ORCID Profile
0000-0002-3585-4618
Current Organisations
Organisation
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University of Wollongong
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Research Topics
In Research Link Australia (RLA), "Research Topics" refer to ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes. These topics are either sourced from ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes listed in researchers' related grants or generated by a large language model (LLM) based on their publications.
Top 5 Research Topics
ANZSRC Field of Research (FoR)
Philosophy | Philosophy Of Mind (Excl. Cognition) | Philosophy of Cognition | Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition) | Philosophy of Specific Cultures (incl. Comparative Philosophy) | Epistemology | Phenomenology |
ANZSRC Socio-Economic Objective (SEO)
Expanding Knowledge in Psychology and Cognitive Sciences | Vocational education and training | Occupational training | Behavioural and cognitive sciences | Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies
Related Links
Publications
Subsurface microbiology and biogeochemistry of a deep, cold‐water carbonate mound from the Porcupine Seabight (IODP Expedition 307)
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 2009
The Extended Mind
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 07-06-2011
Interpersonal Relating
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 05-09-2013
DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199579563.013.0018
Abstract: Getting clear about the nature and basis of interpersonal relating is a central concern of many recent debates in the philosophy of mind. The first section of this chapter highlights some basic facts about the complexity and multifaceted character of interpersonal relating and briefly overviews some of its most prominent dysfunctions. Popular mind-minding hypotheses which claim that the dysfunctions in question are rooted in impaired capacities for attending to and attributing mental states to others are then introduced. Next, recent evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience with which these mind-minding hypotheses must be made compatible is summarized. The important differences between two main philosophical frameworks-frameworks that offer opposing ways of understanding the nature of mind minding capacities are then highlighted. Focusing on these differences, the final section highlights how adoption of these philosophical frameworks matters to thinking about the prognosis and strategies for the treatment of certain mental disorders.
Action understanding: How low can you go?
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 09-2013
DOI: 10.1016/J.CONCOG.2013.01.002
Abstract: This paper begins by reminding the reader of the standard arguments that sceptics offer for doubting that mirror neurons could constitute any kind of action understanding (Section 2). It then outlines the usual response to these sceptical worries made by believers (Section 3). An attempt to put flesh on this idea in terms of what brains understand is critically examined and found wanting (Section 4). The ensuing analysis shows that it is prima facie possible to develop a more tenable account of enactive understanding that would fit the bill (Section 5). However, a second look raises further questions about (A) what mirror neurons target and (B) what such targeting involves (Section 6). Finally it is concluded that while mirror neurons may play a central role in enabling non-mentalistic forms of intersubjective engagement this falls short of action understanding (Section 7).
Basic social cognition without mindreading: minding minds without attributing contents
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 28-07-2017
The narrative practice hypothesis: Origins and applications of folk psychology
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 12-07-2007
REC: Just radical enough
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 06-2015
Abstract: We address some frequently encountered criticisms of Radical Embodied/Enactive Cognition. Contrary to the claims that the position is too radical, or not sufficiently so, we claim REC is just radical enough.
Against passive intellectualism
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Date: 2006
DOI: 10.1075/CEB.2.10HUT
The world is not enough: Shared emotions and other minds
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 11-2002
Re-affirming experience, presence, and the world: setting the RECord straight in reply to Noë
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 20-10-2021
Bradleyian Metaphysics
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 1998
Introduction: Searching for the Natural Origins of Content
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 09-2015
Fiction and conviction
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 11-2003
The cost of over-intellectualizing the free-energy principle
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2020
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002851
Abstract: This commentary raises a question about the target article's proposed explanation of what goes on when we think through other minds. It highlights a tension between non-mindreading characterizations of everyday social cognition and the in idualist, cognitivist assumptions that target article's explanatory proposal inherits from the predictive processing framework it favours.
The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 05-2007
DOI: 10.1017/S1358246107000033
Abstract: Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed. This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there have been interesting recent debates about how we should understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires.
Unprincipled engagements
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Date: 2006
DOI: 10.1075/CEB.2.04HUT
New Essays on Belief
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2013
Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 09-2011
Narrative and understanding persons
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 12-07-2007
Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-2005
Cognition without representation?
