ORCID Profile
0000-0003-1287-3768
Current Organisation
Australian National University
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Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 24-08-2011
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123411000287
Abstract: A debate, fanned by the experiences of South Korea and Taiwan, persists over how economic growth leads to democratization. This article provides a theoretical model showing that economic downturns lead to democratization and evaluates the conclusion systematically with data from South Korea and Taiwan. The model and results corroborate the hypothesis that economic downturns motivate government and non-government actors to pursue political reforms and democratization and highlight several contributions. They show democratization as the outcome of strategic responses pursued under weak economic conditions. Further, the findings are robust to alternative specifications of democratization. The results also bring empirics into line with theoretical expectations about democratization while simultaneously revealing that it is not a panacea for lack of support.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-04-2015
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-2013
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 09-08-2019
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 03-1993
DOI: 10.1177/106591299304600113
Abstract: Based on a representative s le of 504 respondents from the Moscow oblast of the Soviet Union, gender differences in both political and non- political variables (which may serve to explain the connection between gender and the political) were investigated. With controls for age, edu cation, income and membership in the Communist party, women were found to be more favorable to the Communist party, less in favor of radical change, less politically interested and efficacious, more likely to vote but less likely to be involved in unconventional participation. Several inter vening variables were examined as possible explanations for these gender differences, including feminist orientation, compassion, religiosity and fatigue.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 27-10-2014
DOI: 10.1017/GOV.2014.38
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 12-2008
DOI: 10.1017/S1468109908003150
Abstract: Are new democracies with ided government and volatile parties politically ill fated? The literature suggests so, but cases of emergent democracies such as Taiwan and Brazil that face both conditions defy the prediction. This paper explains why: party volatility follows from pursuing distinct executive and legislature agendas under ided government the political ambition that underlies these conditions sustains democratic and even political performance. We evaluate the argument through government spending in Taiwan. The results corroborate our expectations: they show more parties composing the legislature as government spending favors an executive agenda and neglects a legislative welfare-spending agenda. The findings make three contributions to the literature: first, they reveal a political ide between executive and legislature rather than ideological parties to undercut concerns regarding performance. Second, they demonstrate that the strategic use of government spending to institutionalize party development along an executive agenda fuels party fragmentation. Third, they show that legislators split, switch, or create alternative routes to office in reaction to strategic spending to underscore that ambition underlies party volatility and ided government.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 07-2005
Abstract: Do governments in less-democratic newly industrialized countries (NICs) bargain with their citizens? In this article we develop a game-theoretic model to show that the government may not be able to avoid bargaining in open economies such as the Asian NICs when economic conditions are less than optimal. The reason is that, in the absence of government bargaining, citizens acting rationally and strategically choose to withdraw resources such as labor or production investment from a weak economy. Under these circumstances, government bargaining to elicit resource investment is a sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome. To test the model, we analyze data on production investment in the Asian NICs of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia from the 1960s to the 1990s. The analysis supports the prediction of the formal model and, hence, makes three contributions to the study of this topic. First, when we relax the assumption that citizens are naïve, governments in less-democratic open economies such as the Asian NICs may not be able to avoid bargaining with their citizens. Second, resource-withholding or withdrawal is an equilibrium strategy that convinces the government to bargain. Third, governments may bargain credibly even in the absence of formal constraints.
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2016
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2016
Publisher: Universidad Federal de Santa Maria
Date: 30-09-2016
Abstract: A erva-mate (Ilex paraguariensis) é uma espécie arbórea, nativa da América do Sul e largamente consumida na forma de chá. Em ervais debilitados, a poda de recuperação é utilizada para a retomada do vigor vegetativo, bem como o anelamento, os quais estimulam a emissão de brotações. O presente trabalho teve como objetivos verificar a influência do anelamento em combinação com a aplicação de diferentes concentrações de benzil-amino-purina (BAP) e da decepa em diferentes alturas na emissão de brotações por matrizes de erva-mate de 17 e mais de 80 anos de idade, no inverno/2006 e verão/2007. O anelamento foi realizado com motosserra a uma altura de 30 cm do solo, seguido do tratamento com BAP, veiculado em pasta de vaselina, nas concentrações de 0, 150 e 300 mg Kg-1. A decepa foi realizada também com motosserra, sendo os tratamentos três alturas de corte: 15, 30 e 60 cm do solo. Após 6 e 12 meses da instalação foram avaliadas as seguintes variáveis: porcentagem de matrizes brotadas, número de brotações por árvore (ou cepa), comprimento e diâmetro das brotações. Os resultados obtidos mostram que a erva-mate tem boa capacidade de brotação, para as duas técnicas utilizadas. A eficiência na emissão de novos brotos no anelamento é influenciada pela idade da planta matriz e pela estação do ano. Os maiores valores foram obtidos no inverno/2006 e com matrizes de 17 anos de idade, chegando a 95,84% de indução de brotações. Na técnica da decepa, não foi observada influência da época de instalação na porcentagem de brotação, mas a idade da matriz e a altura do corte foram significativos para esta variável. Os maiores valores foram obtidos com matrizes de 17 anos e altura de corte a 60 cm do solo.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 21-02-2018
DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X1800003X
Abstract: How does political trust affect the competing pressures of policy versus political performance in emergent democracies? Studies suggest that political trust buffers against these pressures, but empirical evidence is lacking in regard to if or how, given the focus in the literature on mature democracies where democratic institutions and practices are unlikely to be upended by either policy or political underperformance. However, in emergent democracies where the risks of democratic reversal loom large, the distinction is highly relevant. This article investigates how political trust matters in emergent democracies, specifically, if political trust buffers against public pressures, and whether it is system-directed versus incumbent-directed, for East and Southeast Asia. The evidence from multiple waves of survey data provides three useful insights: first, it shows that political trust supersedes economic expectations in support for the democratising system this supports political trust as a buffer for the political system and is system-directed. Second, political trust goes hand-in-hand with economic performance to explain support for the incumbent government. This finding clarifies that political trust does not buffer the government against public pressure for performance. Third, taken together, the results show that economic growth may keep a government in office but institution-building leads to political trust that undergirds the political system, so that institution-building is a priority for stability in emergent democracies. These results expand the political trust literature to underpin democratic progression and consolidation issues that are unique to emergent democracies.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 2021
DOI: 10.1002/APP5.319
Abstract: This article assesses the role of local councils as a conduit for democratic consolidation through the examination of the legislative performance of the members of a South Korean metropolitan city council. We collected data on ordinance proposals in Busan Metropolitan Council from 2006 to 2018 (the 5th to 7th Councils) and analysed, first, the effects of in idual attributes of local council members on legislative performance through negative binomial model analysis and, second, the effects of legislative networks on council members' performance. Three findings contribute to the literature: first, the number of proposed ordinances by council members increased over time, while those by the mayor decreased in the same period, suggesting an erosion of executive dominance of policymaking in local councils. Second, female and newly elected council members are most active in legislative proposals, which underlines that these members are more connected to the electorate than long‐serving incumbents. Third, network analyses show increasingly erse and multi‐centred communities behind ordinance proposals this suggests a move from personalistic politics to institutionalised politics.
