ORCID Profile
0000-0002-5354-6301
Current Organisation
University of Bristol
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Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 20-07-2022
DOI: 10.1007/S10539-022-09864-Z
Abstract: Over the last fifteen years, an ambitious explanatory framework has been proposed to unify explanations across biology and cognitive science. Active inference, whose most famous tenet is the free energy principle, has inspired excitement and confusion in equal measure. Here, we lay the ground for proper critical analysis of active inference, in three ways. First, we give simplified versions of its core mathematical models. Second, we outline the historical development of active inference and its relationship to other theoretical approaches. Third, we describe three different kinds of claim—labelled mathematical, empirical and general—routinely made by proponents of the framework, and suggest dialectical links between them. Overall, we aim to increase philosophical understanding of active inference so that it may be more readily evaluated. This paper is the Introduction to the Topical Collection “The Free Energy Principle: From Biology to Cognition”.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 07-09-2023
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Date: 09-2020
DOI: 10.1086/710394
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 27-07-2022
DOI: 10.1007/S10539-022-09868-9
Abstract: The free energy principle is notoriously difficult to understand. In this paper, we relate the principle to a framework that philosophers of biology are familiar with: Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantics. We argue that: (i) systems that minimise free energy are systems with a proper function and (ii) Karl Friston’s notion of implicit modelling can be understood in terms of Millikan’s notion of mapping relations. Our analysis reveals some surprising formal similarities between the two frameworks, and suggests interesting lines of future research. We hope this will aid further philosophical evaluation of the free energy principle.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 13-10-2023
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 14-10-2021
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 31-01-2022
DOI: 10.1007/S13164-021-00611-Z
Abstract: In their landmark 2010 paper, “The weirdest people in the world?”, Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan outlined a serious methodological problem for the psychological and behavioural sciences. Most of the studies produced in the field use people from Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) societies, yet inferences are often drawn to the species as a whole. In drawing such inferences, researchers implicitly assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that WEIRD populations are generally representative of the species. Yet neither of these assumptions is justified. In many psychological and behavioural domains, cultural variation begets cognitive variation, and WEIRD s les are recurrently shown to be outliers. In the years since the article was published, attention has focused on the implications this has for research on extant human populations. Here we extend those implications to the study of ancient H. sapiens , their hominin forebears, and cousin lineages. We assess a range of characteristic arguments and key studies in the cognitive archaeology literature, identifying issues stemming from the problem of s le ersity. We then look at how worrying the problem is, and consider some conditions under which inferences to ancient populations via cognitive models might be provisionally justified.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 25-04-2023
DOI: 10.1111/MILA.12419
Abstract: Recent work by Stout and colleagues indicates that the neural correlates of language and Early Stone Age toolmaking overlap significantly. The aim of this paper is to add computational detail to their findings. I use an error minimisation model to outline where the information processing overlap between toolmaking and language lies. I argue that the Early Stone Age signals the emergence of complex structured representations. I then highlight a feature of my account: It allows us to understand the early evolution of syntax in terms of an increase in the number and complexity of models in a cognitive system, rather than the development of new types of processing.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 07-2022
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-04-2018
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 08-04-2021
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2020
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002760
Abstract: Veissière et al. must sacrifice explanatory realism and precision in order to develop a unified formal model. Drawing on ex les from cognitive archeology, we argue that this makes it difficult for them to derive the kinds of testable predictions that would allow them to resolve debates over the nature of human social cognition and cultural acquisition.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 02-08-2023
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 20-09-2022
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 22-10-2021
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2022
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X22001315
Abstract: On Jagiello et al.'s cultural action framework, end-goal resolvability and causal transparency make possible the transmission of complex technologies through low-fidelity cultural learning. We offer three further features of goal-directed action sequences – specificity, riskiness, and complexity – which alter the effectiveness of low-fidelity cultural learning. Incorporating these into the cultural action framework generates further novel, testable predictions for bifocal stance theory.
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
No related grants have been discovered for Ross Pain.