ORCID Profile
0000-0002-5679-1986
Current Organisations
University of Oxford
,
Macquarie University
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Research Topics
In Research Link Australia (RLA), "Research Topics" refer to ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes. These topics are either sourced from ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes listed in researchers' related grants or generated by a large language model (LLM) based on their publications.
Top 5 Research Topics
ANZSRC Field of Research (FoR)
Philosophy | Philosophical Psychology (incl. Moral Psychology and Philosophy of Action) | Social Philosophy | Philosophy Of Mind (Excl. Cognition) | Applied Ethics | Other Behavioural And Cognitive Sciences | Applied Ethics not elsewhere classified | Philosophy of Cognition | Biological Psychology (Neuropsychology, Psychopharmacology, | Philosophy Of Cognition | Biochemistry and Cell Biology | Developmental Psychology And Ageing | Applied Ethics (Incl. Bioethics And Environmental Ethics) | Ethical Theory | Decision Making | Central Nervous System | Human Rights and Justice Issues | Epistemology | Cell Development (Incl. Cell Division And Apoptosis) | Psychiatry |
ANZSRC Socio-Economic Objective (SEO)
Behavioural and cognitive sciences | Social ethics | Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies | Bioethics | Communication Networks and Services not elsewhere classified | Social Ethics | Substance Abuse | The Media | Health related to ageing | Nervous system and disorders | Expanding Knowledge in Psychology and Cognitive Sciences | Political science and public policy | Rehabilitation and Correctional Services | Education policy | Behaviour and Health | Mental health
Related Links
Publications
A global experiment on motivating social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic
Publisher: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Date: 27-05-2022
Abstract: Finding communication strategies that effectively motivate social distancing continues to be a global public health priority during the COVID-19 pandemic. This cross-country, preregistered experiment ( n = 25,718 from 89 countries) tested hypotheses concerning generalizable positive and negative outcomes of social distancing messages that promoted personal agency and reflective choices (i.e., an autonomy-supportive message) or were restrictive and shaming (i.e., a controlling message) compared with no message at all. Results partially supported experimental hypotheses in that the controlling message increased controlled motivation (a poorly internalized form of motivation relying on shame, guilt, and fear of social consequences) relative to no message. On the other hand, the autonomy-supportive message lowered feelings of defiance compared with the controlling message, but the controlling message did not differ from receiving no message at all. Unexpectedly, messages did not influence autonomous motivation (a highly internalized form of motivation relying on one’s core values) or behavioral intentions. Results supported hypothesized associations between people’s existing autonomous and controlled motivations and self-reported behavioral intentions to engage in social distancing. Controlled motivation was associated with more defiance and less long-term behavioral intention to engage in social distancing, whereas autonomous motivation was associated with less defiance and more short- and long-term intentions to social distance. Overall, this work highlights the potential harm of using shaming and pressuring language in public health communication, with implications for the current and future global health challenges.
Persistent vegetative state, akinetic mutism, and consciousness
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 03-2016
National identity predicts public health support during a global pandemic
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 02-09-2020
Abstract: Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors that associated with people reported adopting public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national s les. Study 2 (N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic (r = -.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics.
Against Intellectual Autonomy: Social Animals Need Social Virtues
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 22-02-2023
Neuroethics
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 12-07-2007
Abstract: Neuroscience has dramatically increased understanding of how mental states and processes are realized by the brain, thus opening doors for treating the multitude of ways in which minds become dysfunctional. This book explores questions such as when is it permissible to alter a person's memories, influence personality traits or read minds? What can neuroscience tell us about free will, self-control, self-deception and the foundations of morality? The view of neuroethics offered here argues that many of our new powers to read ,alter and control minds are not entirely unparalleled with older ones. They have, however, expanded to include almost all our social, political and ethical decisions. Written primarily for graduate students, this book will appeal to anyone with an interest in the more philosophical and ethical aspects of the neurosciences.