Publisher: Springer US
Date: 1999
The Routledge International Handbook of Embodied Perspectives in Psychotherapy
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 12-04-2019
Evolving Enactivism
Publisher: The MIT Press
Date: 19-05-2017
DOI: 10.7551/MITPRESS/9780262036115.001.0001
Abstract: Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism , which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix.
Predicative Minds: The Social Ontogeny of Propositional Thinking
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 10-2010
DOI: 10.1093/MIND/FZQ084
Lessons from Wittgenstein: Elucidating folk psychology
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-2009
Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 04-2010
Mental Representation and Consciousness
Publisher: Elsevier
Date: 2009
Enactive Aesthetics: Philosophical Reflections on Artful Minds
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 11-2014
Enactivism: Why be Radical?
Publisher: Akademie Verlag
Date: 2011
Encyclopedia of the Mind
Publisher: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Date: 2013
Social approaches to intentionality
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 18-11-2016
Psychology unified: From folk psychology to radical enactivism.
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 06-2013
DOI: 10.1037/A0032930
Abstract: A properly radical enactivism—one that eschews the idea that all mentality is necessarily contentful and representational—has better prospects of unifying psychology than does traditional cognitivism. This paper offers a five-step argument in support of this claim. The first section advances the view that a principled way of characterizing psychology's subject matter is what is required if it is to be regarded as a special science. In this light, section two examines why and how cognitivism continues to be regarded as the best potential unifier for the discipline. But the third section exposes a serious problem about the scope of cognitivism that occurs because it ascribes properties to basic minds that only belong to more sophisticated minds built atop them. In a nutshell, the root problem is that cognitivism relies on folk psychological models of mental states when it assumes that all mentality is contentful. Although this gives cognitivism its intuitive appeal, it also makes it too limited to provide a general model of the mind. Radical enactivism's way of understanding mentality as embodied activity, it is argued, avoids this and provides a more appropriate means of understanding basic forms of mentality. Against the charge that radical enactivism is also limited in scope, the final section argues that it is inclusive enough to allow for and recognize the emergence of language-based folk psychological modes of mentality, thus making it the superior potential unifier for psychology.
Overly enactive imagination? Radically re-imagining imagining
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-2015
DOI: 10.1111/SJP.12122
The narrative practice hypothesis: Clarifications and implications
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 09-2008
Folk psychology Re-Assessed
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 2007
Re-doing the math: making enactivism add up
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 2019
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-12-2016
The Character of Consciousness
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 14-03-2012
The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 03-2007
DOI: 10.1017/S1358246100009607
Abstract: Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed. This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there have been interesting recent debates about how we should understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires.
Narrative, Emotion, and Insight
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 10-2012
DOI: 10.1093/MIND/FZT004
Narrative and Understanding Persons
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 05-2007
Just faking it? Pretend theory meets sexual fantasising
Publisher: Peter Lang D
Date: 12-02-2015
Mind and supermind
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 2007
DOI: 10.1093/MIND/FZM170
Misreadings, clarifications and reminders: A reply to Hutchinson and Read
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 12-2006
Narrative understanding
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 07-12-2015
Embodied expectations and extended possibilities
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Date: 2006
DOI: 10.1075/CEB.2.12HUT
Cognitive ontology in flux: the possibility of protean brains
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 04-05-2017
Limited engagements and narrative extensions
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 07-2008
Wittgenstein and Naturalism
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 17-01-2018
Impossible problems and careful expositions
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Date: 2006
DOI: 10.1075/CEB.2.06HUT
The Presence of Mind
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Date: 15-05-1999
DOI: 10.1075/AICR.17
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 23-12-2015
DOI: 10.1093/PQ/PQU092
Davidson's identity crisis
Publisher: Verein philosophie.ch
Date: 23-05-1998
Turning hard problems on their heads
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-2006
Narrative Practices in Mental Health: Narrative Therapy and the Fictive Stance
Publisher: Oxford University PressNew York
Date: 07-06-2023
DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780197620540.003.0004
Abstract: Narrative practices can support mental health. This chapter offers a way of defending at least some narrative-based therapies from three crippling challenges. It gives close attention to McConnell and Snoek’s (2018) account of how narrative interventions might positively influence the prospects of recovery from addiction. It then details three skeptical challenges that threaten to cast doubt on the acceptability of the aims and methods of narrative therapy, as well as, potentially, casting doubt on the acceptability of other, similar narrative-based approaches to mental health. Finally, the author argues that it is possible to address these trio of challenges by recasting certain assumptions about the core aims and methods of narrative therapy. It is proposed that by focusing on the “fictive” rather than the “factual” character of its narrative practices, it is possible to rethink how narrative therapy might work in practice in such a way that would protect it from the said skeptical challenges.
