ORCID Profile
0000-0001-7170-5882
Current Organisation
University of Nottingham
Does something not look right? The information on this page has been harvested from data sources that may not be up to date. We continue to work with information providers to improve coverage and quality. To report an issue, use the Feedback Form.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 26-06-2018
DOI: 10.1111/AUAR.12242
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-09-2020
DOI: 10.1111/FAAM.12268
Abstract: This paper draws on agency theory, as extended by the social theory of agency (STA) (Wiseman, Cuevas‐Rodríguez & Gomez‐Mejia, 2012), to examine the association between governance arrangements, reliance on government funding, chief executive officer (CEO) non‐profit experience, and CEO compensation in the UK charity sector. We rely on a hand‐collected data for the largest 240 charities and find that greater trustee board ersity (specifically gender and education ersity) and the existence of a remuneration or nomination committee are positively associated to CEO compensation. The results also show that a reliance on government funding and CEO's non‐profit work experience, together with the presence of a finance/accounting expert on the audit committee are negatively associated to CEO compensation. The existence of an audit committee, internal audit function, use of specialist external auditor and CEO characteristics (gender, ethnicity and managerial experience) are not significant factors. Our findings are largely consistent with the STA's propositions. Specifically, executive compensation levels reflect the CEO's ability to work with a erse board while a higher reliance on government funding signals the role of the State's pressures in moderating CEO compensation. Finally, in a context characterised by altruism and public benefit, financial rewards are not seen as the dominant ‘value metric’, resulting in lower compensation for CEOs previously working in the sector. Our findings have policy implications, specifically in relation to the role, composition and effectiveness of governance structures (e.g., trustee boards, audit and remuneration committees) in overseeing the design of executive compensation schemes within the charity sector.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-07-2022
DOI: 10.1002/BSE.3209
Abstract: The increasing awareness of global climate change puts more pressure on firms to reduce their environmental externalities. Managers long ignored this responsibility, which may erode business profits, going against their traditional goals. In this study, we examine the effect of top management's extrinsic incentives (i.e., reward‐driven motivation) on corporate environmental innovation strategy (i.e., eco‐innovation) using a large dataset of S& P1500 non‐financial firms for 2000–2020. The results indicate that firms with greater levels of top‐management compensation exhibit higher scores of eco‐innovation engagement. The effect holds after we address the endogeneity problem through the quasi‐natural experiment using the difference‐in‐differences analysis on the event of the Paris Agreement 2015. Our further investigations reveal that such a positive impact of managerial incentives on eco‐innovation is less intensified in the more polluting industries but more pronounced in more innovative ones.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-08-2021
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 13-03-2023
DOI: 10.1177/00076503231157725
Abstract: This study investigates the pivotal policy question of whether a firm’s corporate governance influences its political spending disclosures. Using a s le of S& P 500 firms from 2011 to 2019, we find empirical evidence that a board of directors’ monitoring and resource provision roles affect a firm’s political spending disclosure. Extending agency theory-driven expectations, we provide evidence that measures of a board’s monitoring role such as female monitoring directors, shorter board tenure, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and audit committee education enhance a firm’s political spending disclosures. Second, drawing from resource dependence theory and examining a board’s resource provisions, we find evidence that female advisory directors, CEO duality, additional directorships, and audit committee characteristics (i.e., size, number of meetings, age, and education) promote political spending disclosures. The study contributes to corporate governance and corporate political activity literatures by outlining different types of governance that may drive a firm’s political spending disclosures, a key component of a firm’s political responsibility.
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
No related grants have been discovered for TAM NGUYEN.