ORCID Profile
0000-0003-1415-0088
Current Organisation
UNSW Australia
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In Research Link Australia (RLA), "Research Topics" refer to ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes. These topics are either sourced from ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes listed in researchers' related grants or generated by a large language model (LLM) based on their publications.
Psychology | Cognitive Science | Decision Making | Learning, Memory, Cognition And Language | Developmental Psychology And Ageing | Psychological Methodology, Design and Analysis | Knowledge Representation and Machine Learning | Psychology not elsewhere classified | Developmental Psychology and Ageing | Psychological Methodology, Design And Analysis | Biological Psychology (Neuropsychology, Psychopharmacology, Physiological Psychology) | Cognitive Science not elsewhere classified | Psychology and Cognitive Sciences not elsewhere classified | Social and Community Psychology
Expanding Knowledge in Psychology and Cognitive Sciences | Behavioural and cognitive sciences | Learner and Learning Processes | Climate and Climate Change not elsewhere classified | Primary education | Early childhood education |
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2019
Publisher: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science
Date: 2010
DOI: 10.5096/ASCS200927
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 25-01-2019
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2003
DOI: 10.1016/S0010-0277(03)00021-0
Abstract: Two experiments examined how 5- and 10-year-old children revise their category representations when exposed to exemplars that are congruent or incongruent with existing knowledge. During training children were presented with exemplars containing features that were congruent or incongruent with children's social stereotypes together with a stereotype-neutral feature. In the knowledge-subtyping condition this neutral feature predicted the stereotype-congruence of the other features. In the knowledge-standard condition the neutral feature was uncorrelated with stereotype-congruence. At test children made judgements about feature co-occurrence within the learned category. In each experiment these judgements were influenced by both stereotypical beliefs and exemplar observation. Stereotypical beliefs, however, had a greater influence on co-occurrence judgements in the knowledge-subtyping than in the standard conditions. In Experiment 2 these effects were shown to generalize to judgements about features that were not presented during training. These results challenge current models of knowledge-based categorization by showing that exemplar structure determines whether novel exemplar features are incorporated into category representations.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 22-11-2021
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 06-2012
DOI: 10.1037/A0028189
Abstract: Two similar classes of evidence-accumulation model have dominated theorizing about rapid binary choice: diffusion models and racing accumulator pairs. Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, and Wagenmakers (2011) examined mimicry between the Ratcliff diffusion (RD Ratcliff & Smith, 2004) and the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA Brown & Heathcote, 2008), the 2 least similar models from each class that provide a comprehensive account of a set benchmark phenomena in rapid binary choice. Where conditions differed only in the rate of evidence accumulation (the most common case in past research), simulations showed the models supported equivalent psychological inferences. In contrast, differences in 2 other parameters of key psychological interest, response caution (the amount of information required for a decision), and nondecision time, traded-off when fitting 1 model to data simulated from the other, implying the potential for ergent inferences about latent cognitive processes. However, Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, and Wagenmakers did not find such inconsistencies between fits of the RD and LBA models in a survey of data sets from paradigms using a range of experimental manipulations. We examined a further data set, collected by Dutilh, Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, and Wagenmakers (2009), which used a manipulation not surveyed by Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, and Wagenmakers's practice. Dutilh et al.'s RD model fits indicated that practice had large effects on all three types of parameters. We show that in this case the LBA provides a different and simpler account of practice effects. Implications for evidence accumulation modelling are discussed.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 10-1996
Abstract: The study investigated the course of developmental changes in performance on nonverbal implicit and explicit memory tests and examined the degree to which implicit memory performance is dependent upon the storage of specific perceptual information. Four-, 5-, and 10-year-old children were required to name fragmented pictures of common objects or to name and answer general knowledge questions about complete versions of the same pictures. After a 48-h retention interval, all subjects were presented with a fragmented picture identification task containing pictures identical to those present during encoding (old), pictures which were from the same basic category as the study items but which varied in their perceptual similarity to those items (same), and novel pictures which were visually and semantically unrelated to the study items (new). The amount of visual information needed to name each item (picture identification threshold) was recorded. Following identification, subjects were asked whether or not they had been shown the picture previously. All age groups showed significant priming such that the picture identification threshold for the old items was lower than that of the new pictures. A smaller but significant priming effect was obtained for the same-name items. This effect was maximized when the same-name items were perceptually similar to the study items. The magnitude of these priming effects did not vary as a function of age, but greater priming was found for those children who identified picture fragments during the study phase. In contrast, the sensitivity of recognition memory performance increased from 4 to 10 years of age. These results suggest that the processes that subserve pictorial repetition priming and recognition memory develop at different rates and that such priming is dependent upon access to specific perceptual representations of studied objects.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 10-1992
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2000
Abstract: Two experiments investigated the contribution of automatic and intentional memory processes to 5- and 8-year-old children's acceptance of misinformation. Children were presented with a picture story followed by misleading postevent details that either were read to participants or were self-generated in response to semantic and perceptual hints. Children were then given a recognition test under 2 instructional conditions. In the inclusion condition children reported whether they remembered items from either of the previous phases. In the exclusion condition children were instructed to exclude postevent suggestions. Children were more likely to accept misled-generate items compared to misled-read items in the inclusion condition, but the opposite was the case under exclusion instructions. Both automaticity and recollection (cf. L. L. Jacoby, 1991) influenced misinformation acceptance, but the role of automatic processes declined with age.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-0011
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 22-11-2004
DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-8624.2004.00812.X
Abstract: Three experiments examined the changes in category representation that take place when children use exemplars for tasks other than classification. In Experiments 1 and 2, 6- and 10-year-old children learned to classify exemplars of a novel category and then used the same exemplars in an inferential prediction task. In a subsequent classification task, features that were predictive for both classification and inference were classified more accurately than features that were predictive only of category membership. Experiment 3 showed that features with multiple uses were also more likely to be retrieved in feature listing. The findings show that children's category representations are affected by the way exemplars are used after they have been categorized.
