ORCID Profile
0000-0002-0321-3023
Current Organisations
Royal Museum for Central Africa
,
KU Leuven
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Publisher: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
Date: 11-02-2016
DOI: 10.1101/039552
Abstract: How honest signals evolve is a question that has been hotly debated by animal communication theoreticians and for which empirical evidence has been difficult to obtain. Theory predicts that, due to strong conflicts of interest, communication in aggressive contexts should be under strong selection for clear and reliable signaling. On the other hand, context-dependent signaling increases cheating opportunities, depending on how senders and receivers use, acquire and process signal information. Using animal signaling theory, theoretical visual models and behavioral experimentation, we characterize and determine proximate honesty mechanisms of the facial coloration in the Princess of Burundi cichlid, Neol rologus brichardi, a species with complex social interactions. We show that this facial color pattern evolved stable chromatic conspicuousness for efficient transmission in the aquatic environment, while context-dependent plasticity in luminance of the horizontal black stripe element is used to signal switches in aggressive intent. Importantly, using experimental signal manipulation we demonstrate that social selection by receiver retaliation is the mechanism responsible for maintaining signal honesty. We suggest that by affecting the evolution of pigmentation patterns in sexually monochromatic cichlid species, social selection can have potential impacts on ersification dynamics.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 11-2017
DOI: 10.1002/EVL3.24
Abstract: Our understanding of animal communication has been largely driven by advances in theory since empirical evidence has been difficult to obtain. Costly signaling theory became the dominant paradigm explaining the evolution of honest signals, according to which communication reliability relies on differential costs imposed on signalers to distinguish animals of different quality. On the other hand, mathematical models disagree on the source of costs at the communication equilibrium. Here, we present an empirical framework to study the evolution of honest signals that generates predictions on the form, function, and sources of reliability of visual signals. We test these predictions on the facial color patterns of the cooperatively breeding Princess of Burundi cichlid, Neol rologus brichardi. Using theoretical visual models and behavioral experiments we show that these patterns possess stable chromatic properties for efficient transmission in the aquatic environment, while dynamic changes in signal luminance are used by the fish to communicate switches in aggressive intent. By manipulating signal into out-of-equilibrium expression and simulating a cheater invasion, we demonstrate that social costs (receiver retaliation) promote the honesty of this dynamic conventional signal. By directly probing the sender of a signal in real time, social selection is likely to be the mechanism of choice shaping the evolution of inexpensive, yet reliable context-dependent social signals in general.
Publisher: American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
Date: 04-11-2016
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-08-2016
No related grants have been discovered for Hugo Gante.