Are free will believers nicer people? (Four studies suggest not)
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 10-01-2018
Abstract: Free will is widely considered a foundational component of Western moral and legal codes, and yet current conceptions of free will are widely thought to fit uncomfortably with much research in psychology and neuroscience. Recent research investigating the consequences of laypeople’s free will beliefs (FWBs) for everyday moral behavior suggest that stronger FWBs are associated with various desirable moral characteristics (e.g., greater helpfulness, less dishonesty). These findings have sparked concern regarding the potential for moral degeneration throughout society as science promotes a view of human behavior that is widely perceived to undermine the notion of free will. We report four studies (combined N = 921) originally concerned with possible mediators and/or moderators of the abovementioned associations. Unexpectedly, we found no association between FWBs and moral behavior. Our findings suggest that the FWB – moral behavior association (and accompanying concerns regarding decreases in FWBs causing moral degeneration) may be overstated.
Self-deception and responsibility for addiction
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 10-2003
After the Pandemic: New Responsibilities
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 17-05-2021
DOI: 10.1093/PHE/PHAB008
Abstract: Seasonal influenza kills many hundreds of thousands of people every year. We argue that the current pandemic has lessons we should learn concerning how we should respond to it. Our response to the COVID-19 not only provides us with tools for confronting influenza it also changes our sense of what is possible. The recognition of how dramatic policy responses to COVID-19 were and how widespread their general acceptance has been allowed us to imagine new and more sweeping responses to influenza. In fact, we not only can grasp how we can reduce its toll this new knowledge entails new responsibilities to do so. We outline a range of potential interventions to alter social norms and to change structures to reduce influenza transmission, and consider ethical objections to our proposals.
Suspiciously convenient belief
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 20-08-2020
DOI: 10.1007/S10677-020-10116-W
Abstract: Moral judgments entail or consist in claims that certain ways of behaving are called for. These actions have expectable consequences. I will argue that these consequences are suspiciously benign: on controversial issues, each side assesses these consequences, measured in dispute-independent goods, as significantly better than the consequences of behaving in the ways their opponents recommend. This remains the case even when we have not formed our moral judgment by assessing consequences. I will suggest that the evidence indicates that our perception of the consequences of acting as recommended by our moral judgments is motivated, such that the warrant of such assessments is lower than we might have thought. The suspicion correlation between our moral judgments and our assessments of the implicated facts provides higher-order evidence that should lead us to reduce our confidence in these assessments.
What does the CRT measure? Poor performance may arise from rational processes
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 12-02-2023
A role for consciousness after all
Publisher: Brill
Date: 2012
Abstract: In a recent paper in this journal, Matt King and Peter Carruthers argue that the common assumption that agents are only (or especially) morally responsible for actions caused by attitudes of which they are conscious needs to be rethought. They claim that there is persuasive evidence that we are never conscious of our propositional attitudes we ought therefore to design our theories of moral responsibility to accommodate this fact. In this reply, I argue that the evidence they adduce need not worry philosophers. There is an ongoing debate over the role that consciousness of our attitudes plays in morally responsible behaviour, but the evidence they produce does not favour either side. Even if we are not conscious of our propositional attitudes as such – even if we lack introspective access to their content – we nevertheless reliably come to know their content. There are systematic differences between those attitudes of whose content we come to be aware and those we do not, and these differences are directly relevant to our moral responsibility. Moreover, coming to be aware of the content of our attitudes has effects on our behaviour, and these effects are directly relevant to our moral responsibility. The causal route whereby we come to be conscious of the content of our attitudes is irrelevant to whether they play the right kinds of roles to distinguish between actions for which we are responsible and actions for which we ought to be excused.
The surprising truth about disagreement
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 08-06-2021
DOI: 10.1007/S12136-020-00437-X
Abstract: Conciliationism—the thesis that when epistemic peers discover that they disagree about a proposition, both should reduce their confidence—faces a major objection: it seems to require us to significantly reduce our confidence in our central moral and political commitments. In this paper, I develop a typology of disagreement cases and a diagnosis of the source and force of the pressure to conciliate. Building on Vavova’s work, I argue that ordinary and extreme disagreements are surprising, and for this reason, they carry information about the likelihood of error. But deep disagreement is not surprising at all, and token deep disagreements do not put pressure on us to conciliate. However, a pattern of deep disagreements points to a different concern: not the problem of disagreement but the problem of irrelevant influences. Deep disagreement constitutes some pressure to examine the foundations from which we reason, rather than to conciliate on our central moral and political claims.