Much ado about nothing? Why going non-semantic is not merely semantics
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 04-05-2018
Questing for happiness: Augmenting aristotle with davidson?
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 2004
Selfless Activity and Experience: Radicalizing Minimal Self-Awareness
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 11-06-2018
Psychology’s Inescapable Need for Conceptual Clarification
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2013
Psychology’s Inescapable Need for Conceptual Clarification
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Date: 2013
Getting real about pretense: A radical enactivist proposal
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-10-2022
DOI: 10.1007/S11097-022-09826-6
Abstract: This paper argues that radical enactivism (RE) offers a framework with the required nuance needed for understanding of the full range of the various forms of pretense. In particular, its multi-storey account of cognition, which holds that psychological attitudes can be both contentless and contentful, enables it to appropriately account for both the most basic and most advanced varieties of pretense. By comparison with other existing accounts of pretense, RE is shown to avoid the pitfalls of representationalist theories while also allowing us to combine the best elements of the praxeological enactivist (Weichold & Rucińska, 2021) and Langland-Hassan’s (2020, 2021) proposals about pretense, while avoiding their key shortcomings.
Narrative Practices in Medicine and Therapy: Philosophical Reflections
Publisher: Project MUSE
Date: 2017
Interacting? Yes. But, of what kind and on what basis?
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2009
A New, Better BET: Rescuing and Revising Basic Emotion Theory
Publisher: Frontiers Media SA
Date: 17-07-2018
Re-Authoring narrative therapy: Improving our selfmanagement tools
Publisher: Project MUSE
Date: 2017
New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 27-04-2018
Going Radical
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 13-09-2018
DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.5
Abstract: E-approaches to cognition—enactive, embodied, ecological—conceive of minds as fundamentally relational and interactive. They are often heralded as offering a new paradigm for thinking about the mental. Yet only the most radical versions of E-approaches—those that seek not to complement but to replace traditional cognitivist accounts of mind—have any prospect of ushering in a truly revolutionary rethink of the nature of cognition. This chapter considers whether such a conceptual revolution might really be in the cards. It identities the major options proposed by E-theorists, rating each in terms of degree of radicality. It reminds readers of the hard problem of content and reviews the range of options for handling it. It argues that “going radical” is one of the most attractive ways of dealing with the hard problem of content and that it is worth exploring the positive research program that going radical opens up.
Deflating deflationism about mental representation
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 03-12-2021
DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190686673.003.0004
Abstract: The radically enactive, embodied view of cognition (REC) holds that cognition is not always and everywhere grounded in the manipulation of contentful representations. Arguments for REC have assumed that its opponents defend a substantive notion of representation—a notion that entails the existence of content-carrying mental states. This paper considers the prospects of representationalism of a different stripe—one that prefers deflated notions representation. For ex le, deflationists hold that talk of mental representations might just be a kind of convenient labeling that does not commit theorists to any substantive claims about the explanatory work done by psychosemantic properties. Taking the deflationary option thus undercuts the crucial motivation for positing mental representations in the first place. This chapter argues that, should the deflationist arguments prove warranted, they provide reason to hold that some forms of cognition are contentless, à la REC.
Wittgenstein and Perception
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 11-02-2015
XIII—Making Sense of Nonsense: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 06-1998
Relaxed Naturalism: A Liberating Philosophy Of Nature
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 24-01-2022
2. Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Date: 2008
Narrative and Understanding Persons
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 03-2007
DOI: 10.1017/S1358246100009589
Abstract: Our world is replete with narratives—narratives of our making that are uniquely appreciated by us. This can hardly be denied, certainly if by ‘narratives’ we have in mind only those of the purely discursive variety—i.e. those complex representations that relate and describe the course of some unique series of events, however humble, in a coherent but selective arrangement. Our capacity to create, enjoy and benefit from narratives so defined—be they factual or fictive—surely sets us apart from other creatures. Some, impressed by the prominence of this phenomenon in the traffic of human life, have been tempted to deploy that famous Aristotelian formula, holding that we are, inter alia , not just social or rational or political animals but that we are also rightly distinguished as narrative or story-telling animals.
