ORCID Profile
0000-0001-6175-5675
Current Organisations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 10-10-2018
DOI: 10.1093/MIND/FZY043
Abstract: Justification depends on context: even if E on its own justifies H, still it might fail to justify in the context of D. This sort of effect, epistemologists think, is due to defeaters, which undermine or rebut a would-be justifier. I argue that there is another fundamental sort of contextual feature, disqualification, which doesn't involve rebuttal or undercutting, and which cannot be reduced to any notion of screening-off. A disqualifier makes some would-be justifier otiose, as direct testimony sometimes does to distal testimony, and as manifestly decisive evidence might do to gratuitous evidence on the same team. Basing a belief on disqualified evidence, moreover, is distinctively irrational. One is not necessarily irresponsible. Instead one is turning down a free upgrade to a sleeker, stabler basis for one's beliefs. Such an upgrade would prevent wastes of epistemic effort, since someone who bases her belief on a disqualified proposition E will need to remember E and rethink her belief should E ever be defeated. The upgrade might also reduce reliance on unwieldy evidence, if E is relevant only thanks to some labyrinthine argument and if even ideal agents should doubt their ability to follow such arguments, even they should care about disqualifiers.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 06-03-2023
DOI: 10.1111/NOUS.12454
Abstract: Value pluralists believe in multiple dimensions of value. What does betterness along a dimension have to do with being better overall? Any systematic answer begins with the Strong Pareto principle: one thing is overall better than another if it is better along one dimension and at least as good along all others. We defend Strong Pareto from recent counterex les and use our discussion to develop a novel view of dimensions of value, one which puts Strong Pareto on firmer footing. We conclude by defending Dimensionalism, the hypothesis that overall value relations are determined solely by how things compare along value dimensions. These are first steps towards a more systematic value pluralism.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 16-05-2017
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 29-08-2020
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 05-02-2020
DOI: 10.1111/NOUS.12326
Abstract: Supererogatory acts—good deeds “beyond the call of duty”—are a part of moral common sense, but conceptually puzzling. I propose a unified solution to three of the most infamous puzzles: the classic Paradox of Supererogation (if it's so good, why isn't it just obligatory?), Horton's All or Nothing Problem, and Kamm's Intransitivity Paradox. I conclude that supererogation makes sense if, and only if, the grounds of rightness are multi‐dimensional and comparative.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 29-08-2019
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 27-05-2020
DOI: 10.1111/PHPR.12702
Abstract: In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong. This case shows that the subjective and objective ‘oughts’ are somewhat independent. But there remains a powerful intuition that the guidance of objective ‘oughts’ is more authoritative—so long as we know what they tell us. We argue that this intuition must be given up in light of a monotonicity principle, which undercuts the rationale for saying that objective ‘oughts’ are an authoritative guide for agents and advisors.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 16-02-2020
Location: United States of America
Location: United States of America
No related grants have been discovered for Daniel Muñoz.