ORCID Profile
0000-0002-8034-0317
Current Organisation
University of Western Australia
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In Research Link Australia (RLA), "Research Topics" refer to ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes. These topics are either sourced from ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes listed in researchers' related grants or generated by a large language model (LLM) based on their publications.
History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields | Philosophy of Cognition | History and Philosophy of Science (incl. Non-historical Philosophy of Science) | History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Cultural Understanding not elsewhere classified | Expanding Knowledge through Studies of Human Society | Expanding Knowledge in the Biological Sciences |
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 2001
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Date: 06-1996
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2010
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 12-2004
DOI: 10.1086/425947
Abstract: This paper surveys some recent work on realization in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 2001
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-2002
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 11-2001
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 12-1997
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X97421611
Abstract: This commentary raises three questions about the target article: What are pointers or deictic devices? Why insist on deictic codes for cognition rather than deixis simpliciter? And in what sense is cognition embodied, on this view?
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 04-07-2005
Publisher: Elsevier
Date: 2007
Publisher: JSTOR
Date: 1998
DOI: 10.2307/2998320
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 15-09-2017
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 02-2022
DOI: 10.1016/J.SHPSA.2021.10.002
Abstract: Philosophers of biology and biologists themselves for the most part assume that the concept of kin is progenerative: what makes two in iduals kin is a direct or indirect function of reproduction. Derivatively, kinship might likewise be presumed to be progenerative in nature. Yet a prominent view of kinship in contemporary cultural anthropology is a kind of constructivism or performativism that rejects such progenerativist views. This paper critically examines an influential line of thinking used to critique progenerativism and support performativism that cites cross-cultural ersity in what I will call kinmaking. I challenge several key assumptions made in moving from this appeal to ethnography to conclusions about kinship and progeneration, arguing that closer scrutiny of both the ethnographic record and inferences that draw on it in fact support progenerative views of kinmaking.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 04-11-2003
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 04-2022
DOI: 10.1007/S11229-022-03537-W
Abstract: The conceptualisation of kinship and its study remain contested within anthropology. This paper draws on recent cognitive science, developmental cognitive psychology, and the philosophy of science to offer a novel argument for a view of kinship as progeneratively or reproductively constrained. I shall argue that kinship involves a form of extended cognition that incorporates progenerative facts, going on to show how the resulting articulation of kinship’s progenerative nature can be readily expressed by an influential conception of kinds, the homeostatic property cluster view. Identifying the distinctive role that our extended cognitive access to progenerative facts plays in kinship delivers an integrative, progenerativist view that avoids standard performativist criticisms of progenerativism as being ethnocentric, epistemically naïve, and reductive.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 21-10-2022
DOI: 10.1017/PSA.2022.89
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 11-1992
DOI: 10.1007/BF00354473
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-05-2010
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 1994
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 08-02-2013
DOI: 10.1002/WCS.1226
Abstract: Traditional views in philosophy of mind and cognitive science depict the mind as an information processor, one whose connections with the body and the world are of little theoretical importance. On the contrary, mounting empirical evidence shows that bodily states and modality‐specific systems for perception and action underlie information processing, and that embodiment contributes to various aspects and effects of mental phenomena. This article will briefly review and discuss some of this evidence and what it implies. By challenging mainstream accounts of mind and cognition, embodiment views offer new ways of conceptualizing knowledge and suggest novel perspectives on cognitive variation and mind‐body reductionism. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:319–325. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1226 This article is categorized under: Neuroscience Cognition
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 13-08-2014
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 14-05-2008
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2008
DOI: 10.1353/CJP.0.0012
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 19-08-2010
Publisher: JSTOR
Date: 10-1994
DOI: 10.2307/2186107
Publisher: CRC Press
Date: 14-06-2022
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 19-07-2019
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 20-08-2016