Knowing without Thinking
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2012
Revolution in Mind?
Publisher: The MIT Press
Date: 2017
Four Herculean labours
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Date: 2006
DOI: 10.1075/CEB.2.14HUT
Narrative and understanding persons: Royal institute of philosophy supplement: 60
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 12-07-2007
Abstract: The human world is replete with narratives - narratives of our making that are uniquely appreciated by us. Some thinkers have afforded special importance to our capacity to generate such narratives, seeing it as variously enabling us to: exercise our imaginations in unique ways engender an understanding of actions performed for reasons and provide a basis for the kind of reflection and evaluation that matters vitally to moral and self development. Perhaps most radically, some hold that narratives are essential for the constitution of human selves. This volume brings together nine original contributions in which the in idual authors advance, develop and challenge proposals of these kinds. They critically examine the place and importance of narratives in human lives and consider the underlying capacities that permit us to produce and utilise these special artifacts. All of the papers are written in a non-technical and accessible style.
Consciousness
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 25-03-2011
Continuity: Kinks Not Breaks
Publisher: The MIT Press
Date: 2017
Two wittgensteins too many: Wittgenstein's foundationalismx
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 15-05-2017
A Positively Relaxed Take on Naturalism: Reasons to be Relaxed but not too Liberal
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 08-03-2023
DOI: 10.1007/S11245-023-09892-8
Abstract: Relaxed naturalism and liberal naturalism both invite us to adopt a philosophy of nature that includes a range of non-scientific phenomena in its inventory while nevertheless keeping the supernatural at bay. This paper considers the question of how relaxed naturalism relates to liberal naturalism and what refinements are required if they are to succeed in their joint cause of developing a tenable alternative to scientific naturalism. Particular attention is given to what might be added to the naturalist’s toolbox when it comes to identifying and dealing with supernatural excesses and clarifying how philosophers can do positive metaphysical work in support of the naturalistic project.
Ur-Intentionality: What’s It All About?
Publisher: The MIT Press
Date: 2017
RECtifying and REConnecting
Publisher: The MIT Press
Date: 2017
The Natural Origins of Content
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 09-2015
A Cause for Concern: Reasons, Causes and Explanations
Publisher: JSTOR
Date: 06-1999
DOI: 10.2307/2653677
From Revolution to Evolution
Publisher: The MIT Press
Date: 2017
Reasons to REConceive
Publisher: The MIT Press
Date: 2017
Culture in Mind – An Enactivist Account
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 30-09-2020
Both Bradley and Biology
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Date: 2006
DOI: 10.1075/CEB.2.08HUT
Voices to be Heard
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 02-2005
Extensive enactivism: why keep it all in?
Publisher: Frontiers Media SA
Date: 25-09-2014
The limits of spectatorial folk psychology
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 11-2004
Fictionalism about Folk Psychology
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 2013
Wittgenstein and the end of philosophy: Neither theory nor therapy
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2003
11. First communions: Mimetic sharing without theory of mind
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Date: 2008
CONSCIOUSNESS DEMYSTIFIED - A WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE OF DENNETT,D.C. PROJECT
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 1995
Epilogue: Missing Information?
Publisher: The MIT Press
Date: 2017
Looking beyond the brain: Social neuroscience meets narrative practice
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2015
Narrative self-shaping: a modest proposal
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 14-02-2016
Why Believe in Contentless Beliefs?
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2013
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 14-07-2017
REC: Revolution Effected by Clarification
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 08-12-2017
The Representation of Ocean Circulation and Variability in Thermodynamic Coordinates
Publisher: American Meteorological Society
Date: 07-2014
Abstract: The ocean’s circulation is analyzed in Absolute Salinity SA and Conservative Temperature Θ coordinates. It is separated into 1) an advective component related to geographical displacements in the direction normal to SA and Θ isosurfaces and 2) into a local component, related to local changes in SA–Θ values, without a geographical displacement. In this decomposition, the sum of the advective and local components of the circulation is equivalent to the material derivative of SA and Θ. The sum is directly related to sources and sinks of salt and heat. The advective component is represented by the advective thermohaline streamfunction . After removing a trend, the local component can be represented by the local thermohaline streamfunction . Here, can be diagnosed using a monthly averaged time series of SA and Θ from an observational dataset. In addition, and are determined from a coupled climate model. The diathermohaline streamfunction is the sum of and and represents the non ergent diathermohaline circulation in SA–Θ coordinates. The diathermohaline trend, resulting from the trend in the local changes of SA and Θ, quantifies the redistribution of the ocean’s volume in SA–Θ coordinates over time. It is argued that the diathermohaline streamfunction provides a powerful tool for the analysis of and comparison among ocean models and observation-based gridded climatologies.