Arrogance and servility online
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 15-06-2021
Intellectual virtue signaling
Publisher: University of Illinois Press
Date: 07-2023
Report cards for institutions, not individuals
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 26-07-2007
Preface
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date: 18-02-2010
The sweetness of surrender
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 21-04-2016
Applying Brown and Savulescu
Publisher: BMJ
Date: 08-08-2019
Do your own research!
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 20-08-2022
DOI: 10.1007/S11229-022-03793-W
Abstract: Philosophical tradition and conspiracy theorists converge in suggesting that ordinary people ought to do their own research, rather than accept the word of others. In this paper, I argue that it’s no accident that conspiracy theorists value lay research on expert topics: such research is likely to undermine knowledge, via its effects on truth and justification. Accepting expert testimony is a far more reliable route to truth. Nevertheless, lay research has a range of benefits in particular, it is likely to lead to greater understanding, even when it does not lead to knowledge. I argue that we can reap most of the genuine benefits of lay research while minimizing the risks by engaging in exploratory, rather than truth-directed, inquiry. To engage in exploratory inquiry is to engage dogmatically, expecting to be unable to confirm the expert view or to disconfirm rivals.
Autonomy, Responsibility and the Oscillation of Preference
Publisher: Elsevier
Date: 2012
Doing without deliberation: Automatism, automaticity, and moral accountability
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-2004
DOI: 10.1080/09540260400003909
Abstract: Actions performed in a state of automatism are not subject to moral evaluation, while automatic actions often are. Is the asymmetry between automatistic and automatic actions justified? In order to answer this question we need a model of moral accountability that does justice to our intuitions about a range of modes of agency, both pathological and non-pathological. Our aim in this paper is to lay the groundwork for the development of such a model.
A multi-country test of brief reappraisal interventions on emotions during the COVID-19 pandemic
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 02-08-2021
Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2015
Addiction is not a brain disease (and it matters)
Publisher: Frontiers Media SA
Date: 2013
“Sleights of mind”: Delusions and self-deception
Publisher: Psychology Press
Date: 18-10-2011
Culpable ignorance
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2016
DOI: 10.5840/JPR201672778
Culpable ignorance and moral responsibility
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Date: 07-2009
DOI: 10.1086/605018
When Is Company Unwelcome?
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 23-12-2023
DOI: 10.1017/EPI.2020.52
Abstract: In a recent paper in this journal, Joshua Blanchard has identified a novel problem: the problem of unwelcome epistemic company. We find ourselves in unwelcome epistemic company when we hold a belief that is also held mainly or most prominently by those we regard as morally or epistemically bad. Blanchard argues that some, but not all, unwelcome epistemic company provides higher-order evidence against our belief. But he doesn't provide a test for when company is unwelcome or a diagnosis of why it is unwelcome. I provide both. On my disjunctive test, unwelcome epistemic company provides us with a defeater when either there is a match between the content of the belief and the properties that make our company unwelcome, or there is reason to suspect that the belief arose via a shared, unreliable, causal process.
Neuroethics
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 18-02-2009
Disease, Normality, and Current Pharmacological Moral Modification
Publisher: Project MUSE
Date: 2014
Religious beliefs are factual beliefs
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 04-2017
DOI: 10.1016/J.COGNITION.2017.01.012
Abstract: Neil Van Leeuwen argues that religious beliefs are not factual beliefs: typically, at least, they are attitudes of a different type. He argues that they exhibit much more sensitivity to context than factual beliefs: outside of contexts in which they are salient, they do not govern behaviour or inference, or provide background assumptions for cognition. This article surveys a large range of data to show that the kind of context sensitivity that Van Leeuwen thinks is the province of religious beliefs does not correlate with belief content. Beliefs about matters of fact beyond the theological realm exhibit this kind of sensitivity too. Conversely, theological and supernatural beliefs often guide behaviour across contexts. It is the intuitiveness of representations across contexts that predicts context (in)sensitivity, and intuitiveness is powerfully influenced by processing fluency. Fluency, in turn, is sensitive to cues that vary across contexts.