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 02-2016
DOI: 10.1037/XGE0000113
Abstract: Previous models of category-based induction have neglected how the process of induction unfolds over time. We conceive of induction as a dynamic process and provide the first fine-grained examination of the distribution of response times observed in inductive reasoning. We used these data to develop and empirically test the first major quantitative modeling scheme that simultaneously accounts for inductive decisions and their time course. The model assumes that knowledge of similarity relations among novel test probes and items stored in memory drive an accumulation-to-bound sequential s ling process: Test probes with high similarity to studied exemplars are more likely to trigger a generalization response, and more rapidly, than items with low exemplar similarity. We contrast data and model predictions for inductive decisions with a recognition memory task using a common stimulus set. Hierarchical Bayesian analyses across 2 experiments demonstrated that inductive reasoning and recognition memory primarily differ in the threshold to trigger a decision: Observers required less evidence to make a property generalization judgment (induction) than an identity statement about a previously studied item (recognition). Experiment 1 and a condition emphasizing decision speed in Experiment 2 also found evidence that inductive decisions use lower quality similarity-based information than recognition. The findings suggest that induction might represent a less cautious form of recognition. We conclude that sequential s ling models grounded in exemplar-based similarity, combined with hierarchical Bayesian analysis, provide a more fine-grained and informative analysis of the processes involved in inductive reasoning than is possible solely through examination of choice data.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 04-2014
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 12-1995
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 08-2010
DOI: 10.1080/17470210903438547
Abstract: Three studies examined how task demands that impact on attention to typical or atypical category features shape the category representations formed through classification learning and inference learning. During training categories were learned via exemplar classification or by inferring missing exemplar features. In the latter condition inferences were made about missing typical features alone (typical feature inference) or about both missing typical and atypical features (mixed feature inference). Classification and mixed feature inference led to the incorporation of typical and atypical features into category representations, with both kinds of features influencing inferences about familiar (Experiments 1 and 2) and novel (Experiment 3) test items. Those in the typical inference condition focused primarily on typical features. Together with formal modelling, these results challenge previous accounts that have characterized inference learning as producing a focus on typical category features. The results show that two different kinds of inference learning are possible and that these are subserved by different kinds of category representations.
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 08-2023
DOI: 10.1037/XLM0001152
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-11-2011
DOI: 10.3758/S13421-010-0022-7
Abstract: Two studies examined multiple category reasoning in property induction with cross-classified foods. Pilot tests identified foods that were more typical of a taxonomic category (e.g., "fruit" termed 'taxonomic primary') or a script based category (e.g., "snack foods" termed 'script primary'). They also confirmed that taxonomic categories were perceived as more coherent than script categories. In Experiment 1 participants completed an induction task in which information from multiple categories could be searched and combined to generate a property prediction about a target food. Multiple categories were more often consulted and used in prediction for script primary than for taxonomic primary foods. Experiment 2 replicated this finding across a range of property types but found that multiple category reasoning was reduced in the presence of a concurrent cognitive load. Property type affected which categories were consulted first and how information from multiple categories was weighted. The results show that multiple categories are more likely to be used for property predictions about cross-classified objects when an object is primarily associated with a category that has low coherence.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 19-01-2017
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000012
Abstract: Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, autonoetic character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken toward an event simulation. In this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in future-oriented mental time travel do justice neither to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 05-2013
DOI: 10.1037/A0029526
Abstract: Two studies examined whether adults and children could learn to make context-dependent inferences about novel stimuli and the role of awareness of context cues in such learning. Participants were trained to match probes to targets on the basis of shape or color with the relevant dimension shifting according to item context. A selective induction test then examined context-dependent responding in a more complex matching task. Awareness of the role of context was assessed using a behavioral task and explicit questions. Experiment 1 showed that after training with the procedure described by Sloutsky and Fisher (2008), only a minority of adults showed evidence of context-dependent responding in the selective induction test. Experiment 2 used a modified training protocol that promoted attention to context cues. This led to reliable selective induction in a majority of adults and a sizeable proportion of 4- to 6-year-olds. Crucially, in both age groups, selective induction was dependent on awareness of context. Hence, children as young as 4 can learn to make selective inferences about novel stimuli, but only when they are aware of the relevant context cues. These results challenge previous claims that selective induction in children is the product of implicit learning.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 03-2002
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-1995
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 06-2007
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X07001847
Abstract: The article by Barbey & Sloman (B& S) provides a valuable framework for integrating research on base-rate neglect and respect. The theoretical arguments and data supporting the nested set model are persuasive. But we found the dual-process account to be under-specified and less compelling. Our concerns are based on (a) inconsistencies within the literature cited by B& S, and (b) studies of base-rate neglect in categorization.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-11-2011
DOI: 10.3758/S13421-010-0009-4
Abstract: In four experiments, we investigated how people make feature predictions about objects whose category membership is uncertain. Artificial visual categories were presented and remained in view while a novel instance with a known feature, but uncertain category membership was presented. All four experiments showed that feature predictions about the test instance were most often based on feature correlations (referred to as feature conjunction reasoning). Experiment 1 showed that feature conjunction reasoning was generally preferred to category-based induction in a feature prediction task. Experiment 2 showed that people used all available exemplars to make feature conjunction predictions. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the preference for predictions based on feature conjunction persisted even when category-level information was made more salient and inferences involving a larger number of categories were required. Little evidence of reasoning based on the consideration of multiple categories (e.g., Anderson, (Psychological Review, 98:409-429, 1991)) or the single, most probable category (e.g., Murphy & Ross, (Cognitive Psychology, 27:148-193, 1994)) was found.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 2004
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 04-1996
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 08-2011
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1100029X
Abstract: Bayesian accounts are currently popular in the field of inductive reasoning. This commentary briefly reviews the limitations of one such account, the Rational Model (Anderson 1991b), in explaining how inferences are made about objects whose category membership is uncertain. These shortcomings are symptomatic of what Jones & Love (J& L) refer to as “fundamentalist” Bayesian approaches.