Abstract: John Locke is known within anthropology primarily for his empiricism, his views of natural laws, and his discussion of the state of nature and the social contract. Marilyn Strathern and Marshall Sahlins, however, have offered distinctive, novel, and broad reflections on the nature of anthropological knowledge that appeal explicitly to a lesser-known aspect of Locke’s work: his metaphysical views of relations. This paper examines their distinctive conclusions – Sahlins’ about cultural relativism, Strathern’s about relatives and kinship – both of which concern the objectivity of anthropological knowledge. Although Locke’s own views of relations have been neglected by historians of philosophy in the past, recent and ongoing philosophical discussions of Locke on relations create a productive trading zone between philosophy and anthropology on the objectivity of anthropological knowledge that goes beyond engagement with the particular claims made by Sahlins and Strathern.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 05-2022
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 15-01-2021
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-08-2005
DOI: 10.1007/S10339-005-0012-Z
Abstract: While memory is conceptualized predominantly as an in idual capacity in the cognitive and biological sciences, the social sciences have most commonly construed memory as a collective phenomenon. Collective memory has been put to erse uses, ranging from accounts of nationalism in history and political science to views of ritualization and commemoration in anthropology and sociology. These appeals to collective memory share the idea that memory "goes beyond the in idual" but often run together quite different claims in spelling out that idea. This paper reviews a s ling of recent work on collective memory in the light of emerging externalist views within the cognitive sciences, and through some reflection on broader traditions of thought in the biological and social sciences that have appealed to the idea that groups have minds. The paper concludes with some thoughts about the relationship between these kinds of cognitive metaphors in the social sciences and our notion of agency.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 17-09-2019
DOI: 10.1093/MIND/FZY039
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 07-04-2022
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-2021
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 29-09-2014
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 26-07-2017
DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0352
Abstract: Across different areas of philosophy, “internalism” and “externalism” designate distinctly opposed positions. In the philosophy of mind, the debate between internalists and externalists arose in the 1970s with a focus on meaning and mental representation and the nature of mental states. Internalists or in idualists hold that the nature of an in idual’s mental states depends metaphysically just on facts about that in idual, facts intrinsic to that in idual, rather than her social or physical environment. A common way to express internalism is to say that an in idual’s mental states are fixed or determined by the intrinsic, physical properties of that in idual, where this relation of determination has typically been understood in terms of the notion of supervenience. For an in idualist, two molecule-for-molecule identical in iduals also must have the same mental states. Externalists or anti-in idualists deny this. The two seminal papers here—Hilary Putnam’s “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (Putnam 1975, cited under Classic and Early Work) and Tyler Burge’s “In idualism and the Mental” (Burge 1979, cited under Classic and Early Work)—both launched attacks on taken-for-granted internalist or in idualist views of meaning and mind. They did so in part by introducing thought experiments in which so-called doppelgängers (those molecule-for-molecule identical in iduals), located in distinct physical and social environments, had thoughts with different mental contents. In addition, Burge published a large number of papers over the next two decades systematically drawing out the scope and implications of his anti-in idualistic views for central topics in the metaphysics and epistemology of mind and cognitive science, including mental causation and psychological explanation, self-knowledge, and computational accounts of cognitive processing. Shifting from the initial focus on meaning and mental content in the 1980s to the idea that cognition is embodied and extends into the environment—the extended mind thesis—the debate over externalism in the philosophy of mind has infused much work on core topics in the field, such as the nature of intentionality, computational psychology, consciousness, perception, experience, functionalism, and materialism. The sections General Background, Classic and Early Work, Philosophy of Language/Mind Interface, and the Extended Mind and Cognition below provide background and fundamental readings on internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. Sections from Mental Causation and Explanation I to Knowledge and Self-Knowledge give coverage to particular topics, such as intentionality and consciousness. Sections Other Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Science: Articles and Other Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Science: Books cover miscellaneous books and articles that focus primarily on cognitive science and the philosophy of science. Some sectional isions are artifacts of the ten entries-per-section constraint, together with finding no more meaningful way to categorize these entries. Other Oxford Bibliographies articles with complementary content include “Epistemology and Active Externalism,” “The Extended Mind Thesis,” “Self-Knowledge,” and “Supervenience.”