Determinist Deliberations
Publisher: Verein philosophie.ch
Date: 12-2006
A will of one's own: Consciousness, control, and character
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 09-2004
Moral responsibility and consciousness
Publisher: Oxford University PressNew York
Date: 05-02-2013
DOI: 10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199925605.003.0007
Abstract: Until recently, most philosophers seem implicitly to have assumed that consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility this is, moreover, an assumption that seems built into the law. Under the pressure of scientific evidence and independent philosophical argument, some philosophers now reject that assumption. Against these philosophers, I argue that we need to be conscious of the facts that make our actions morally significant in order to be morally responsible for them. I present two separate defences of this claim. First, I argue that actions caused by unconscious attitudes do not express good or ill will toward others. Second, I argue that such actions do not express our evaluative agency. Finally, I turn to some alleged empirical evidence against the claim that we can be conscious of our volitions, and show how the defence offered is immune to this challenge.
Neuroethics
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 02-2013
DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.WBIEE745
Abstract: Neuroethics is a relatively new subdiscipline of philosophy. It has two branches. The first, on which I will focus here, is concerned with the ethical issues arising out of neuroscience and the other sciences of the mind (psychiatry, social and cognitive psychology, and so on see Psychiatric Ethics ) the second is more theoretical and deals with how the sciences of the mind illuminate traditional philosophical questions, like the nature of persons and the existence of free will (Roskies 2002 see Free Will ). As a branch of applied ethics ( see Applied Ethics ), neuroethics was born as a response to the expansion of our powers to intervene in the mind, in a manner parallel to the way in which bioethics ( see Bioethics ) was born as a response to advances in somatic medicine. Just as the medical advances of the past five decades – for ex le, advances in new powers to create human life in vitro , and to preserve it when it no longer seemed to have much value for patients – provoked novel and pressing ethical issues, so advances in our ability to comprehend mental processes and to intervene in them have raised pressing questions about whether and when these powers should be exercised.
Evolutionary psychology
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 02-03-2010
A Neuroethics Framework for the Australian Brain Initiative
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 02-2019
DOI: 10.1016/J.NEURON.2019.01.004
Abstract: Neuroethics is central to the Australian Brain Initiative's aim to sustain a thriving and responsible neurotechnology industry. Diverse and inclusive community and stakeholder engagement and a trans-disciplinary approach to neuroethics will be key to the success of the Australian Brain Initiative.
Fake news
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 10-11-2021
DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198857815.013.6
Abstract: The blame for fake news obviously lies with the producers. It is plausible, nevertheless, that consumers have a responsibility to avoid fake news, to engage in fact-checking, or to seek multiple sources, including sources with different ideologies. This chapter argues that these strategies have limited utility and if the problem of fake news is to be effectively addressed, we need responses at the supply end, not the consumption end. Since suppliers, who are often ill motivated, cannot be expected to offer or consent to these responses, we need effective regulation or control of sources. The author sketches proposals compatible with maintaining the rights of everyone to free speech.
'Barbarians at the gates': The moral costs of political community
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2006
Consciousness and Moral Responsibility
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 06-03-2014
Are You Morally Modified?: The Moral Effects of Widely Used Pharmaceuticals
Publisher: Project MUSE
Date: 2014
Neuroethics: A new way of doing ethics
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 31-03-2011
Must publicly funded research be culturally neutral?