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 2008
DOI: 10.1037/0012-1649.44.5.1430
Abstract: Three studies examined the development of category-based induction using an induction then recognition (ITR) procedure in which participants make category-based predictions about study items and are then given a surprise recognition test that requires discrimination between old and new category members. Exposure duration for study items was either self-paced (Experiment 1) or fixed for 5-year-olds and adults (Experiments 2a-b). Adults always showed a decrement in recognition performance following induction. Children showed the same decrement when exposure duration was equated across age groups. These results show that both young children and adults spontaneously access category-level information during induction. When study exposure time is self-paced, however, children may process additional, noncategorical aspects of study stimuli.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 10-2018
DOI: 10.1016/J.SEMCANCER.2018.07.001
Abstract: The extent of tumor-infiltrating lymphocytes (TILs), along with immunomodulatory ligands, tumor-mutational burden and other biomarkers, has been demonstrated to be a marker of response to immune-checkpoint therapy in several cancers. Pathologists have therefore started to devise standardized visual approaches to quantify TILs for therapy prediction. However, despite successful standardization efforts visual TIL estimation is slow, with limited precision and lacks the ability to evaluate more complex properties such as TIL distribution patterns. Therefore, computational image analysis approaches are needed to provide standardized and efficient TIL quantification. Here, we discuss different automated TIL scoring approaches ranging from classical image segmentation, where cell boundaries are identified and the resulting objects classified according to shape properties, to machine learning-based approaches that directly classify cells without segmentation but rely on large amounts of training data. In contrast to conventional machine learning (ML) approaches that are often criticized for their "black-box" characteristics, we also discuss explainable machine learning. Such approaches render ML results interpretable and explain the computational decision-making process through high-resolution heatmaps that highlight TILs and cancer cells and therefore allow for quantification and plausibility checks in biomedical research and diagnostics.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2014
DOI: 10.1016/J.COGNITION.2014.08.011
Abstract: Two studies examined a novel prediction of the causal Bayes net approach to judgments under uncertainty, namely that causal knowledge affects the interpretation of statistical evidence obtained over multiple observations. Participants estimated the conditional probability of an uncertain event (breast cancer) given information about the base rate, hit rate (probability of a positive mammogram given cancer) and false positive rate (probability of a positive mammogram in the absence of cancer). Conditional probability estimates were made after observing one or two positive mammograms. Participants exhibited a causal stability effect: there was a smaller increase in estimates of the probability of cancer over multiple positive mammograms when a causal explanation of false positives was provided. This was the case when the judgments were made by different participants (Experiment 1) or by the same participants (Experiment 2). These results show that identical patterns of observed events can lead to different estimates of event probability depending on beliefs about the generative causes of the observations.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 29-03-2012
DOI: 10.1111/J.1551-6709.2012.01244.X
Abstract: Two experiments examined the impact of causal relations between features on categorization in 5- to 6-year-old children and adults. Participants learned artificial categories containing instances with causally related features and noncausal features. They then selected the most likely category member from a series of novel test pairs. Classification patterns and logistic regression were used to diagnose the presence of independent effects of causal coherence, causal status, and relational centrality. Adult classification was driven primarily by coherence when causal links were deterministic (Experiment 1) but showed additional influences of causal status when links were probabilistic (Experiment 2). Children's classification was based primarily on causal coherence in both cases. There was no effect of relational centrality in either age group. These results suggest that the generative model (Rehder, 2003a) provides a good account of causal categorization in children as well as adults.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2001
Publisher: American Speech Language Hearing Association
Date: 04-1992
Abstract: It is well known that unusual speech quality may result from stuttering treatments that are based on prolonged speech. However, empirical information concerning the speech quality associated with those treatments is lacking. The present study was designed to contribute such empirical information. Results indicated that speech quality assessments of posttreatment clients, using Martin, Haroldson, and Triden's (1984) speech naturalness scale, gave similar results regardless of whether they were based on monologues or conversations. The speech quality of those clients remained stable at the conclusion of their treatment program. Further, there was a significant, positive correlation between pretreatment speech measures and measures of speech naturalness made after the establishment of stutter-free speech. The subjects whose pretreatment stuttering was the most severe had posttreatment speech naturalness scores that were more than two scale values worse than the subjects whose pretreatment stuttering was the least severe. Speech naturalness scale scores are presented for nonstutterers and posttreatment stutterers and these data are compared with existing findings.
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 2007
DOI: 10.1037/0096-3445.136.3.470
Abstract: Four experiments examined the development of property induction on the basis of causal relations. In the first 2 studies, 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults were presented with triads in which a target instance was equally similar to 2 inductive bases but shared a causal antecedent feature with 1 of them. All 3 age groups used causal relations as a basis for property induction, although the proportion of causal inferences increased with age. Subsequent experiments pitted causal relations against featural similarity in induction. It was found that adults and 8-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, preferred shared causal relations over strong featural similarity as a basis for induction. The implications for models of inductive reasoning and development are discussed.