Remembering without stored contents: A philosophical reflection on memory
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2016
More making sense of nonsense: From logical form to forms of life
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 08-09-2017
The Enactive Roots of STEM: Rethinking Educational Design in Mathematics
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 15-07-2015
Predictive Processing and Some Disillusions about Illusions
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 24-11-2022
DOI: 10.1007/S13164-021-00588-9
Abstract: A number of perceptual (exteroceptive and proprioceptive) illusions present problems for predictive processing accounts. In this chapter we’ll review explanations of the Müller-Lyer Illusion (MLI), the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) and the Alien Hand Illusion (AHI) based on the idea of Prediction Error Minimization (PEM), and show why they fail. In spite of the relatively open communicative processes which, on many accounts, are posited between hierarchical levels of the cognitive system in order to facilitate the minimization of prediction errors, perceptual illusions seemingly allow prediction errors to rule. Even if, at the top, we have reliable and secure knowledge that the lines in the MLI are equal, or that the rubber hand in the RHI is not our hand, the system seems unable to correct for sensory errors that form the illusion. We argue that the standard PEM explanation based on a short-circuiting principle doesn’t work. This is the idea that where there are general statistical regularities in the environment there is a kind of short circuiting such that relevant priors are relegated to lower-level processing so that information from higher levels is not exchanged (Ogilvie and Carruthers, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7:721–742, 2016), or is not as precise as it should be (Hohwy, The Predictive Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013). Such solutions (without convincing explanation) violate the idea of open communication and/or they over-discount the reliable and secure knowledge that is in the system. We propose an alternative, 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) solution. We argue that PEM fails to take into account the ‘structural resistance’ introduced by material and cultural factors in the broader cognitive system.
Similarity-based cognition: radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 10-12-2021
Enactive emotions and imaginative association: a multi-layered account
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 04-09-2017
Intersubjective engagements without theory of mind: A cross-species comparison
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 05-09-2012
The brain as part of an enactive system
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 25-07-2013
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X12002105
Abstract: The notion of an enactive system requires thinking about the brain in a way that is different from the standard computational-representational models. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it does and is the way that it is, across some scale of variations, because it is part of a living body with hands that can reach and grasp in certain limited ways, eyes structured to focus, an autonomic system, an upright posture, etc. coping with specific kinds of environments, and with other people. Changes to any of the bodily, environmental, or intersubjective conditions elicit responses from the system as a whole. On this view, rather than representing or computing information, the brain is better conceived as participating in the action.
Beyond Physicalism
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Date: 15-05-2000
DOI: 10.1075/AICR.21
Getting into predictive processing’s great guessing game: Bootstrap heaven or hell?
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 04-04-2017
Narrative practice and understanding reasons
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Date: 2006
DOI: 10.1075/CEB.2.16HUT
Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action and the Embodied Mind
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 10-01-2018
Embodied cognition and body psychotherapy: The construction of new therapeutic environments
Publisher: Swinburne University of Technology
Date: 09-07-2014
DOI: 10.7790/SA.V10I1.389
Folk psychology without theory or simulation
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 2007
ToM rules, but it is not ok!
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2009
Against intellectualism about skill
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-04-2023
DOI: 10.1007/S11229-023-04096-4
Abstract: This paper will argue that intellectualism about skill—the contention that skilled performance is without exception guided by proposition knowledge—is fundamentally flawed. It exposes that intellectualists about skill run into intractable theoretical problems in explicating a role for their novel theoretical conceit of practical modes of presentation. It then examines a proposed solution by Carlotta Pavese which seeks to identify practical modes of presentation with motor representations that guide skilled sensorimotor action. We argue that this proposed identification is problematic on empirical and theoretical grounds, and—as such—it fails to deliver on its explanatory ambitions. In the final analysis, it will be argued that intellectualism about skill is, in any case, superfluous when it comes to accounting for the aspects of skilled performance it purports to explain.
