ORCID Profile
0000-0003-4000-3276
Current Organisations
University of Western Australia
,
Australian Catholic University
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In Research Link Australia (RLA), "Research Topics" refer to ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes. These topics are either sourced from ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes listed in researchers' related grants or generated by a large language model (LLM) based on their publications.
Philosophy | History and Philosophy of Science (incl. Non-historical Philosophy of Science) | Metaphysics | Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition)
Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies | Expanding Knowledge in the Physical Sciences |
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 19-07-2014
DOI: 10.1111/THEO.12031
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 15-02-2013
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Date: 09-2019
DOI: 10.1093/BJPS/AXX062
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 07-11-2019
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 02-04-2020
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 04-2019
DOI: 10.1093/MIND/FZZ008
Abstract: Mathematics appears to play a genuine explanatory role in science. But how do mathematical explanations work? Recently, a counterfactual approach to mathematical explanation has been suggested. I argue that such a view fails to differentiate the explanatory uses of mathematics within science from the non-explanatory uses. I go on to offer a solution to this problem by combining elements of the counterfactual theory of explanation with elements of a unification theory of explanation. The result is a theory according to which a counterfactual is explanatory when it is an instance of a generalized counterfactual scheme.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 07-03-2015
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-2013
DOI: 10.1111/SJP.12032
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 02-12-2020
Abstract: Our goal in this paper is to extend counterfactual accounts of scientific explanation to mathematics. Our focus, in particular, is on intra-mathematical explanations: explanations of one mathematical fact in terms of another. We offer a basic counterfactual theory of intra-mathematical explanations, before modelling the explanatory structure of a test case using counterfactual machinery. We finish by considering the application of counterpossibles to mathematical explanation, and explore a second test case along these lines.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 22-07-2020
DOI: 10.1093/PQ/PQZ036
Abstract: In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in the work of Dodd, Hornsby, Schnieder, Williamson, and others. These philosophers believe that the ambitions of truthmaker theory are easily satisfied, without recourse to ambitious ontological investigation—hence the analogy with deflationary truth. We argue that the deflationists’ agenda fails: there is no coherent deflationary theory of truthmaking. Truthmaking, once deflated, fails to address the questions at the heart of truthmaking investigation. Truthmaking cannot be had on the cheap.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 16-01-2021
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 30-01-2013
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 27-11-2019
DOI: 10.1007/S11098-019-01374-1
Abstract: What distinguishes causation from grounding? One suggestion is that causation, but not grounding, occurs over time. Recently, however, counterex les to this simple temporal criterion have been offered. In this paper, we situate the temporal criterion within a broader framework that focuses on two aspects: locational overlapping in space and time and the presence of intermediaries in space and time. We consider, and reject, the idea that the difference between grounding and causation is that grounding can occur without intermediaries. We go on to use the fact that grounding and causation both involve intermediaries to develop a better temporal criterion for distinguishing causation from grounding. The criterion is this: when a cause and effect are spatially disjoint, there is always a chain of causal intermediaries between the cause and the effect that are extended in time. By contrast, when the grounds and the grounded are spatially disjoint, there is always a chain of grounding intermediaries, but the chain need not be extended in time, it can be purely spatial. The difference between grounding and causation, then, is that causation requires time for chaining in a way that grounding does not.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 26-11-2013
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-2019
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 05-2013
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-09-2016
DOI: 10.1111/PHPR.12337
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 26-09-2019
DOI: 10.1111/PHPR.12637
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 26-07-2019
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-2012
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 08-08-2016
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2016
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 30-09-2022
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 24-07-2015
DOI: 10.1111/PHC3.12244
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 11-07-2016
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2013
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819112000526
Abstract: This paper seeks to differentiate negative properties from positive properties, with the aim of providing the groundwork for further discussion about whether there is anything that corresponds to either of these notions. We differentiate negative and positive properties in terms of their functional role, before drawing out the metaphysical implications of proceeding in this fashion. We show that if the difference between negative and positive properties tabled here is correct, then negative properties are metaphysically contentious entities, entities that many philosophers will be unwilling to countenance.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 24-12-2017
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 18-03-2019
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 29-07-2014
DOI: 10.1111/SJP.12069
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 11-01-2016
DOI: 10.1093/PQ/PQV123
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 20-06-2019
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 16-03-2016
DOI: 10.1111/PHPR.12270
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2015
DOI: 10.1111/HYPA.12150
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 15-11-2018
DOI: 10.1007/S11229-018-01983-Z
Abstract: In this paper we offer a response to one argument in favour of Priority Monism, what Jonathan Schaffer calls the nomic argument for monism. We proceed in three stages. We begin by introducing Jonathan Schaffer’s Priority Monism and the nomic argument for that view. We then consider a response to the nomic argument that we presented in an earlier paper (Baron and Tallant in Philos Phenomenol Res 93:583–606, 2016). We show that this argument suffers from a flaw. We then go on to offer a different response to the nomic argument. The core idea is that the current laws of physics are not integrated in the manner that Schaffer requires to get the nomic argument for monism off the ground.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-12-2014
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 22-01-2019
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2016
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-03-2014
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 02-06-2016
DOI: 10.1111/RATI.12101
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 09-2012
DOI: 10.1002/THT3.39
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 14-08-2013
Start Date: 06-2018
End Date: 07-2022
Amount: $336,905.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 06-2018
End Date: 04-2024
Amount: $200,232.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded Activity