ORCID Profile
0000-0002-2510-7109
Current Organisations
University of Zurich
,
University of Melbourne
,
Bocconi University
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Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 07-2020
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2021
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-05-2023
DOI: 10.1007/S11166-023-09408-0
Abstract: This work reports the results of two online experiments with a general-population s le examining the performance of different tasks for the elicitation of risk attitudes. First, I compare the investment task of Gneezy and Potters (1997), the standard choice-list method of Holt and Laury (2002), and the multi-alternative procedure of Eckel and Grossman (2002) and evaluate their performance in terms of the number of correctly-predicted binary decisions in a set of out-of-s le lottery choices. There are limited differences between the tasks in this sense, and performance is modest. Second, I included three additional budget-choice tasks (selection of a lottery from a linear budget set) where optimal decisions should have been corner solutions, and find that a large majority of participants provided interior solutions instead, casting doubts on people’s understanding of tasks of this type. Finally, I investigate whether these two results depend on cognitive ability, numerical literacy, and education. While optimal choices in budget-choice tasks are related to numerical literacy and cognitive ability, the predictive performance of the risk-elicitation tasks is unaffected.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2018
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3265190
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 02-2022
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2019
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3428515
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2021
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3748599
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 09-2022
DOI: 10.1017/S1930297500009335
Abstract: In a controlled laboratory experiment we investigate whether time pressure influences voting decisions, and in particular the degree of strategic (insincere) voting. We find that participants under time constraints are more sincere when using the widely-employed Plurality Voting method. That is, time pressure might reduce strategic voting and hence misrepresentation of preferences. However, there are no effects for Approval Voting, in line with arguments that this method provides no incentives for strategic voting.
Publisher: Frontiers Media SA
Date: 24-11-2021
DOI: 10.3389/FPSYG.2021.737225
Abstract: We study how payoff valence affects voting behavior on the distribution of monetary outcomes framed as gains or losses in a group when using standard plurality voting (PV) procedures and when using approval voting (AV). The latter method allows the subjects to approve of as many alternatives as they wish and has been shown to eliminate the incentives to vote strategically. For both methods, we observe that voters express higher support for egalitarian allocations (and lower support for selfish options) when sharing gains than when sharing losses. Moreover, the average number of approved alternatives per ballot is higher when distributions are framed in terms of gains than when they are framed in terms of losses. We also discuss under which circumstances the shift in voting behavior is more likely to produce changes in the electoral outcome. The results suggest that framing manipulations (payoff valence) can significantly impact voting behavior.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2020
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3692455
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 23-05-2022
DOI: 10.1007/S11166-022-09381-0
Abstract: Influential economic approaches as random utility models assume a monotonic relation between choice frequencies and “strength of preference,” in line with widespread evidence from the cognitive sciences, which also document an inverse relation to response times. However, for economic decisions under risk, these effects are largely untested, because models used to fit data assume them. Further, the dimension underlying strength of preference remains unclear in economics, with candidates including payoff-irrelevant numerical magnitudes. We provide a systematic, out-of-s le empirical validation of these relations (both for choices and response times) relying on both a new experimental design and simulations.
Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Date: 09-2023
Abstract: Decisions in management and finance rely on information that often includes win-lose feedback (e.g., gains and losses, success and failure). Simple reinforcement then suggests to blindly repeat choices if they led to success in the past and change them otherwise, which might conflict with Bayesian updating of beliefs. We use finite mixture models and hidden Markov models, adapted from machine learning, to uncover behavioral heterogeneity in the reliance on difference behavioral rules across and within in iduals in a belief-updating experiment. Most decision makers rely both on Bayesian updating and reinforcement. Paradoxically, an increase in incentives increases the reliance on reinforcement because the win-lose cues become more salient. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. Funding: C. Alós-Ferrer gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under [Grant AL1169/4], part of the research unit “Psychoeconomics” (FOR 1882). Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at 0.1287/mnsc.2022.4584 .
Publisher: Frontiers Media SA
Date: 22-09-2016
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-2022
Start Date: 2018
End Date: 2023
Funder: Swiss National Science Foundation
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2016
End Date: 2019
Funder: Horizon 2020
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2023
End Date: 2023
Funder: HORIZON EUROPE Innovative Europe
View Funded Activity