ORCID Profile
0000-0003-2561-9021
Current Organisation
University of Melbourne
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In Research Link Australia (RLA), "Research Topics" refer to ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes. These topics are either sourced from ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes listed in researchers' related grants or generated by a large language model (LLM) based on their publications.
Philosophy | Philosophy Of Language | Metaphysics | Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition) | Philosophy of Language | Epistemology | Feminist Theory |
Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies | Other | Expanding Knowledge in Language, Communication and Culture
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 04-04-2012
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 09-2014
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 25-11-2014
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 04-02-2009
Publisher: Oxford University PressOxford
Date: 22-01-2010
DOI: 10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199267989.003.0005
Abstract: Jackson often writes as if his account of public language meanings in terms of descriptivist conventions were just plain common sense. How else are we to explain how different speakers manage to communicate using a public language? And how else can we explain how in iduals arrive at confident judgments about the reference of their words in hypothetical scenarios? This chapter shows just how controversial the psychological assumptions behind Jackson's semantic theory really are. First, it explains how Jackson's theory goes well beyond the commonsense platitudes he cites in its defence. Second, it sketches an alternative explanation of those platitudes, the improvisation model of meaning, which seems psychologically more realistic. The chapter concludes that the psychological picture presupposed by Jackson's semantic theory stands in need of a more substantial defence than he has so far offered.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 02-2022
DOI: 10.1017/CAN.2022.27
Abstract: According to philosophical orthodoxy, the parties to moral or legal disputes genuinely disagree only if their uses of key normative terms in the dispute express the same meaning. Recently, however, this orthodoxy has been challenged. According to an influential alternative view, genuine moral and legal disagreements should be understood as metalinguistic negotiations over which meaning a given term should have. In this paper, we argue that the shared meaning view is motivated by much deeper considerations than its recent critics recognize, and that much would be lost in opting for the explanation of normative disputes as metalinguistic negotiations.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 06-2003
DOI: 10.1080/713659631
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 02-01-2019
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2015
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-08-2019
DOI: 10.1111/NOUS.12216
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 24-06-2020
DOI: 10.1017/CAN.2020.4
Abstract: Our main focus in this paper is Herman Cappelen’s claim, defended in Fixing Language , that reference is radically inscrutable. We argue that Cappelen’s inscrutability thesis should be rejected. We also highlight how rejecting inscrutability undermines Cappelen’s most radical conclusions about conceptual engineering. In addition, we raise a worry about his positive account of topic continuity through inquiry and debate.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 03-2020
DOI: 10.1017/S1352325220000063
Abstract: What does it take for lawyers and others to think or talk about the same legal topic—e.g., defamation, culpability? We argue that people are able to think or talk about the same topic not when they possess a matching substantive understanding of the topic, as traditional metasemantics says, but instead when their thoughts or utterances are related to each other in certain ways. And what determines the content of thoughts and utterances is what would best serve the core purposes of the representational practice within which the thought or utterance is located. In thus favoring a “relational model” in metasemantics, we share Ronald Dworkin's goal of explaining fundamental legal disagreements, and also his reliance on constructive interpretation. But what we delineate is a far more general and explanatorily resourceful metasemantics than what Dworkin articulated, which also bypasses some controversial implications for the nature of law that Dworkin alleged.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 19-10-2014
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 11-09-2023
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2020
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3597692
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 2013
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 06-2013
DOI: 10.1111/PHIB.12010
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-11-2004
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 19-07-2018
DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198797074.003.0001
Abstract: The first part of this introductory chapter introduces and discusses four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason, (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori, and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. The chapter sketches different—stronger and weaker—versions of each thesis, and tentatively examines whether specific versions of the different theses can be recombined into attractive rationalist packages, in which the various strands are mutually supporting. The chapter’s second part provides an overview of the contributions included in this volume.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2018
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2018.1432399
Abstract: In this paper, we argue that ordinary judgments about core normative topics purport to attribute stable, objective properties and relations. Our strategy is first to analyze the structures and practices characteristic of paradigmatically representational concepts such as concepts of objects and natural kinds. We identify three broad features that ground the representational purport of these concepts. We then argue that core normative concepts exhibit these same features.
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Date: 07-2015
DOI: 10.1086/680901
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 10-2006
Publisher: ASME International
Date: 08-2015
DOI: 10.1115/1.4030201
Abstract: In this paper, we presented an integrated numerical model for the wave-induced pore pressures in marine sediments. Two mechanisms of the wave-induced pore pressures were considered. Both elastic components (for oscillatory) and the plastic components (for residual) were integrated to predict the wave-induced excess pore pressures and liquefaction in marine sediments. The proposed two-dimensional (2D) poro-elasto-plastic model can simulate the phenomenon of the pore pressure buildup and dissipation process in a sandy seabed. The proposed model overall agreed well with the previous wave experiments and geo-centrifuge tests. Based on the parametric study, first, we examined the effects of soil and wave characteristics on the pore pressure accumulations and residual liquefaction. Then, a set of analysis on liquefaction potential was presented to show the development of liquefaction zone. Numerical ex le shows that the pattern of progressive waves-induced liquefaction gradually changes from 2D to one-dimensional (1D), while the standing wave-induced liquefaction stays in a 2D pattern in the whole process.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 19-07-2018
DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198797074.003.0007
Abstract: This chapter sketches a metasemantic model that promises to vindicate a broadly rationalist version of normative realism. It introduces a metasemantic principle that ties reference determination to what is justifiable from the perspective of the conceptually competent subject. The chapter explains how this metasemantic principle can help vindicate something close to the traditional rationalist claim that normative truths can be known a priori. It then shows how an anti-in idualist version of this metasemantic principle can handle the problem of radical disagreement among competent speakers. The last part of the paper explains how our metasemantic model can help vindicate the traditional rationalist thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action.
Publisher: University of Michigan Library
Date: 22-10-2021
DOI: 10.3998/ERGO.1135
Abstract: According to Ardent Normative Realists, reality favors certain ways of valuing and acting. Matti Eklund has recently argued that Ardent Normative Realists are committed to Referential Normativity, i.e., the thesis that the action-guiding and motivational roles associated with normative predicates determine their reference. In this paper, we argue that Referential Normativity should be rejected.
Publisher: No publisher found
Date: 2015
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 12-2013
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 09-2005
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 09-2009
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 24-08-2018
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-2004
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-2008
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 12-2007
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 06-2012
Start Date: 10-2007
End Date: 10-2012
Amount: $483,070.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2018
End Date: 12-2024
Amount: $457,511.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded Activity