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2018
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 15-07-2019
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 12-2008
DOI: 10.1017/S1468109908003137
Abstract: A vast body of literature emphasizes that successful political development relies on stable and united political parties that underpin clear and responsive policymaking. By this perspective, ided government and party volatility represent pathologies that imperil political accountability and development. Indeed, studies contend that ided government – where different parties control the executive and legislative branches of government – lead to policy deadlock while party volatility – characterized by frequent party splits, solo switches, mergers, dissolutions or the establishment of new parties – confounds representation and accountability. Clearly, each on its own is seen as a considerable threat to political performance and democratic development the confluence of the two points virtually to an inevitable political doom.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 05-11-2010
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 13-09-2012
Abstract: How does economic performance affect support for democracy in emergent democracies? Government approval studies do not directly evaluate this. Recent literature suggests using separate assessments: Citizens in emergent democracies—through political trust—distinguish between government approval and democratic support. This article directly assesses the question for Asia’s democratizing nations of Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines. Two results are relevant: First, economic performance explains government approval over time and across these democratizing nations. This result accords with findings from other regions to lend to the accumulation of knowledge from extending study to Asia. Second, economic performance does not explain democratic support instead, political trust is statistically related to democratic support. Specifically, although political trust and economic performance both explain government approval, political trust outweighs economic conditions in explaining democratic support. These results show that by building political trust in the democratizing system, citizens may hold officials accountable while remaining committed to democratic development. Theoretically, then, this article synthesizes erse findings in the literature to enrich theory building.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 02-01-2018
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 15-07-2010
Publisher: University of California Press
Date: 2015
Abstract: The Sewol ferry tragedy revealed weaknesses in South Korea’s politics, economy, and society that had been sidestepped during economic development and political transition. The split in local elections, the Saenuri Party’s sweep in by-elections, and the installation of critics of President Park as leaders of the ruling party all underscore the public’s rejection of political stonewalling or politicking-as-usual.
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2016
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 21-02-2017
DOI: 10.1017/JEA.2017.1
Abstract: When do citizens take costly collective action against government corruption? When citizens act in concert, their demands are credible and not easily discounted by governments, which should be more likely to respond. In this study, we use the stag-hunt game, supplemented by Granovetter's threshold model of collective action, to investigate the conditions under which citizens coordinate to collectively act against government corruption. We use survey experiments in laboratory settings in Australia, Singapore, and the United States. The results show several conditions motivate participants to pursue collective action using the wellspring of the theoretical argument, they clarify that information that others pursue collective action, together with clear mutual benefits as measured by rewards, are primary motivators of the in idual's choice. Correspondingly, other considerations, including initial costs or final potential penalties, do not bear on the in idual's choice. The findings have implications not only for the empirical literature on policy but also for policy debates on how to control it.
Publisher: University of California Press
Date: 2016
Abstract: The year 2015 featured real and metaphorical battles in South Korea: face-offs between the executive and the legislature saw President Park Geun-hye duel with the non-Park faction in the ruling Saenuri Party and fend off the opposition, whose alliance struggled with infighting and subsequent fractures. The government waged war against a health epidemic and exchanged artillery fire with North Korea at the Demilitarized Zone. The by-elections in April 2015 augur the political stage for pending elections in 2016 and 2017.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 07-2003
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123403000218
Abstract: Does the lack of competitive elections in the less democratic newly industrialized or industrializing countries (NICs) mean that their governments are unconstrained by their citizens' preferences for economic performance? In this article, I show how non-electoral mechanisms in the less democratic NICs of South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia constrain their governments. Governments pay attention to the effects of policies on economic performance because labour disquiet and disinvestment are likely to arise otherwise. To pre-empt labour disquiet and disinvestment, the governments offer ‘credible apologies’ that include punishment and monitoring of government when economic performance is less than optimal in these countries. When they fail to offer credible apologies, labour and producers respond with strikes and disinvestment. Governments' credible apologies play an important role in explaining labour quiescence and production investment. The argument and evidence contrasts with the general impression that governments in the less democratic NICs are constrained only by elites or are responsible only to themselves. The analysis shows that governments use bargaining mechanisms even where the citizens are perceived as meek and without bargaining strength.
Start Date: 2018
End Date: 2022
Funder: National Research Foundation of Korea
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2015
End Date: 2018
Funder: National Research Foundation of Korea
View Funded Activity