ORCID Profile
0000-0002-6792-1192
Current Organisations
Institute for Advanced Studies
,
University of Vienna
,
Universität Wien
Does something not look right? The information on this page has been harvested from data sources that may not be up to date. We continue to work with information providers to improve coverage and quality. To report an issue, use the Feedback Form.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 28-01-2016
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 04-2013
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 10-2016
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 05-2017
Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Date: 10-2013
Abstract: We study the effects of time pressure on risky decisions for pure gain prospects, pure loss prospects, and mixed prospects involving both gains and losses. In two experiments we find that time pressure has no effect on risk attitudes for gains, but increases risk aversion for losses. For mixed prospects, subjects become simultaneously more loss averse and more gain seeking under time pressure, depending on the framing of the prospects. The results suggest the importance of aspiration levels, and thus the overall probability to break even, under time pressure. We discuss the implications of our findings for decision-making situations that involve time pressure. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2022
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 04-2018
DOI: 10.1016/J.YHBEH.2018.02.003
Abstract: Decision-making in groups is a remarkable and decisive element of human societies. Humans are able to organize themselves in groups, engage in collaborative decision-making processes and arrive at a binding agreement, even in the absence of unanimous consent. However, the transfer of decision-making autonomy requires a willingness to deliberately expose oneself to the decisions of others. A lack of trust in the abilities of others or of the underlying decision-making process, i.e. public trust, can lead to a breakdown of organizations in political or economic domains. Recent studies indicate that the biological basis of trust on an in idual level is related to Oxytocin, an endogenous neuropeptide and hormone, which is also associated with pro-social behavior and positive conflict resolution. However, little is known about the effects of Oxytocin on the inclination of in iduals to form or join groups and to deliberately engage in collaborative decision-making processes. Here, we show that intranasal administration of Oxytocin (n = 60) compared to placebo (n = 60) in males causes an adverse effect on the choice for forming groups in the presence of a competitive environment. In particular, Oxytocin negatively affects the willingness to work collaboratively in a p-Beauty contest game, whereas the effect is most pronounced for participants with relatively high strategic sophistication. Since our data provide initial evidence that Oxytocin has a positive effect on strategic thinking and performance in the p-Beauty contest game, we argue that the adverse effect on group formation might be rooted in an enhanced strategic sophistication of participants treated with Oxytocin.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2008
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 02-11-2007
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 12-2005
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 22-12-2004
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2021
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2003
Publisher: Mohr Siebeck
Date: 2016
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 29-08-2017
DOI: 10.1093/SCAN/NSX101
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 05-2007
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 27-06-2019
Publisher: No publisher found
Date: 2002
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-2021
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 02-2016
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 27-04-2013
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2014
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 18-08-2011
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 02-2014
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 11-05-2012
DOI: 10.1002/WCS.1184
Abstract: Many decisions are interactive the outcome of one party depends not only on its decisions or on acts of nature but also on the decisions of others. Standard game theory assumes that in iduals are rational, self‐interested decision makers—that is, decision makers are selfish, perfect calculators, and flawless executors of their strategies. A myriad of studies shows that these assumptions are problematic, at least when examining decisions made by in iduals. In this article, we review the literature of the last 25 years on decision making by groups. Researchers have compared the strategic behavior of groups and in iduals in many games: prisoner's dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede and principal–agent games, among others. Our review suggests that results are quite consistent in revealing that group decisions are closer to the game‐theoretic assumption of rationality than in idual decisions. Given that many real‐world decisions are made by groups, it is possible to argue that standard game theory is a better descriptive model than previously believed by experimental researchers. We conclude by discussing future research avenues in this area. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012, 3:471–482. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1184 This article is categorized under: Psychology Reasoning and Decision Making
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-01-2007
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2018
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 04-2008
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 05-2021
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-2015
Publisher: RMIT University
Date: 2022
Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Date: 08-2012
Abstract: Dynamic competitive settings may create psychological pressure when feedback about the performance of competitors is provided before the end of the competition. Such psychological pressure could produce a first-mover advantage, despite a priori equal winning probabilities. Using data from a randomized natural experiment—penalty shootouts in soccer—we reexamine evidence by Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta [Apesteguia J, Palacios-Huerta I (2010) Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(5):2548–2564]. They report a 21-percentage-point advantage for first movers over second movers in terms of winning probabilities. Extending their s le of 129 shootouts to 540, we fail to detect any significant first-mover advantage. Our results are fully consistent with recent evidence from other sports contests. This paper was accepted by Teck Ho, behavioral economics.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 16-05-2018
