ORCID Profile
0000-0002-3703-615X
Current Organisations
Institute of Mathematics and Informatics
,
University of York
,
University of Limerick
,
Plovdiv University Paisii Hilendarski
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Labour Economics | Health Economics | Applied Economics |
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-2009
DOI: 10.1002/HEC.1536
Abstract: An incentive program for general practitioners to encourage systematic and igh-quality care in chronic disease management was introduced in Australia in 1999. There is little empirical evidence and ambiguous theoretical guidance on which effects to expect. This paper evaluates the impact of the incentive program on quality of care in diabetes, as measured by the probability of ordering an HbA1c test. The empirical analysis is conducted with a unique data set and a bivariate probit model to control for the self-selection process of practices into the program. The study finds that the incentive program increased the probability of an HbA1c test being ordered by 20 percentage points and that participation in the program is facilitated by the support of Divisions of General Practice.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 10-2018
DOI: 10.1016/J.SOCSCIMED.2018.08.014
Abstract: Many countries use financial incentive programs to attract physicians to work in rural areas. This paper examines the effectiveness of a policy reform in Australia that made some locations newly eligible for financial incentives and increased incentives for locations already eligible. The analysis uses panel data (2008-2014) on all Australian general practitioners (GPs) aggregated to small areas. We use a difference-in-differences approach to examine if the policy change affected GP entry or exit to the 755 newly eligible locations and the 787 always eligible locations relative to 2249 locations which were never eligible. The policy change increased the entry of newly-qualified GPs to newly eligible locations but had no effect on the entry and exit of other GPs. Our results suggest that location incentives should be targeted at newly qualified GPs.
Publisher: IEEE
Date: 07-2018
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 18-12-2013
Abstract: Local primary care facilities in China struggle to recruit and retain doctors and nurses. Implementing policies to address this issue requires detailed knowledge of the preferences of primary care workers. The aim of this study is to find out which job attributes affect Chinese primary care providers' choice of job and whether there are any differences in these job preferences between doctors and nurses. A discrete choice experiment was used to analyse the job preferences of 517 primary care providers, including 282 doctors and 235 nurses. Chinese primary care providers in Community Health Organizations (CHOs) considered monetary factors and non-monetary factors when choosing a job. Doctors' and nurses' preferences over job attributes were similar. Though income was important, Chinese primary care providers had strongest preferences for sufficient welfare benefits, sufficient essential equipment and respect from the community. Younger primary care providers were more likely to value training and career development opportunities. In order to retain skilled primary care providers to work in CHOs, policymakers in China need to improve primary care providers' income, benefits and working conditions to fulfil their basic needs. Policymakers also need to invest in CHOs' infrastructure and strengthen training programmes for primary care providers in order to raise the community's confidence in the services provided by CHOs.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 28-05-2022
DOI: 10.1002/HEC.4533
Abstract: Non‐pecuniary sources of motivation are a strong feature of the health care sector and the impact of competitive incentives on behavior may be lower where pecuniary motivation is low. This paper measures the marginal utility of income (MUY) of physicians from a stated‐choice experiment, and examines whether this measure influences the association between competition faced by physicians and the prices they charge. We find that physicians are more likely to exploit a lack of competition with higher prices if they have a high MUY.
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 03-2016
DOI: 10.1111/JOIE.12098
Publisher: IEEE
Date: 11-2016
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 10-08-2015
DOI: 10.1002/HEC.3222
Abstract: We develop a theoretical model to study a policy that publicly reports hospital waiting times. We characterize two effects of such a policy: the 'competition effect' that drives hospitals to compete for patients by increasing service rates and reducing waiting times and the 'signaling effect' that allows patients to distinguish a high-quality hospital from a low-quality one. While for a low-quality hospital both effects help reduce waiting time, for a high-quality hospital, they act in opposite directions. We show that the competition effect will outweigh the signaling effect for the high-quality hospital, and consequently, both hospitals' waiting times will be reduced by the introduction of the policy. This result holds in a policy environment where maximum waiting time targets are not binding. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Publisher: IEEE
Date: 09-2016
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 25-06-2019
DOI: 10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.60
Abstract: Quality competition between alternative providers is an increasingly important topic in the health economics literature. This literature includes theoretical and empirical studies that have been developed in parallel to 21st-century policies to increase competition between doctors or hospitals. Theoretical studies have clarified how competitive markets can give healthcare providers the incentive to improve quality. Broadly speaking, if providers have an incentive to attract more patients and patients value quality, providers will raise quality until the costs of raising quality are equal to the additional revenue from patients attracted by the rise in quality. The theoretical literature has also investigated how institutional and policy parameters determine quality levels in equilibrium. Important parameters in models of quality competition include the degree of horizontal differentiation, the level of information about provider quality, the costs of switching between providers, and the time-horizon of quality investment decisions. Empirical studies have focused on the prerequisites of quality competition (e.g., do patients choose higher quality providers?) and the impact of pro-competition policies on quality levels. The most influential studies have used modern econometric approaches, including difference-in differences and instrumental variables, to identify plausibly causal effects. The evidence suggests that in most contexts, quality is a determinant of patient choice of provider, especially after greater patient choice is made available or information is published about provider quality. The evidence that increases in competition improve quality in healthcare is less clear cut. Perhaps reflecting the economic theory of quality competition, showing that different parameter combinations or assumptions can produce different outcomes, empirical results are also mixed. While a series of high-quality studies in the United Kingdom appear to show strong improvements in quality in more competitive areas following pro-competition reforms introducing more choice and competition, other studies showed that these quality improvements do not extend to all types of healthcare or alternative measures of quality. The most promising areas for future research include investigating the “black box” of quality improvement under competition, and behavioral studies investigating financial and nonfinancial motivations for quality improvements in competitive markets.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 07-2021
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-09-2011
Publisher: IEEE
Date: 09-2017
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 2021
Publisher: Hindawi Limited
Date: 2017
DOI: 10.1155/2017/6783240
Abstract: With the development of ubiquitous computing, recommendation systems have become essential tools in assisting users in discovering services they would find interesting. This process is highly dynamic with an increasing number of services, distributed over networks, bringing the problems of cold start and sparsity for service recommendation to a new level. To alleviate these problems, this paper proposes a hybrid service recommendation prototype utilizing user and item side information, which naturally constitute a heterogeneous information network (HIN) for use in the emerging ubiquitous consumer wireless world (UCWW) wireless communication environment that offers a consumer-centric and network-independent service operation model and allows the accomplishment of a broad range of smart-city scenarios, aiming at providing consumers with the “best” service instances that match their dynamic, contextualized, and personalized requirements and expectations. A layered architecture for the proposed prototype is described. Two recommendation models defined at both global and personalized level are proposed, with model learning based on the Bayesian Personalized Ranking (BPR). A subset of the Yelp dataset is utilized to simulate UCWW data and evaluate the proposed models. Empirical studies show that the proposed recommendation models outperform several widely deployed recommendation approaches.
Publisher: Public Library of Science (PLoS)
Date: 31-05-2019
Publisher: IEEE
Date: 03-2017
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Date: 09-2016
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Start Date: 06-2015
End Date: 12-2019
Amount: $387,100.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2015
End Date: 2018
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded Activity