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 11-2022
DOI: 10.1037/XLM0001105
Abstract: Much recent research and theorizing in the field of reasoning has been concerned with intuitive sensitivity to logical validity, such as the logic-brightness effect, in which logically valid arguments are judged to have a "brighter" typeface than invalid arguments. We propose and test a novel signal competition account of this phenomenon. Our account makes two assumptions: (a) as per the demands of the logic-brightness task, people attempt to find a perceptual signal to guide brightness judgments, but (b) when the perceptual signal is hard to discern, they instead attend to cues such as argument validity. Experiment 1 tested this account by manipulating the difficulty of the perceptual contrast. When contrast discrimination was relatively difficult, we replicated the logic-brightness effect. When the discrimination was easy, the effect was eliminated. Experiment 2 manipulated the ambiguity of the perceptual task, comparing discrimination performance when the perceptual contrast was labeled in terms of rating "brightness" or "darkness". When the less ambiguous darkness labeling was used, there was no evidence of a logic-brightness effect. In both experiments, in idual sensitivity to the perceptual discrimination was negatively correlated with sensitivity to argument validity. Hierarchical latent mixture modeling revealed distinct in idual strategies: responses based on perceptual cues, responses based on validity or guessing. Consistent with the signal competition account, the proportion of those responding to validity increased with perceptual discrimination difficulty or task ambiguity. The results challenge explanations of the logic-brightness effect based on parallel dual-process models of reasoning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 09-2023
DOI: 10.1037/XLM0001149
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 15-05-2017
DOI: 10.3758/S13423-017-1312-X
Abstract: Previous work has demonstrated a "side-effect effect," such that intentionality is more likely to be attributed to agents who bring about negatively valenced as opposed to positively valenced side effects. The rational-scientist model explains this by suggesting that norm-violating side effects are more informative for inferring intentionality than norm-conforming side effects. In the present study we reexamined this account, addressing limitations of previous empirical tests (e.g., Uttich & Lombrozo, Cognition 116: 87-100, 2010). Side-effect valence and norm status were manipulated factorially, enabling an examination of the impact of norm status on intentionality judgments in both positively and negatively valenced side effects. Additionally, the impact of side-effect norm status on the perceived valences of side effects and agents was examined. Effects of norm status were found for both positive and negative side effects. Violation of an ostensibly neutral norm led to negative perceptions of the side effect. However, a norm status effect on intentionality judgments persisted when these effects were controlled. These results support the view that the side-effect effect is the result of the rational use of social-cognitive evidence.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-2010
DOI: 10.3758/PBR.17.6.869
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 04-2005
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 09-2019
DOI: 10.1016/J.COGPSYCH.2019.05.003
Abstract: We propose and test a Bayesian model of property induction with evidence that has been selectively s led leading to "censoring" or exclusion of potentially relevant data. A core model prediction is that identical evidence s les can lead to different patterns of inductive inference depending on the censoring mechanisms that cause some instances to be excluded. This prediction was confirmed in four experiments examining property induction following exposure to identical s les that were subject to different s ling frames. Each experiment found narrower generalization of a novel property when the s le instances were selected because they shared a common property (property s ling) than when they were selected because they belonged to the same category (category s ling). In line with model predictions, s ling frame effects were moderated by the addition of explicit negative evidence (Experiment 1), s le size (Experiment 2) and category base rates (Experiments 3-4). These data show that reasoners are sensitive to constraints on the s ling process when making property inferences they consider both the observed evidence and the reasons why certain types of evidence has not been observed.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-2008
DOI: 10.1002/BDM.584
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 03-2018
Publisher: No publisher found
Date: 1993
Abstract: This study is an attempt to clarify the nature of developmental differences in the use of prototypical features or information about specific exemplars for object categorization and to identify stimulus factors that may modulate the use of these information sources. To this end, 6-year-olds, 11-year-olds, and adults were taught to sort visual patterns into one of two overlapping categories. Immediately or 24 h following category acquisition subjects were presented with a set of transfer stimuli consisting of both old and new patterns, including the theoretical prototype. Categorization responses to these test stimuli were examined against predictions derived from the prototype and nearest-old-exemplar accounts of categorization. A significant developmental change in the process of categorization was noted. For the youngest group, only the prototype model was found to fit the test data, whereas for the older groups both models independently explained significant amounts of variance in performance. This trend was not affected by the delay between training and testing, nor by a manipulation of intracategory variability. The emergence of the specific exemplar model as a viable explanation of ill-defined categorization thus appears to be related to the developmental level attained.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-1989
DOI: 10.1007/BF01173404
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 09-2009
DOI: 10.3758/MC.37.6.730
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 02-2023
DOI: 10.1037/XLM0001171
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 21-09-2011
DOI: 10.3758/S13423-011-0155-0
Abstract: Recent research has examined how people predict unobserved features of an object when its category membership is ambiguous. The debate has focused on whether predictions are based solely on information from the most likely category, or whether information from other possible categories is also used. In the present experiment, we compared these category-based approaches with feature conjunction reasoning, where predictions are based on a comparison among exemplars (rather than categories) that share features with a target object. Reasoning strategies were assessed by examining patterns of feature prediction and by using an eye gaze measure of attention during induction. The main findings were (1) the majority of participants used feature conjunction rather than categorical strategies, (2) people predominantly gazed at the exemplars that were most similar to the target object, and (3) although people gazed most at the most probable category to which an object could belong, they also attended to other plausible category alternatives during induction. These findings question the extent to which category-based reasoning is used for induction when category membership is uncertain.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 10-2002
