ORCID Profile
0000-0002-6293-7873
Current Organisation
University of Western Australia
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Publisher: Akademiai Kiado Zrt.
Date: 02-2021
Abstract: Serotonergic (or “ classic” ) psychedelics have struck many researchers as raising significant philosophical questions that, until recently, were largely unexplored by academic philosophers. This paper provides an overview of four emerging lines of research at the intersection of academic philosophy and psychedelic science that have gained considerable traction in the last decade: selfless consciousness, psychedelic epistemology, psychedelic ethics, and spiritual/religious naturalism. In this paper, we highlight philosophical questions concerning (i) psychedelics, self-consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness, (ii) the epistemic profile of the psychedelic experience (iii) ethical concerns about the appropriate use of psychedelics and (iv) whether spiritual or religious dimensions of psychedelic use are compatible with a naturalistic worldview.
Publisher: Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum
Date: 24-03-2020
DOI: 10.33735/PHIMISCI.2020.I.47
Abstract: Can there be phenomenal consciousness without self-consciousness? Strong intuitions and prominent theories of consciousness say “no”: experience requires minimal self-awareness, or “subjectivity”. This “subjectivity principle” (SP) faces apparent counterex les in the form of anomalous mental states claimed to lack self-consciousness entirely, such as “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia and certain mental states in depersonalization disorder (DPD). However, Billon & Kriegel (2015) have defended SP by arguing (inter alia) that while some of these mental states may be totally selfless, those states are not phenomenally conscious and thus do not constitute genuine counterex les to SP. I argue that this defence cannot work in relation to certain experiences of ego dissolution induced by potent fast-acting serotonergic psychedelics. These mental states jointly instantiate the two features whose co-instantiation by a single mental state SP prohibits: (a) phenomenal consciousness and (b) total lack of self-consciousness. One possible objection is that these mental states may lack “me-ness” and “mineness” but cannot lack “for-me-ness”, a special inner awareness of mental states by the self. In response I propose a dilemma. For-me-ness can be defined either as containing a genuinely experiential component or as not. On the first horn, for-me-ness is clearly absent (I argue) from my counterex les. On the second horn, for-me-ness has been defined in a way that conflicts with the claims and methods of its proponents, and the claim that phenomenally conscious mental states can totally lack self-consciousness has been conceded. I conclude with some reflections on the intuitive plausibility of SP in light of evidence from altered states.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2016
DOI: 10.1016/J.CONCOG.2015.11.012
Abstract: One recent development in epistemology, the philosophical study of knowledge, is the notion of 'epistemic innocence' introduced by Bortolotti and colleagues. This concept expresses the idea that certain suboptimal cognitive processes may nonetheless have epistemic (knowledge-related) benefits. The idea that delusion or confabulation may have psychological benefits is familiar enough. What is novel and interesting is the idea that such conditions may also yield significant and otherwise unavailable epistemic benefits. I apply the notion of epistemic innocence to research on the transformative potential of psychedelic drugs. The popular epithet 'hallucinogen' exemplifies a view of these substances as fundamentally epistemically detrimental. I argue that the picture is more complicated and that some psychedelic states can be epistemically innocent. This conclusion is highly relevant to policy debates about psychedelic therapy. Moreover, analysing the case of psychedelics can shed further light on the concept of epistemic innocence itself.
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 14-03-2022
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 18-08-2017
DOI: 10.1111/ZYGO.12353
Publisher: Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum
Date: 19-04-2022
DOI: 10.33735/PHIMISCI.2022.9627
Abstract: In this précis I summarise the main ideas of my book Philosophy of Psychedelics. The book discusses philosophical issues arising from the therapeutic use of “classic” (serotonergic) psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin and LSD. The book is organised around what I call the Comforting Delusion Objection to psychedelic therapy: the concern that this novel and promising treatment relies essentially on the induction of non-naturalistic metaphysical beliefs, rendering it epistemically (and perhaps, therefore, ethically) objectionable. I begin the précis by summarizing material from chapters two and three of the book, which review evidence for the therapeutic efficacy of psychedelics, and the facts about their clinical use that prompt the Comforting Delusion Objection. I then summarize materials from chapters four and five of the book, which argue that psychedelic therapy works neither by experience-independent processes of neuroplasticity, nor by inducing non-naturalistic metaphysical ideations, but by altering mental representations of the self. Next, I summarise the specific, speculative account of how this might work that is developed in chapters six and seven of the book. This account is based on the predictive processing theory of brain function and the self-binding theory of self-representation. Chapters eight and nine of the book argue, on the basis of this account, that psychedelic therapy can have significant epistemic and spiritual benefits that are compatible with a naturalistic worldview. I summarize this material, and then, finally, the overall conclusions about psychedelic therapy drawn in the tenth and final chapter of the book.
Publisher: Akademiai Kiado Zrt.
