ORCID Profile
0000-0003-4944-9733
Current Organisation
Nanyang Technological University
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Publisher: Wiley
Date: 26-01-2020
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 02-2022
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 23-03-2022
Abstract: We investigate whether in idual securities regulators exhibit personal styles in their work, a question of importance to corporate executives and capital market participants. Using the SEC's comment letters as our setting, we find that SEC staff members exhibit unique personal “styles.” We manually collect information on SEC staff members and provide evidence that staff members' personal characteristics influence the SEC's review process. Further analyses reveal that SEC staff members with a CPA qualification are associated with a lower likelihood of future accounting restatements moreover, similarity between the SEC staff member and the firm's correspondent is associated with lower scrutiny intensity. Overall, our study offers evidence that SEC staff members exhibit in idual differences and that their styles shape the SEC's enforcement actions. Our results offer implications for the working of securities regulators.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-08-2021
DOI: 10.1111/JBFA.12486
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-2018
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-2022
DOI: 10.1111/JBFA.12646
Abstract: We examine how political corruption affects firms’ accounting choices. We hypothesize and find that firms headquartered in corrupt districts manipulate earnings downwards, relative to firms headquartered elsewhere. Our finding is robust to alternative corruption measures, alternative discretionary accrual measures, alternative model specifications, the instrumental variable approach and difference‐in‐differences analyses based on firm relocation and high profile cases. We find that firms headquartered in corrupt districts prefer income‐decreasing accounting choices and exhibit higher conservatism. Finally, we find that the effect of corruption on earnings management is more pronounced for geographically concentrated firms, for firms without political connections, for firms in politically sensitive industries, for firms with lower transient institutional investor ownership and for firms with less analyst coverage. In sum, our findings suggest that firms respond to corruption by lowering their accounting earnings.
No related grants have been discovered for Huai Zhang.