Publisher: Elsevier
Date: 2006
Publisher: No publisher found
Date: 1997
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 07-2022
DOI: 10.1037/XAN0000327
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 28-12-2018
DOI: 10.1002/WCS.1459
Abstract: Inductive reasoning entails using existing knowledge to make predictions about novel cases. The first part of this review summarizes key inductive phenomena and critically evaluates theories of induction. We highlight recent theoretical advances, with a special emphasis on the structured statistical approach, the importance of s ling assumptions in Bayesian models, and connectionist modeling. A number of new research directions in this field are identified including comparisons of inductive and deductive reasoning, the identification of common core processes in induction and memory tasks and induction involving category uncertainty. The implications of induction research for areas as erse as complex decision-making and fear generalization are discussed. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Psychology > Learning.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2020
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 2016
DOI: 10.1037/XLM0000205
Abstract: Four experiments examined the locus of impact of causal knowledge on consideration of alternative hypotheses in judgments under uncertainty. Two possible loci were examined overcoming neglect of the alternative when developing a representation of a judgment problem and improving utilization of statistics associated with the alternative hypothesis. In Experiment 1, participants could search for information about the various components of Bayes's rule in a diagnostic problem. A majority failed to spontaneously search for information about an alternative hypothesis, but this bias was reduced when a specific alternative hypothesis was mentioned before search. No change in search patterns was found when a generic alternative cause was mentioned. Experiments 2a and 2b broadly replicated these patterns when participants rated or made binary judgments about the relevance of each of the Bayesian components. In contrast, Experiment 3 showed that when participants were given the likelihood of the data given a focal hypothesis p(D|H) and an alternative hypothesis p(D|¬H), they gave estimates of p(H|D) that were consistent with Bayesian principles. Additional causal knowledge had relatively little impact on such judgments. These results show that causal knowledge primarily affects neglect of the alternative hypothesis at the initial stage of problem representation. (PsycINFO Database Record
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 07-01-2014
DOI: 10.3758/S13423-013-0576-Z
Abstract: In two experiments, we examined the development of sensitivity to the inductive potential of shared novel noun and feature labels. Children (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds, and 8-year-olds) and adults were presented with a complete base stimulus and an incomplete target. The task was to infer whether the missing target feature matched the corresponding base feature. The base and target were given matching or mismatching novel labels, which were either count nouns or adjectives describing object features. Use of matching labels for induction increased with age. Nevertheless, all age groups were more likely to make inferences based on novel noun labels rather than feature labels. These results support the view that even preschool children grasp the conceptual significance of count nouns for induction.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-2008
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 25-08-2021
Abstract: Studying generalisation of associative learning requires analysis of response gradients measured over a continuous stimulus dimension. In human studies, there is often a high degree of in idual variation in the gradients, making it difficult to draw conclusions about group-level trends with traditional statistical methods. Here, we demonstrate a novel method of analysing generalisation gradients based on hierarchical Bayesian curve-fitting. This method involves fitting an augmented (asymmetrical) Gaussian function to in idual gradients and estimating its parameters in a hierarchical Bayesian framework. We show how the posteriors can be used to characterise group differences in generalisation and how classic generalisation phenomena such as peak shift and area shift can be measured and inferred. Estimation of descriptive parameters can provide a detailed and informative way of analysing human generalisation gradients.
Publisher: No publisher found
Date: 1994
Abstract: An investigation was conducted to compare the effects of single word and connected speech s ling conditions on the production of consonant clusters. Speech s les were obtained from 40 children with speech sound impairments who were aged 3 years: 6 months to 5 years. The children's productions of 36 commonly occurring consonant clusters were compared across the two s ling conditions. Overall children's productions were more similar than different. Differences between the s ling conditions were apparent for three of the eight phonological processes studied, namely, cluster reduction, final consonant deletion, and epenthesis. Of 12 fine phonetic variations, only aspirated stops showed a significant difference between the s ling conditions. There was a wide range of in idual variation.
Publisher: Frontiers Media SA
Date: 17-06-2014
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 21-06-2019
Abstract: In property induction tasks, encountering a erse range of instances (e.g., hippos and hamsters) with a given property usually increases our willingness to generalise that property to a novel instance, relative to non- erse evidence (e.g., hippos and rhinos). Although generalisation in property induction and predictive learning tasks share conceptual similarities, it is unknown whether this ersity principle applies to generalisation of a predictive association. We tested this hypothesis in two predictive learning experiments using differential training where one category of stimuli (e.g., fruits) predicted an outcome and another category (e.g., vegetables) predicted no outcome. We compared generalisation between a Non-Diverse group who were presented with non- erse evidence in both positive (predicted the outcome) and negative (predicted no outcome) categories, and two groups who received the same training as the Non-Diverse group but with a more erse range of exemplars in the positive (Diverse+ group) or negative (Diverse– group) category. Diversity effects were found for both positive and negative categories, in that learning about a erse range of exemplars increased generalisation of a predictive association to novel exemplars from that same category. The results suggest that ersity, a key principle describing how we reason inductively, also applies to generalisation in associative learning tasks.