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2007
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-2006
Publisher: American Economic Association
Date: 02-2013
Abstract: We study risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes, and time preferences of 661 children and adolescents, aged ten to eighteen years, in an incentivized experiment and relate experimental choices to field behavior. Experimental measures of impatience are found to be significant predictors of health-related field behavior, saving decisions, and conduct at school. In particular, more impatient children and adolescents are more likely to spend money on alcohol and cigarettes, have a higher body mass index, are less likely to save money, and show worse conduct at school. Experimental measures for risk and ambiguity attitudes are only weak predictors of field behavior.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2015
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 02-2018
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 27-07-2017
DOI: 10.1111/ECIN.12482
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2012
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 2001
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 04-2010
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2008
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2014
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 15-12-2013
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2018
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 13-09-2022
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-2004
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 11-2006
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-08-2023
DOI: 10.1007/S40881-023-00139-1
Abstract: People behave much more cooperatively than predicted by the self-interest hypothesis in social dilemmas such as public goods games. Some studies have suggested that many decision makers cooperate not because of genuine cooperative preferences but because they are confused about the incentive structure of the game—and therefore might not be aware of the dominant strategy. In this research, we experimentally manipulate whether decision makers receive explicit information about which strategies maximize in idual income and group income or not. Our data reveal no statistically significant effects of the treatment variation, neither on elicited contribution preferences nor on unconditional contributions and beliefs in a repeated linear public goods game. We conclude that it is unlikely that confusion about optimal strategies explains the widely observed cooperation patterns in social dilemmas such as public goods games.
Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Date: 12-2016
Abstract: Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real-effort matrix task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design with 600 experimental participants to examine whether the extent of cheating is reference dependent. Self-reported performance in the unmonitored condition is significantly higher than actual performance in the monitored condition—a clear indication of cheating. However, the level of cheating is by far higher in the loss frame than in the gain frame under no monitoring. The fear of a loss seems to lead to more dishonest behavior than the lure of a gain. Data, as supplemental material, are available at 0.1287/mnsc.2015.2313 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 2003
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 07-04-2017
Abstract: Justifications may promote unethical behavior because they constitute a convenient loophole through which people can gain from immoral behavior and preserve a positive self-image at the same time. A justification that is widely used is rooted in conformity: Unethical choices become more permissible because one’s peers are expected to make the same unethical choices. In the current study, we tested whether an exogenous alteration of conformity led to a lower inclination to adhere to a widely accepted norm (i.e., honesty) under the pressure of competition. We took advantage of the well-known effects of intranasally applied oxytocin on affiliation, in-group conformity, and in-group favoritism in humans. We found that conformity was enhanced by oxytocin, and this enhancement had a detrimental effect on honesty in a competitive environment but not in a noncompetitive environment. Our findings contribute to recent evidence showing that competition may lead to unethical behavior and erode moral values.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2002
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 07-2023
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 02-2012
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 10-2001
DOI: 10.1177/0193841X0102500503
Abstract: Journal rankings are important for evaluating research output, for academic promotions, and for allocating funds. Examining the assignment of economics journals to different quartiles of citation-based rankings, the authors found that about 60% of journals remain in the same quartile and about 95% of journals remain in the same or move in a neighborhood quartile within 5- to 10-year intervals. Top journal rankings exhibit even more inertia, which is a desirable property for decisions on promotion, tenure, or institutional evaluation. A reexamination of journal assignment to different quality categories every 5 or 10 years, therefore, suffices for practical evaluation purposes.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2006
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 13-08-2010
Publisher: No publisher found
Date: 2009
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 10-07-2021
DOI: 10.1111/JORI.12319
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 22-09-2018
DOI: 10.1093/RFS/HHY109
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 22-06-2023
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-023-01459-1
Abstract: Social dilemmas such as greenhouse gas emission reduction are often characterized by heterogeneity in benefits from solving the dilemma. How should leadership of group members be organized in such a setting? We implement a laboratory public goods experiment with heterogeneous marginal per capita returns from the public good and leading by ex le that is either implemented exogenously or by self-selection. Our results suggest that both ways of implementing leadership only have small effects on contributions to the public good. Self-selected leaders—in particular self-selected low-benefit leaders—tend to set better ex les than imposed leaders, but they are also exploited more strongly by followers. Leaders seem to need additional instruments to be more effective when benefits are heterogeneous.
