ORCID Profile
0000-0002-9826-7082
Current Organisation
Royal Holloway University of London
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Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2010
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 11-2004
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 16-09-2021
DOI: 10.1111/AEHR.12228
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 08-10-2014
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 04-2001
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2011
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-2010
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 04-10-2023
DOI: 10.1111/AEHR.12274
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 16-04-2013
Publisher: American Economic Association
Date: 04-2011
Abstract: This paper provides the first experimental test of Edward Lazear's (1979) model of deferred compensation. We examine the relation ship between firms' wage offers and workers' effort supply in a multi-period environment. If firms can ex ante commit to a wage schedule with deferred compensation, workers should respond by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. We contrast this full-commitment case to controls with no commitment and computer-generated wages in order to examine the roles of monetary incentives, social preferences, and reciprocity. Finally, we examine a setup without formal commitment, but where firms can build a reputation for paying deferred wages. (JEL D86, J22, J31, J33, J41)
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 04-2011
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 31-03-2007
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 26-02-2014
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 22-06-2009
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 04-2009
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
No related grants have been discovered for Andrew Seltzer.