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 08-1997
DOI: 10.1037/0021-9010.82.4.562
Abstract: In this study the authors examine the effects of procedures adapted from the cognitive interview of R. E. Geiselman, R.P. Fisher, D.P. MacKinnon, and H.L. Holland (1985) on children's recall following exposure to misleading suggestions. Children aged 5-7 years and 9-11 years saw a videotaped story and were presented with misleading or neutral information concerning story details. All were later given free- and cued-recall tests preceded by standard interview instructions or instructions that reinstated the encoding context and encouraged exhaustive reporting. Increased recall accuracy was found following cognitive interview instructions. Both age groups were susceptible to misleading suggestions, but susceptibility was unaffected by interview type. The authors discuss the implications for interviewing child witnesses.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 31-01-2013
DOI: 10.3758/S13421-013-0297-6
Abstract: Conventionally, memory and reasoning are seen as different types of cognitive activities driven by different processes. In two experiments, we challenged this view by examining the relationship between recognition memory and inductive reasoning involving multiple forms of similarity. A common study set (members of a conjunctive category) was followed by a test set containing old and new category members, as well as items that matched the study set on only one dimension. The study and test sets were presented under recognition or induction instructions. In Experiments 1 and 2, the inductive property being generalized was varied in order to direct attention to different dimensions of similarity. When there was no time pressure on decisions, patterns of positive responding were strongly affected by property type, indicating that different types of similarity were driving recognition and induction. By comparison, speeded judgments showed weaker property effects and could be explained by generalization based on overall similarity. An exemplar model, GEN-EX (GENeralization from EX les), could account for both the induction and recognition data. These findings show that induction and recognition share core component processes, even when the tasks involve flexible forms of similarity.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 1992
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2004
DOI: 10.1016/S0010-0277(03)00159-8
Abstract: Previous research (e.g. Cognition 64 (1997) 73) suggests that the privileged level for inductive inference in a folk biological conceptual hierarchy does not correspond to the "basic" level (i.e. the level at which concepts are both informative and distinct). To further explore inductive inference within conceptual hierarchies, we examine relations between knowledge of concepts at different hierarchical levels, expectations about conceptual coherence, and inductive inference. In Experiments 1 and 2, 5- and 8-year-olds and adults listed features of living kind (Experiments 1 and 2) and artifact (Experiment 2) concepts at different hierarchical levels (e.g. plant, tree, oak, desert oak), and also rated the strength of generalizations to the same concepts. For living kinds, the level that showed a relative advantage on these two tasks differed the greatest increase in features listed tended to occur at the life-form level (e.g. tree), whereas the greatest increase in inductive strength tended to occur at the folk-generic level (e.g. oak). Knowledge and induction also showed different developmental trajectories. For artifact concepts, the levels at which the greatest gains in knowledge and induction occurred were more varied, and corresponded more closely across tasks. In Experiment 3, adults reported beliefs about within-category similarity for concepts at different levels of animal, plant and artifact hierarchies, and rated inductive strength as before. For living kind concepts, expectations about category coherence predicted patterns of inductions knowledge did not. For artifact concepts, both knowledge and expectations predicted patterns of induction. Results suggest that beliefs about conceptual coherence play an important role in guiding inductive inference, that this role may be largely independent of specific knowledge of concepts, and that such beliefs are especially important in reasoning about living kinds.
Publisher: Annual Reviews
Date: 17-10-2014
DOI: 10.1146/ANNUREV-ENVIRON-010713-094623
Abstract: Humanity faces an unprecedented set of global environmental problems. We argue that to promote pro-environmental decisions and to achieve public consensus on the need for action we must address in idual and collective understanding (cognition) of environmental problems, as well as in idual and collective commitments to take action to mitigate or prevent those problems. We review literature pertaining to psychological predispositions, mental models, framing, psychological distance, and the social context of decisions that help elucidate how these goals of cognition and commitment can be achieved. This article reveals the complex and multiply determined nature of environmental decisions. However, we argue that this complexity points to opportunities to reduce the inherent uncertainty surrounding global environmental challenges via appeals to the psychological mechanisms that underpin our decisions.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-2009
DOI: 10.1002/BDM.646
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 2012
DOI: 10.1037/A0026038
Abstract: Previous research has suggested that when feature inferences have to be made about an instance whose category membership is uncertain, feature-based inductive reasoning is used to the exclusion of category-based induction. These results contrast with the observation that people can and do use category-based induction when category membership is known. The present experiments examined the conditions that drive feature-based and category-based strategies in induction under category uncertainty. Specifically, 2 experiments investigated whether reliance on feature-based inductive strategies is a product of the lack of coherence in the categories used in previous research or is due to the use of a decision-only induction procedure. Experiment 1 found that feature-based reasoning remained the preferred strategy even when categories with relatively high internal coherence were used. Experiment 2 found a shift toward category-based reasoning when participants were trained to classify category members prior to feature induction. Together, these results suggest that an appropriate conceptual representation must be formed through experience with a category before it is likely to be used as a basis for feature induction.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 02-2005
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X05360018
Abstract: The proposal regarding rules and similarity is considered in terms of ability to provide insights regarding previous work on reasoning and categorization. For reasoning, the issue is the relation between this proposal and one-process as well as two-process accounts of deduction and induction. For categorization, the issue is how the proposal would simultaneously explain both similarity-to-rule and rule-to-similarity shifts.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 06-2010
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X10000373
Abstract: We critically review key lines of evidence and theoretical argument relevant to Machery's “heterogeneity hypothesis.” These include interactions between different kinds of concept representations, unified approaches to explaining contextual effects on concept retrieval, and a critique of empirical dissociations as evidence for concept heterogeneity. We suggest there are good grounds for retaining the concept construct in human cognition.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-2004
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-2020
DOI: 10.1111/COGS.12895
