terrestrial sense of meaning is the meaning people find (subjectively) in their own lives apart from the place of their lives in any ultimate end or context.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-1987
DOI: 10.1007/BF02781154
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-1990
DOI: 10.1007/BF00143576
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 05-1988
DOI: 10.1007/BF00141038
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-04-2015
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Date: 06-2020
Abstract: In this paper, we argue that revisionary theories about the nature and extent of Hume's scepticism are mistaken. We claim that the source of Hume's pervasive scepticism is his empiricism. As earlier readings of Hume's Treatise claim, Hume was a sceptic – and a radical one. Our position faces one enormous problem. How is it possible to square Hume's claims about normative reasoning with his radical scepticism? Despite the fact that Hume thinks that causal (inductive) reasoning is irrational, he explicitly claims that one can and should make normative claims about beliefs being ‘reasonable’. We show that even though Hume thinks that our causal (inductive) beliefs are rationally unjustified, there is nonetheless a ‘relative’ sense of justification available to Hume and that he relies on this ‘relative’ sense in those places where he makes normative claims about what we ought to believe.
Publisher: Journal Review Foundation
Date: 08-05-2017
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 1993
DOI: 10.1007/BF02379805
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-1992
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 09-1989
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412500019880
Abstract: Two theses are central to foundationalism. First, the foundationalist claims that there is a class of propositions, a class of empirical contingent beliefs, that are ‘immediately justified’. Alternatively, one can describe these beliefs as ‘self–evident’, ‘non–inferentially justified’, or ‘self–warranted’, though these are not always regarded as entailing one another. The justification or epistemic warrant for these beliefs is not derived from other justified beliefs through inductive evidential support or deductive methods of inference. These ‘basic beliefs’ constitute the foundations of empirical knowledge. One can give a reason for the justification of a basic belief even though the justification for that belief is not based on other beliefs. Thus, according to Chisholm, if asked what one's justification was for thinking that one knew, presently, that one is thinking about a city one takes to be Albuquerque, one could simply say ‘what justifies me…is simply the fact that I am thinking about a city I take to be Albuquerque’.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-1992
DOI: 10.1007/BF02772490
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 09-2003
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 03-1998
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412597004162
Abstract: Nicholas Wolterstorff has recently defended the acceptability of the belief that God speaks and examined various implications of such a belief. This paper examines several of his major hermeneutical and epistemological thesis. Among the issues discussed are the following (i) I examine Wolterstorff's claim to ‘honour’ the results of biblical criticism, and argue that excavative biblical scholarship challenges the plausibility of various crucial assumptions necessary for believing authorial-discourse interpretation of the Bible to be possible. (ii) I dispute his peculiar view that God's speech should not be included under the rubric of ine revelation. (iii) Contrary to Wolterstorff I claim that miracles would have to play an essential role in ine discourse. (iv) I critically examine and reject his claim that – in the case he describes – ‘we are entitled’ to believe God is speaking.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 1982
DOI: 10.1007/BF00148935
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 19-12-2013
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 1984
DOI: 10.1007/BF00136574
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 1983
DOI: 10.1007/BF00136894
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 06-1986
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-1988
DOI: 10.1007/BF02773265
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-2006
Publisher: IGI Global
Date: 10-2014
Abstract: Social Engineering (the “possibility of making society”) and physical determinism (influencing or determining human behaviour through space) are two ideas that have been deeply imbedded in modern urban planning from the start. More recently these issues re-appear in the debate on ‘New Urbanism' as well as in questions concerning contemporary architecture and planning. New Urbanism's self-conscious concern is to bring urban planning into line with the ethical (including social and political) standards and values that its charter delineates as consonant with what urbanism, democratic values, social justice, and more generally human flourishing require in a contemporary urban environment. It sees the architect's task as one of interpreting and helping to build, in Giedion's terms, “a way of life valid for our time.”More pointedly, New Urbanism illustrates Lagueux's (2004) contention that architecture and ethics are joined indissolubly at the hip. It assumes that, like it or not, and no doubt many architects relish the role, not only is architectural practice inextricably bound to ethical decision making, but design practitioners generally are arbiters and promulgators of value and taste. This article examines problematic aspects of New Urbanism's assumptions about the relation between architecture, planning and social justice. As a subsidiary or parallel case, the article considers e-planning's position in these relations. As regular readers of this journal will most likely recognize, e-planning encompasses a range of services including the online lodgment of planning documents, processing of development applications and distribution of information (maps, policies and regulations). The movement promises planners, developers and additional stakeholders in the built environment greater freedoms and efficiencies as they pursue their interests. However, in the realm of values, ‘efficiency' is not necessarily an obvious or desirable outcome of deliberations over the proper form that communities should take. Rather, the goal of ‘efficiency' in planning and design through electronic, digital or web-based practices may serve to obfuscate important ethical concerns from the start.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 08-1992
DOI: 10.1007/BF01313557
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-1994
DOI: 10.1007/BF01538955
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 10-2016
DOI: 10.1017/S1358246116000084
Abstract: The first part of this essay asks: What is the function, purpose and value of a museum? Has any museologist or philosopher given a credible account of philosophical problems associated with museums? Is there any set of properties shared by the erse entities called museums? Overgeneralization is the principal problem here. The essay then examines a central kind of museum experience one that invokes and relies upon nostalgia. I argue that the attraction of museums are varied but are best explained affectively and in terms of the orectic (appetitive, desiderative, wishing) rather than cognitively conatively (willing, deciding). Although this need not be taken as conflicting with the idea that museums are focused on scholarship, it is more consonant with the claim that exhibitions are central. Museums may at times both pique and satisfy our curiosity. However it is a mistake to see ‘curiosity’ as merely, or even primarily, a matter of cognition.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 03-1985
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412500016887
Abstract: I shall argue that the question ‘Can we speak literally of God?’ is fundamentally an epistemological question concerning whether we can know that God exists. If and only if we can know that God can exist can we know that we can speak literally of God.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 26-10-2023
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 12-1997
DOI: 10.1177/004839319702700405
Abstract: An account of the relation between belief and practice is inseparable from a general theory of religion and religious discourse. Rejection of the one time popular, but now more or less defunct, nonrealist position of people such as D. Z. Phillips, Don Cupitt, and indeed Wittgenstein leaves contemporary theo rists in anthropology and the "history of religions" with basically the vastly different "literalist" and "symbolist" analyses of religion (i.e., its ritual and discourse, belief and practice) from which to choose. This article critically appraises John Skorupksi's influential defense of intellectualism. I argue that his dismissal of symbolist approaches is more theoretically radical than he recog nizes. It rejects outright some of the very foundations and staples of contempo rary anthropology in, for ex le, Durkheim. His argument for the rejection of the symbolist approach is examined. Skorupski's defense of intellectualism is set in the context of a problematically naive understanding of the nature and function of religion.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-2012
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 04-1988
DOI: 10.1007/BF02380126
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 07-2006
Start Date: 02-2002
End Date: 12-2005
Amount: $295,400.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 03-2007
End Date: 12-2011
Amount: $246,441.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 03-2004
End Date: 08-2008
Amount: $150,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2012
End Date: 12-2016
Amount: $482,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded Activity