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-09-2015
Publisher: No publisher found
Date: 2017
Publisher: Oxford University PressOxford
Date: 07-12-2018
DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198737865.001.0001
Abstract: Much information in our lives is remembered in a social context, as we often reminisce about shared experiences with others, and more generally remember in the social context of our communities and our cultures. Memory researchers across disciplines and subdisciplines are actively exploring collaborative remembering. However, despite this common interest and growing research area, there is currently relatively little crosstalk between perspectives. This is at least partly due to differences in the assumptions, methodologies, and conclusions that guide different approaches, and which can make it difficult to synthesize and compare methods and findings. The primary purpose of this book is to feature outstanding recent work on collaborative remembering across several fields and subfields (including developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, social psychology, discourse processing, philosophy, neuropsychology, design, and media studies), to highlight the points of overlap and contrast, and to initiate conversations and debate both within and across the various perspectives. Toward that end, we present a comprehensive and field-defining set of chapters that illustrate the many different perspectives of collaborative memory research, and demonstrate the nuance and complexity of collaborative remembering within and across research traditions.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 10-08-2023
DOI: 10.1177/02780771231194781
Abstract: The ontological turn (OT) is a loose cluster of theoretical approaches within cultural anthropology that advocates a synthetic, overarching way forward for ethnographically oriented cultural anthropology. We argue that in order to contribute substantively to ethnobiology the OT needs to distance itself from a long-standing tradition of thinking within ethnography that assumes some kind of fundamental ide between the natural and the social sciences. This distancing seems especially unlikely in light of the meta-anthropological nature of the OT as primarily a perspective on ethnographic methodology. Instead, we advocate for naturalistic theoretical alternatives for thinking about human sociality, where philosophical innovation develops in concert with ongoing empirical work across the biological, cognitive, and social sciences. We illustrate this perspective by drawing on two naturalistic accounts likely to prove more fruitful for ethnobiological practice, namely, trans-genera models of sociality and progenerative views of kinship.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 07-2003
DOI: 10.1086/376784
Abstract: This paper distinguishes and critiques several forms of pluralism about the levels of selection, and introduces a novel way of thinking about the biological properties and processes typically conceptualized in terms of distinct levels. In particular, “levels” should be thought of as being entwined or fused. Since the pluralism discussed is held by ergent theorists, the argument has implications for many positions in the debate over the units of selection. And since the key points on which the paper turns apply beyond this specific issue, the paper may prove of general interest in thinking about the metaphysics of science
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 07-2004
DOI: 10.1086/421539
Abstract: The evolution of the myxoma virus in Australia has been presented for many years as a test case for the hypothesis that group selection can function effectively ‘in the wild.’ This paper critically examines the myxoma case, and argues that its failure as a test case for this hypothesis has broader implications for debates over the levels of selection.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 1996
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 13-09-2005
Abstract: Genes and the Agents of Life undertakes to rethink the place of the in idual in the biological sciences, drawing parallels with the cognitive and social sciences. Genes, organisms, and species are all agents of life but how are each of these conceptualized within genetics, developmental biology, evolutionary biology, and systematics? The book includes highly accessible discussions of genetic encoding, species and natural kinds, and pluralism above the levels of selection, drawing on work from across the biological sciences. The book is a companion to the author's Boundaries of the Mind, also available from Cambridge, where the focus is the cognitive sciences. The book will appeal to a broad range of professionals and students in philosophy, biology, and the history of science.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 28-05-2009
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 03-2008
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-2004
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 12-2000
DOI: 10.1086/392860
Abstract: This paper points to some problems for the position that D.M. Walsh calls “alternative in idualism,” and argues that in defending this view Walsh has omitted an important part of what separates in idualists and externalists in psychology. Walsh's ex le of Hox gene complexes is discussed in detail to show why some sort of externalism about scientific taxonomy more generally is a more plausible view than any extant version of in idualism.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 1998
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 07-2019
DOI: 10.1086/703572
Abstract: This article defends a version of the Westermarck Effect, integrating existing clinical, biological, and philosophical dimensions to incest avoidance. By focusing on care-based attachment in primates, my formulation of the effect suggests the power of a phylogenetic argument widely accepted by primatologists but not by cultural anthropologists. Identifying postadoption incest as a phenomenon with underexplored evidential value, the article sketches an explanatory strategy for reconciling the effect with the clinical reality of incest, concluding with an explicit argument against culture-first or conventionalist accounts of incest avoidance prevalent in anthropology.
Publisher: University of Michigan Library
Date: 15-11-2018
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 18-03-2013
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X12001835
Abstract: I propose that in at least some cases, objects of artistic appreciation are best thought of not simply as causes of artistic appreciation, but as parts of the cognitive machinery that drives aesthetic appreciation. In effect, this is to say that aesthetic appreciation operates via extended cognitive systems.
Start Date: 12-2021
End Date: 11-2024
Amount: $329,328.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
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