A reconciliation for the future of psychiatry: Both folk psychology and cognitive science
Publisher: Frontiers Media SA
Date: 16-02-2016
Introduction
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 2007
Wittgenstein's Inspiring View of Nature: On Connecting Philosophy and Science Aright
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 08-02-2018
DOI: 10.1111/PHIN.12193
Exorcising action oriented representations: Ridding cognitive science of its Nazgûl
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 14-05-2013
Abstract: This paper reviews two main strategies for dealing with the threat posed by radically enactive/embodied cognition to traditional cognitive science. Both strategies invoke action oriented representations (AORs). They differ in emphasizing different features of AORs in their attempt to answer the REC threat – focusing on their contents and vehicles, respectively. The first two sections review the central motivations and rationales driving the ‘content’ and ‘format’ strategies in turn and raise initial concerns about the tenability of each. With respect to the ‘content’ strategy, these worries ought to make us suspicious about the explanatory value of positing AORs. Although the ‘format’ strategy has a way of answering this concern, it raises a more fundamental worry about the motivation for even believing in AORs in the first place. Although these worries cast doubt on the feasibility of invoking AORs as a means of dealing with the REC threat, they do not constitute conclusive reasons for eliminating AORs altogether. There are other, stronger reasons for supposing that we should. The third section provides a sketch of a master argument, developed elsewhere, which makes that case in full dress fashion. The final section – ‘Resurrection?’ – considers and rejects the possibility that AORs might be resurrected, even if it is agreed that the master argument cited in the third section succeeds.
Choking RECtified: embodied expertise beyond Dreyfus
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 17-08-2015
AN AUTOMATIC ADAPTIVE REFINEMENT FINITE-ELEMENT PROCEDURE FOR 2D ELASTOSTATIC ANALYSIS
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-1992
Philosophical clarification, its possibility and point
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 29-04-2009
Truly enactive emotion
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 04-2012
Abstract: Any adequate account of emotion must accommodate the fact that emotions, even those of the most basic kind, exhibit intentionality as well as phenomenality. This article argues that a good place to start in providing such an account is by adjusting Prinz’s (2004) embodied appraisal theory (EAT) of emotions. EAT appeals to teleosemantics in order to account for the world-directed content of embodied appraisals. Although the central idea behind EAT is essentially along the right lines, as it stands Prinz’s proposal needs tweaking in a number of ways. This article focuses on one—the need to free it from its dependence on teleosemantics. EAT, so modified, becomes compatible with a truly enactivist understanding of basic emotions.
Comment: Understanding reasons without reenactment: Comment on Stueber
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 2012
Abstract: This comment on Stueber’s article clarifies the nature of the core disagreement between his approach to understanding reasons and mine. The purely philosophical nature of the dispute is highlighted. It is argued that understanding someone’s narrative often suffices for understanding the person’s reasons in ordinary cases. It is observed that Stueber has yet to provide a compelling counter case. There is also a brief clarification of some of the empirical commitments of the narrative practice hypothesis.
What are we doing when we perceive numbers?
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2021
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X21001114
Abstract: Clarke and Beck rightly contend that the number sense allows us to directly perceive number. However, they unnecessarily assume a representationalist approach and incur a heavy theoretical cost by invoking “modes of presentation.” We suggest that the relevant evidence is better explained by adopting a radical enactivist approach that avoids characterizing the approximate number system (ANS) as a system for representing number.
A brickhouse defence for folk psychology: How to defeat Big Bad Wolf Eliminativism
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 07-03-2022
Exposing the Background: Deep and Local
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2012
Representation Reconsidered
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 02-2011
Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 2015
Comparing the effects of goal types in a walking session with healthy adults: Preliminary evidence for open goals in physical activity
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 03-2020
Time and the Philosophy of Action
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 10-06-2016
Neural representations not needed - no more pleas, please
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 09-08-2014
Related Organisations
University Of St Andrews
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
University Of York
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Related Funding Activities
Discovery Projects - Grant ID: DP170102987
Start Date: 03-2017
End Date: 03-2023
Amount: $263,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityDiscovery Projects - Grant ID: DP1095109
Start Date: 2010
End Date: 04-2015
Amount: $293,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded Activity