Abstract: The extent to which we generalize a novel property from a s le of familiar instances to novel instances depends on the s le composition. Previous property induction experiments have only used s les consisting of novel types (unique entities). Because real‐world evidence s les often contain redundant tokens (repetitions of the same entity), we studied the effects on property induction of adding types and tokens to an observed s le. In Experiments 1–3, we presented participants with a s le of birds or flowers known to have a novel property and probed whether this property generalized to novel items varying in similarity to the initial s le. Increasing the number of novel types (e.g., new birds with the target property) in a s le produced tightening, promoting property generalization to highly similar stimuli but decreasing generalization to less similar stimuli. On the other hand, increasing the number of tokens (e.g., repeated presentations of the same bird with the target property) had little effect on generalization. Experiment 4 showed that repeated tokens are encoded and can benefit recognition, but appear to be given little weight when inferring property generalization. We modified an existing Bayesian model of induction (Navarro, Dry, & Lee, 2012) to account for both the information added by new types and the discounting of information conveyed by tokens.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 11-2007
DOI: 10.1016/J.BRAT.2007.07.005
Abstract: This experimental study investigated whether preparatory sensory information was more effective in managing children's pain when coupled with a distraction technique. Seventy-eight children aged 7-12 years were randomly allocated to 1 of 4 experimental conditions. They were given either a detailed sensory description of an imminent painful event (cold-pressor arm immersion in 10 degrees C water) or control instructions lacking sensory information. During the cold-pressor task, half the s le received an imagery-based distraction intervention. Pain measures included immersion tolerance, self-reported pain intensity, and facial pain responses. Self-reported coping style was assessed using the Pain Coping Questionnaire [Reid, G. J., Gilbert, C. A., & McGrath, P. J. (1998). The pain coping questionnaire: Preliminary validation. Pain, 76, 83-96]. The effects of information provision interacted with distraction for pain intensity but not pain tolerance. Children given sensory preparation reported less intense pain when this was coupled with distraction than when it was not. Children with a distraction-based coping style showed greater tolerance when assigned to a condition congruent with their coping style. These findings suggest ways to better prepare children for painful medical procedures.
Publisher: BMJ
Date: 27-10-2017
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 2013
DOI: 10.1037/A0028891
Abstract: In 2 studies, the authors examined the development of the relationship between inductive reasoning and visual recognition memory. In both studies, 5- to 6-year-old children and adults were shown instances of a basic-level category (dogs) followed by a test set containing old and new category members that varied in their similarity to study items. Participants were given either recognition instructions (memorize study items and discriminate between old and new test items) or induction instructions (learn about a novel property shared by the study items and decide whether it generalizes to test items). Across both tasks, children made a greater number of positive responses than did adults. Across both age groups, a greater number of positive responses were made in induction than in recognition. The application of a mathematical model, called GEN-EX for generalization from ex les, showed that both memory and reasoning data could be explained by a single exemplar-based process that assumes task and age differences in generalization gradients. These results show considerable developmental continuity in the cognitive processes that underlie memory and inductive reasoning.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 11-03-2013
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 06-2007
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 13-09-2017
DOI: 10.3758/S13421-017-0750-Z
Abstract: Three studies reexamined the claim that clarifying the causal origin of key statistics can increase normative performance on Bayesian problems involving judgment under uncertainty. Experiments 1 and 2 found that causal explanation did not increase the rate of normative solutions. However, certain types of causal explanation did lead to a reduction in the magnitude of errors in probability estimation. This effect was most pronounced when problem statistics were expressed in percentage formats. Experiment 3 used process-tracing methods to examine the impact of causal explanation of false positives on solution strategies. Changes in probability estimation following causal explanation were the result of a mixture of in idual reasoning strategies, including non-Bayesian mechanisms, such as increased attention to explained statistics and approximations of subcomponents of Bayes' rule. The results show that although causal explanation of statistics can affect the way that a problem is mentally represented, this does not necessarily lead to an increased rate of normative responding.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 12-1998
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X98311760
Abstract: The discovery of a quaternary complexity limitation to mature cognitive operations raises important theoretical issues. We propose that cognitive limitations arise naturally in a complex dynamic information processing system, and consider problems such as the distinction between parallel and serial processes and the representativeness of the empirical data base used by Halford et al. to support their relational complexity scheme.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 09-2003
DOI: 10.3758/BF03196515
Abstract: A framework theory, organized around the principle of relevance, is proposed for category-based reasoning. According to the relevance principle, people assume that premises are informative with respect to conclusions. This idea leads to the prediction that people will use causal scenarios and property reinforcement strategies in inductive reasoning. These predictions are contrasted with both existing models and normative logic. Judgments of argument strength were gathered in three different countries, and the results showed the importance of both causal scenarios and property reinforcement in category-based inferences. The relation between the relevance framework and existing models of category-based inductive reasoning is discussed in the light of these findings.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2018
DOI: 10.1016/J.JBTEP.2017.12.001
Abstract: This study examined the hypothesis that participants diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) show a selective deficit in inductive reasoning but are equivalent to controls in deductive reasoning. Twenty-five participants with OCD and 25 non-clinical controls made inductive and deductive judgments about a common set of arguments that varied in logical validity and the amount of positive evidence provided (premise s le size). A second inductive reasoning task required participants to make forced-choice decisions and rate the usefulness of erse evidence or non- erse evidence for evaluating arguments. No differences in deductive reasoning were found between participants diagnosed with OCD and control participants. Both groups saw that the amount of positive evidence supporting a conclusion was an important guide for evaluating inductive arguments. However, those with OCD showed less sensitivity to premise ersity in inductive reasoning than controls. The findings were similar for both emotionally neutral and OCD-relevant stimuli. The absence of a clinical control group means that it is difficult to know whether the deficit in ersity-based reasoning is specific to those with OCD. People with OCD are impaired in some forms of inductive reasoning (using erse evidence) but not others (use of s le size). Deductive reasoning appears intact in those with OCD. Difficulties using evidence ersity when reasoning inductively may maintain OCD symptoms through reduced generalization of learned safety information.
