ORCID Profile
0000-0002-7186-2674
Current Organisation
Flinders University
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Information Systems | Heritage and Cultural Conservation | Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Archaeology | Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Information and Knowledge Systems
Conserving Intangible Cultural Heritage | Expanding Knowledge in History and Archaeology |
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2020
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 10-2012
DOI: 10.1017/S003181911200040X
Abstract: In his influential paper ‘The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn’, Jonathan Bennett suggests that Huck's failure to turn in the runaway slave Jim as his conscience – a conscience distorted by racism – tells him he ought to is not merely right but also praiseworthy. James Montmarquet however argues against what he sees here as Bennett's ‘anti-intellectualism’ in moral psychology that insofar as Huck lacks and so fails to act on the moral belief that he should help Jim his action is not praiseworthy. In this paper I suggest that we should reject Montmarquet's claim here that the case of Huck Finn indicates rather how many of our everyday moral responses to others do not and need not depend on any particular moral beliefs we hold about them or their situation.
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 18-09-2019
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 04-2006
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 1999
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 03-2001
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-2005
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 08-2005
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 07-2014
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 06-10-2015
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 13-03-2022
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2019
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 22-03-2023
DOI: 10.1007/S11841-023-00954-3
Abstract: The idea that human beings have a distinct moral worth—a moral significance over and above any moral worth, such as that may be, possessed by other animals—has a long history and has traditionally been taken for granted by philosophers and theologians. However, in a variety of quarters in recent philosophy, this idea has come into disrepute, seeming to indicate a mere prejudice in favour of our own species. For ex le, Peter Singer has argued that such a position is mere speciesism, a prejudice of a kind with racism and sexism in that it involves making moral distinctions between our own and other species that cannot be morally justified. What on such views is needed to justify any such distinction is a difference in terms of the morally relevant properties possessed by our own species as compared with other species. I will call this view the moral property view. Insofar as other species share with us morally relevant properties, for ex le the capacity to suffer cognitive ability and so on, it is mere prejudice not to accept moral requirements with respect to them as we do with respect to our own species. While on the surface such a view may seem morally enlightened, it indicates what will seem to many problematic moral judgments with respect to severely disabled human beings. In this paper, I will respond to these concerns by suggesting a different basis for the idea of human moral distinctiveness, one that draws on recent work by Wittgensteinian moral philosophers and which denies what I called above the property view. According to this view, while our shared life with other animals involves the recognition of their moral significance, our shared life with other human beings involves recognising that human beings as human beings have a distinctive moral value.
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 24-08-2024
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-2018
DOI: 10.1111/META.12315
Publisher: Acumen Publishing Limited
Date: 29-12-2011
Abstract: Moralism involves the distortion of moral thought, the distortion of reflection and judgement. It is a vice, and one to which many from the philosopher to the media pundit to the politician are highly susceptible. This book examines the nature of moralism in specific moral judgements and the ways in which moral philosophy and theories about morality can themselves become skewed by this vice. The book ranges across the problem of the demands of morality the conflict between moral and other values the contrast between the practice of moral philosophy and other modes of moral thought or reflection moralism in the media and moralism in the public discussion of literature and art. This highly original and provocative work will be of interest to students of philosophy, psychology, theology and media, and to anyone who takes a serious interest in contemporary morality.
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 20-12-2017
Abstract: According to a widely held view, moral thought essentially involves the survey of an array of independently specifiable morally relevant facts, on the basis of which an agent is to reach a judgment about how anybody in that situation ought to act. I argue, drawing on Henry James’s
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 04-1995
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 18-09-2019
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 05-06-2009
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819109000357
Abstract: Mrs. Digby told me that when she lived in London with her sister, Mrs. Brooke, they were every now and then honoured by the visits of Dr. Johnson. He called on them one day soon after the publication of his immortal dictionary. The two ladies paid him due compliments on the occasion. Amongst other topics of praise they very much commended the omission of all naughty words. ‘What! my dears! then you have been looking for them?’ said the moralist. The ladies, confused at being thus caught, dropped the subject of the dictionary. (H.D. Best, Personal and Literary Memorials , London, 1829, printed in Johnsonian Miscellanies Vol. 2 , G. Birkbeck Hill (ed.) (London: Constable & Co.,1897))
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 13-03-2022
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 21-12-2010
DOI: 10.1017/S003181911000063X
Abstract: While a number of philosophers have argued recently that it is through our emotional response to certain literary works that we might achieve particular moral understanding, what has not been discussed in detail in this connection are works which generate conflicting responses in the reader which is to say literary works in which there is significant element of ambiguity. Consider Joseph Conrad's novel Lord Jim. I argue that in making sense of our potentially conflicting responses to this novel, and specifically to its central character Jim, we may gain a richer sense of the ways in which literature may contribute to moral understanding – in this case by contributing to an understanding of our own character, its blind spots and its limitations.
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 25-04-2019
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 19-12-2013
Start Date: 01-2023
End Date: 01-2028
Amount: $1,752,795.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded Activity