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 15-05-2020
Abstract: Die Corona-Epidemie fand die Weltgemeinschaft unvorbereitet. Sie zwang die Regierungen zu umfassenden gesundheits- und wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmen, wodurch innerhalb weniger Wochen eine nicht vorhersehbare Weltwirtschaftskrise enormen Ausmaßes entstand. Die österreichische Regierung reagierte in Europa als eine der ersten und verordnete Mitte März 2020 einen weitgehenden Lockdown. Mit Fokus auf Österreich stellen Thomas Czypionka, Martin G. Kocher und Alexander Schnabl die einzelnen Maßnahmen dar und bewerten sie. Zusätzlich nähern sie sich den volkswirtschaftlichen Folgen des Lockdowns mittels Einschätzungen von Fachleuten und einer multiregionalen Input-Output-Analyse auf nationaler, sektoraler, und regionaler Ebene, jeweils zum Informationsstand 28. April 2020. Demnach wird die Corona-Krise die österreichische Wirtschaftsleistung im Jahr 2020 um rund 8,5 Prozent im Vergleich zum Referenzszenario reduzieren, vorbehaltlich weiterer politischer Maßnahmen, möglicher Konjunkturpakete oder dem Risiko einer zweiten Epidemiewelle im Herbst 2020.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 2014
Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Date: 09-2018
Abstract: Unethical behavior such as dishonesty, cheating and corruption occurs frequently in organizations or groups. Recent experimental evidence suggests that there is a stronger inclination to behave immorally in groups than in idually. We ask if this is the case, and if so, why. Using a parsimonious laboratory setup, we study how in idual behavior changes when deciding as a group member. We observe a strong dishonesty shift. This shift is mainly driven by communication within groups and turns out to be independent of whether group members face payoff commonality or not (i.e., whether other group members benefit from one’s lie). Group members come up with and exchange more arguments for being dishonest than for complying with the norm of honesty. Thereby, group membership shifts the perception of the validity of the honesty norm and of its distribution in the population. Data and the online appendix are available at 0.1287/mnsc.2017.2800 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-01-2008
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-12-2021
DOI: 10.1007/S10683-020-09690-8
Abstract: Decisions under risk are often embedded in a social context that we usually abstract from when studying decision-making in the laboratory. In contrast to that practice, our experiment investigates whether risk-taking is affected by social comparisons. In particular, we focus on situations where some amount of money has to be allocated to two parties: either the amount can be shared, or a random device allocates the entire amount to one of the parties. We find that the social context of the decision matters strongly: When participants are in a disadvantageous initial position compared to the other party, they select the risky option much more often than in a purely in idual decision, identical in all other respects. Overall, we find that in iduals are relatively more risk-seeking in the socially unfavorable domain than in isolation, in contrast to the favorable one, where we find no or little change in elicited risk attitudes in comparison to an isolated decision.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-2004
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 22-10-2008
DOI: 10.1093/OEP/GPN037
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 07-02-2017
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 05-2013
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
No related grants have been discovered for Martin Kocher.