Date: 23-06-2022
Abstract: In this opinion piece we propose the investigation of psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy for the treatment of body dysmorphic disorder (BDD). BDD is a psychiatric disorder characterised by appearance-based preoccupations and accompanying compulsions. While safe and effective treatments for BDD exist, non-response and relapse rates remain high. Therefore, there is a need to investigate promising new treatment options for this highly debilitating condition. Preliminary evidence suggests safety, feasibility, and potential efficacy of psychedelic treatments in disorders that share similar psychopathological mechanisms with BDD. Drawing on this evidence, as well as on relevant qualitative reports and theoretical proposals, we argue that it would be worthwhile to conduct a phase 2a study aimed at assessing the safety and feasibility of psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy in BDD. We also offer some suggestions for how future research ought to proceed.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-06-2012
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 23-11-2021
DOI: 10.1038/S41598-021-01209-2
Abstract: Can the use of psychedelic drugs induce lasting changes in metaphysical beliefs? While it is popularly believed that they can, this question has never been formally tested. Here we exploited a large s le derived from prospective online surveying to determine whether and how beliefs concerning the nature of reality, consciousness, and free-will, change after psychedelic use. Results revealed significant shifts away from ‘physicalist’ or ‘materialist’ views, and towards panpsychism and fatalism, post use. With the exception of fatalism, these changes endured for at least 6 months, and were positively correlated with the extent of past psychedelic-use and improved mental-health outcomes. Path modelling suggested that the belief-shifts were moderated by impressionability at baseline and mediated by perceived emotional synchrony with others during the psychedelic experience. The observed belief-shifts post-psychedelic-use were consolidated by data from an independent controlled clinical trial. Together, these findings imply that psychedelic-use may causally influence metaphysical beliefs—shifting them away from ‘hard materialism’. We discuss whether these apparent effects are contextually independent.
Publisher: Imprint Academic Ltd
Date: 14-07-2022
DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.7.069
Abstract: An emerging body of research suggests that psychedelic experiences can change users' religious or metaphysical beliefs. Here I explore issues concerning psychedelic-induced belief change via a critique of some recent arguments by Wayne Glausser. Two scientific studies seem to show that psychedelic experiences can convert atheists to belief in God, but Glausser holds that academic and popular discussions of these studies are misleading. I offer a different analysis of the relevant findings, attempting to preserve the insights of Glausser's critique while setting the record straight on some important points. For one thing, the studies provide stronger evidence for atheist 'deconversion' than Glausser allows. For another, Glausser's arguments against the 'Metaphysical Belief Theory' of psychedelic therapy involve scientifically dubious claims and inferences. Finally, in evaluating this theory, we ought to focus on its strongest version, which posits belief shifts from metaphysical naturalism to nonnaturalism, rather than from atheism to classical monotheism.
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 25-06-2021
Abstract: Are psychedelics able to induce lasting changes in metaphysical beliefs? While it is popularly believed that they can, this has never been systematically tested. Here we exploited a large s le derived from prospective online surveying to determine whether and how beliefs concerning the nature of reality, consciousness, and free-will, change after psychedelic use. Results revealed significant shifts away from ‘physicalist’ or ‘materialist’ views, and towards panpsychism and fatalism, post use. These changes remained detectable at 6 months, and were associated with the extent of past use and improved mental-health outcomes. Path modelling suggested that the belief-shifts were moderated by impressionability at baseline and mediated by perceived emotional synchrony with others during the psychedelic experience. The observed belief-shifts post psychedelic use were confirmed by data from an independent controlled clinical trial. Together, these findings imply that psychedelic use has a causal influence on metaphysical beliefs – shifting them away from ‘hard materialism’.
Publisher: Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum
Date: 19-04-2022
DOI: 10.33735/PHIMISCI.2022.9642
Abstract: Much of my book Philosophy of Psychedelics is devoted to elaborating and defending two basic claims: that psychedelic therapy works mainly by changing mental representations of the self, and that it has many epistemic benefits consistent with a naturalistic worldview. The commentaries in this symposium generally focus on one or the other of these claims. On the mechanistic front, the commentaries by Hoffman and by Martin and Sterzer seek to supplement my account by drawing attention to factors it does not emphasize. In this reply I agree with most of their claims, but propose some important qualifications. Meanwhile, the commentaries by Lyon and Farrenikova and by Colombo challenge some core commitments of my account. I agree with many of their claims, but defend some of these core commitments. On the epistemological front, Bortolotti and Murphy-Hollies endorse the overall shape of my account and make some productive connections to ideas concerning agency-first epistemology and self know-how. Caporuscio brings into play the idea of self-shaping, which connects to self know-how, but argues against certain core claims of my account. I endorse many of these claims about agency-first, self know-how, and self-shaping, but propose some important qualifications. Finally, Fink agrees that psychedelic experiences can have some epistemic benefits, but argues that these do not pertain to epistemic justification, and that the main benefit is increased understanding. I am sympathetic to Fink’s proposal about understanding, but criticize some of his arguments for the thesis of Psychedelic Justification Impossibilism.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 2017
DOI: 10.1093/NC/NIX016
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 29-03-2022
No related grants have been discovered for Chris Letheby.