ORCID Profile
0000-0002-7328-0563
Current Organisations
Princeton University
,
Australian National University
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Philosophy | Philosophical Psychology (incl. Moral Psychology and Philosophy of Action) | Ethical Theory | Epistemology |
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 04-05-2015
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 14-04-2015
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 1996
DOI: 10.2307/2940837
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-2018
DOI: 10.1111/PHPR.12541
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 2008
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 07-2021
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 09-2021
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 04-2008
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 15-05-2017
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 03-2012
Abstract: What is hope? Though variously characterized as a cognitive attitude, an emotion, a disposition, and even a process or activity, I argue that it is, more deeply, a unifying and grounding force of human agency. Since we cannot live a human life without hope, questions about the rationality of hope are properly recast as questions about what it means to hope well. This thesis is defended and elaborated in four parts. In the first two sections, I argue that hope is an essential and distinctive feature of human agency, both conceptually and developmentally. I then explore a number of dimensions of agency that are critically implicated in the art of hoping well, drawing on several ex les from George Eliot’s Middlemarch . I conclude with a short section that suggests how hoping well in an in idual context may be extended to hope at the collective level.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-2009
DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-9973.2009.01601.X
Abstract: Abstract: Ian Hacking proposes that ways of talking about autistic experience can shape, or even transform, what it is like to be autistic. I explore the grounds for two nonexclusive interpretations of this thesis. The informative interpretation holds that, because nonautistics cannot read mental states into autistic behaviour as they normally do with one another, autistic self‐narratives give nonautistics unique insights into what it is like to be autistic. This in turn affects how nonautistics interact with autistic in iduals, enriching their social environment in various ways. The more radical, transformative interpretation holds that autistic experience is itself moulded under the influence of developing a language‐game for talking about autistic experience. I endorse both theses, albeit with some cautionary remarks.
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2009
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 07-2002
Publisher: XMLink
Date: 2023
DOI: 10.5534/WJMH.230008
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 27-12-2012
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 1994
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 05-10-2018
Publisher: MIT Press
Date: 10-2011
DOI: 10.1162/JOCN_A_00017
Abstract: Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether “moral judgments” are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment of moral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different moral areas and that these differences were much more robust than differences in wrongness judgments within a moral area. Dishonest, disgusting, and harmful moral transgression recruited networks of brain regions associated with mentalizing, affective processing, and action understanding, respectively. Dorsal medial pFC was the only region activated by all scenarios judged to be morally wrong in comparison with neutral scenarios. However, this region was also activated by dishonest and harmful scenarios judged not to be morally wrong, suggestive of a domain-general role that is neither peculiar to nor predictive of moral decisions. These results suggest that moral judgment is not a wholly unified faculty in the human brain, but rather, instantiated in dissociable neural systems that are engaged differentially depending on the type of transgression being judged.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 2002
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 02-09-2015
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 04-12-2014
Publisher: Psychology Press
Date: 04-05-2012
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 20-08-2009
Abstract: From Plato to Max Weber, the attempt to understand political judgement took the form of a struggle to define the relationship between politics and morals. This book by leading international scholars in the fields of history, philosophy and politics restores the subject to a place at the very centre of political theory and practice. Whilst it provides a range of perspectives on the theme of practical reason, it also explores a series of related problems in philosophy and political thought, raising fundamental questions about democracy, trust, the nature of statesmanship, and the relations between historical and political judgement. In the process, the volume reconsiders some classic debates in political theory – about equality, authority, responsibility and ideology – and offers new and original treatments of key figures in the history of political thought, including Thucydides, Montaigne, Locke, Smith, Burke and Marx.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 09-10-2015
Publisher: CAIRN
Date: 2015
DOI: 10.3917/RAI.059.0017
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 02-2004
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 26-09-2007
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 03-2004
Abstract: What is hope? Though variously characterized as a cognitive attitude, an emotion, a disposition, and even a process or activity, hope, more deeply, a unifying and grounding force of human agency. We cannot live a human life without hope, therefore questions about the rationality of hope are properly recast as questions about what it means to hope well. This thesis is defended and elaborated as follows. First, it is argued that hope is an essential and distinctive feature of human agency, both conceptually and developmentally. The author then explores a number of dimensions of agency that are critically implicated in the art of hoping well, drawing on several ex les from George Eliot’s Middlemarch. The article concludes with a short section that suggests how hoping well in an in idual context may be extended to hope at the collective level.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 20-04-2016
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 11-2006
DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-8624.2006.00958.X
Abstract: Although developmental psychologists are generally happy to endorse dissociationist and gradualist views of development like Woolley's (2006), the design and interpretation of developmental research often suggests an implicit commitment to a cleaner, less dissociative, sudden-transition view of development. Such an implicit commitment may derive some of its power from the "representational warehouse" model of cognition and development that rose to prominence in the cognitive revolution. An alternative model of cognition and development, grounded in dispositional patterns of responding to stimuli, more naturally accommodates dissociative phenomena in development and highlights mechanisms for self-regulation and for fashioning and deploying representations, or depictions, in a uniquely human way.
Publisher: XMLink
Date: 2023
DOI: 10.5534/WJMH.220282
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 02-03-2017
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-2015
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 20-05-2008
Publisher: Psychology Press
Date: 03-2004
Publisher: Royal Society of Chemistry (RSC)
Date: 2016
DOI: 10.1039/C6RA08706J
Abstract: The addition of Fe/Bi decrease the atomic percent of Sn 4+ , thus effect the electrical resistivity of the solder alloy.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 09-2015
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 12-09-2005
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 30-04-2014
Abstract: Results from three studies demonstrate that victims’ justice-related satisfaction with punishment is influenced by the kind of feedback they receive from offenders after punishment. In contrast to previous studies that found a discrepancy between anticipated and experienced satisfaction from punishment (Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008), participants were able to accurately predict their satisfaction when made aware of the presence or absence of offender feedback acknowledging the victim’s intent to punish. Results also indicate that victims were most satisfied when offender feedback not only acknowledged the victim’s intent to punish but also indicated a positive moral change in the offender’s attitude toward wrongdoing. These findings indicate that punishment per se is neither satisfying nor dissatisfying but that it is crucial to take its communicative functions and its effects on the offender into account. Implications for psychological and philosophical theories on punishment motives as well as implications for justice procedures are discussed.
Publisher: XMLink
Date: 2023
DOI: 10.5534/WJMH.230076
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 04-1992
DOI: 10.1007/BF02380824
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-10-2018
DOI: 10.1111/EJOP.12408
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 05-2004
Abstract: Does the Internet provide an environment in which rational in iduals can initiate and maintain relationships of interpersonal trust? This paper argues that it does. It begins by examining distinctive challenges facing would-be trusters on the net, concluding that, however distinctive, such challenges are not unique to the Internet, so cannot be cited as grounds for disparaging the rationality of Internet trust. Nevertheless, these challenges point up the importance of developing mature capacities for trust, since immature trusters are particularly vulnerable to the liabilities of Internet trust. This suggests that Internet trust can only be rational for those who have developed mature capacities for trust. But that suggestion ignores how trust on the Internet may also facilitate the development of such capacities.
Start Date: 2014
End Date: 2016
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 04-2014
End Date: 04-2020
Amount: $166,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded Activity