ORCID Profile
0000-0003-2568-187X
Current Organisation
Iran University of Science and Technology
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Publisher: EDP Sciences
Date: 03-2021
DOI: 10.1051/RO/2021040
Abstract: This study contributes to the periodic review inventory system literature by: (1) investigating customer service level (CSL) as a social responsibility in pharmaceutical supply chains (PSCs) and (2) proposing supply chain contracting to achieve win–win coordination and guarantee a satisfied CSL. Specifically, considering the demand uncertainty as one of the main challenges faced by pharmacies, we analyze how applying contracts to coordinate the inventory policy of a pharmacy with that of its supplier can affect their profits and the CSL offered to society. Having shown the advantages of the centralization compared to the decentralization, we design a coordination scheme based on the quantity discount contract to encourage the players move towards centralization. Under the proposed scheme, we first obtain the minimum and maximum acceptable amounts of discount from each actor’s viewpoint. Then, we propose a benefit-sharing strategy in order to make the plan interesting to both sides. The proposed discount contract and benefit-sharing strategy distribute the extra profits equitably between the two participants according to their bargaining power, which can make a win–win condition for two actors. Our results suggest that coordinating review period and order-up-to-level of the retailer and replenishment multiplier of the supplier will be of benefit in terms of both economic profitability and social responsibility.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-2019
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 21-06-2013
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2018
Publisher: Hindawi Limited
Date: 2014
DOI: 10.1155/2014/951783
Abstract: This paper presents a multiobjective winner determination combinatorial auction mechanism for transportation carriers to present multiple transport lanes and bundle the lanes as packet bids to the shippers for the purposes of ocean freight. This then allows the carriers to maximize their network of resources and pass some of the cost savings onto the shipper. Specifically, we formulate three multi-objective optimization models (weighted objective model, preemptive goal programming, and compromise programming) under three criteria of cost, marketplace fairness, and the marketplace confidence in determining the winning packages. We develop solutions on the three models and perform a sensitivity analysis to show the options the shipper can use depending on the existing conditions at the point of awarding the transport lanes.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 02-10-2015
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2018
Location: Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Location: Iran (Islamic Republic of)
No related grants have been discovered for Seyyed-Mahdi Hosseini-Motlagh.