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 04-2019
DOI: 10.1037/XLM0000753
Abstract: Four experiments examined the claims that people can intuitively assess the logical validity of arguments, and that qualitatively different reasoning processes drive intuitive and explicit validity assessments. In each study participants evaluated arguments varying in validity and believability using either deductive criteria (logic task) or via an intuitive, affective response (liking task). Experiment 1 found that people are sensitive to argument validity on both tasks, with valid arguments receiving higher liking as well as higher deductive ratings than invalid arguments. However, the claim that this effect is driven by logical intuitions was challenged by the finding that sensitivity to validity in both liking and logic tasks was affected in similar ways by manipulations of concurrent memory load (Experiments 1 and 2) and variations in in idual working memory capacity (Experiments 3 and 4). In both tasks better discrimination between valid and invalid arguments was found when more working memory resources were available. Formal signal detection models of reasoning were tested against the experimental data using signed difference analysis (Stephens, Dunn, & Hayes, 2018b). A single-process reasoning model which assumes that argument evaluation in both logic and liking tasks involves a single latent dimension for assessing argument strength but different response criteria for each task, was found to be consistent with the data from each experiment (as were some dual-process models). The experimental and modeling results confirm that people are sensitive to argument validity in both explicit logic and affect rating tasks, but that these results can be explained by a single underlying reasoning process. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 08-2001
Abstract: Three experiments examined how children's domain knowledge and observation of exemplars interact during concept acquisition and how exposure to novel exemplars causes revision of such knowledge. In Experiments 1 (N = 126) and 2 (N = 64), children aged 4 to 10 years were shown exemplars of fictitious animal categories that were either unrelated to, or consistent with, their prior knowledge in 25% or 75% of presented exemplars. In Experiment 3, children (N = 290) saw fictitious animal, artifact, or unfamiliar social categories that were either consistent or inconsistent with their prior knowledge in 20%, 40%, 60%, or 80% of exemplars. In the test, children made judgments about the likely co-occurence of features. In all experiments, prior knowledge and exemplar observation independently influenced children's categorization judgments. Utilization of prior knowledge was consistent across age and domain, but 10-year-olds were more sensitive to observed feature covariation. Training with larger categories increased the impact of observed feature covariation and decreased reliance on prior knowledge.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2020
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 2001
Publisher: American Psychological Association (APA)
Date: 10-2021
DOI: 10.1037/XGE0001031
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 22-09-2016
DOI: 10.1111/DESC.12469
Abstract: This experiment examined single-process and dual-process accounts of the development of visual recognition memory. The participants, 6-7-year-olds, 9-10-year-olds and adults, were presented with a list of pictures which they encoded under shallow or deep conditions. They then made recognition and confidence judgments about a list containing old and new items. We replicated the main trends reported by Ghetti and Angelini () in that recognition hit rates increased from 6 to 9 years of age, with larger age changes following deep than shallow encoding. Formal versions of the dual-process high threshold signal detection model and several single-process models (equal variance signal detection, unequal variance signal detection, mixture signal detection) were fit to the developmental data. The unequal variance and mixture signal detection models gave a better account of the data than either of the other models. A state-trace analysis found evidence for only one underlying memory process across the age range tested. These results suggest that single-process memory models based on memory strength are a viable alternative to dual-process models for explaining memory development.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 2002
DOI: 10.1002/ACP.789
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 27-07-2017
Abstract: Conventionally, the process of clinical diagnosis is seen as distinct from subsequent clinical decisions. In the current study we challenge this distinction by examining a category use effect whereby diagnostic features that can be used to classify instances and make additional predictions are more likely to be used in diagnosis. During training, senior medical students ( n = 36) and undergraduates ( n = 44) learned to classify cases into one of two artificial disease categories. They were then asked to make an additional prediction about each instance. Some features were informative for both diagnosis and the additional prediction (relevant-use features) whereas others were useful only for diagnosis (irrelevant-use features). At test, all groups classified instances with relevant-use features more accurately and confidently than instances with irrelevant-use features. This effect was stronger in those with clinical training and when there was a plausible connection between diagnosis and prediction. The implications for clinical psychology diagnosis and judgment are discussed.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 02-2018
DOI: 10.1111/POPS.12486
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 10-2019
Start Date: 2012
End Date: 2014
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 01-2004
End Date: 03-2007
Amount: $170,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2016
End Date: 06-2019
Amount: $318,166.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 04-2015
End Date: 06-2019
Amount: $534,209.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2012
End Date: 12-2014
Amount: $228,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 01-2013
End Date: 12-2016
Amount: $231,014.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 08-2006
End Date: 12-2010
Amount: $240,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2007
End Date: 02-2011
Amount: $271,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 05-2012
End Date: 05-2016
Amount: $215,913.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2002
End Date: 12-2004
Amount: $149,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 07-2019
End Date: 06-2022
Amount: $390,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 01-2010
End Date: 01-2013
Amount: $254,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 07-2022
End Date: 06-2025
Amount: $394,244.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 07-2019
End Date: 06-2023
Amount: $440,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
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