Publisher: American Medical Association (AMA)
Date: 02-2007
The use of animal as models: Ethical considerations
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 19-06-2012
DOI: 10.1111/J.1747-4949.2012.00772.X
Abstract: The use of animals in scientific research is highly controversial. Older justifications, which referred to an immense gulf between human beings and other animals, can no longer be sustained in the face of a large body of scientific evidence concerning the similarities between human beings and other animals. The probability is very high that they are like us in many important ways, including in having a capacity to suffer. Because animals may suffer during research, their use must be justified. An appropriate justification will require that researchers can demonstrate that the expected benefits of the research, in terms of pure knowledge and medical applications, outweigh the suffering imposed. However, while the infliction of suffering on animal models must meet stringent conditions, research which involves the (painless) death of animals is often easier to justify, since few animals other than human beings possess the psychological capacities required to care about their future.
Is religious neutrality possible?
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 15-10-2022
Cognitive enhancement
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 26-03-2020
DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190651145.003.0002
Abstract: According to the parity principle, the means whereby an agent intervenes in his or her mind, or the minds of others, is irrelevant when it comes to assessing the moral status of the intervention: what matters is how the intervention affects the agent. This chapter sets out the case for the parity principle, before defending it from recent objections due to Christoph Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel. Bublitz and Merkel argue that direct interventions bypass agents’ psychological capacities and therefore produce states over which agents have less control and which are less reflective of who they genuinely are. I argue that indirect interventions that are processed psychologically may be no less destructive of control or of the degree to which the resulting states are reflective of the agent and, further, that direct interventions may be morally unproblematic. Given that right now and for the foreseeable future indirect interventions threaten our autonomy far more often and far more deeply than direct, the distinction between direct and indirect interventions doesn’t even provide a useful heuristic for assessing when an intervention into the mind/brain is problematic.
Countering Cova
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 04-09-2014
Does she still love and feel hungry? Afterlife beliefs, mind-body dualism, and religion across 24 countries
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 03-02-2023
Abstract: All over the world, people reason dualistically. We consider it more probable that mental states, such as love, continue after biological death than we think bodily states, such as hunger, will continue. However the extent to which culture affects mind-body dualism remains unclear. Here, we draw on a large and erse cross-cultural s le (24 countries, N = 10195) to systematically quantify cultural variation in tendencies for mind-body dualism. Our findings replicate previous work suggesting that mind-body dualism is culturally universal. Furthermore, our experiment reveals that religion lifies dualistic tendencies. At the same time, however, the modal response across most countries was the cessation of all states. In addition, explicit afterlife beliefs were more prevalent than implicit afterlife beliefs (i.e., continuity judgments). Overall, these data suggest that intuitive materialism is the cross-cultural norm, with dualism arising from culturally acquired beliefs.
Neuroethics
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 07-2014
Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 03-05-2019
Abstract: A key source of support for the view that challenging people’s beliefs about free will may undermine moral behavior is two classic studies by Vohs and Schooler (2008). These authors reported that exposure to certain prompts suggesting that free will is an illusion increased cheating behavior. In the present paper, we report several attempts to replicate this influential and widely cited work. Over a series of five studies (s le sizes of N = 162, N = 283, N = 268, N = 804, N = 982) (four preregistered) we tested the relationship between (1) anti-free-will prompts and free will beliefs and (2) free will beliefs and immoral behavior. Our primary task was to closely replicate the findings from Vohs and Schooler (2008) using the same or highly similar manipulations and measurements as the ones used in their original studies. Our efforts were largely unsuccessful. We suggest that manipulating free will beliefs in a robust way is more difficult than has been implied by prior work, and that the proposed link with immoral behavior may not be as consistent as previous work suggests.
Impostor syndrome and pretense
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 22-02-2022
The Earthling's secret weapon
Publisher: ResearchersLinks Ltd
Date: 09-07-2016
Luck and history-sensitive compatibilism
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 04-2009
The Powers that bind
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 14-08-2014
Implicit bias and moral responsibility
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-11-2017
DOI: 10.1111/PHPR.12352
Response to open peer commentaries on neuroethics: A new way of doing ethics
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 31-03-2011
Vegetarianism
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 11-2016
Agency is realized by subpersonal mechanisms too
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2018
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000735
Abstract: John Doris argues that, when behaviors are caused by processes that we would not endorse, our agency is defeated. I argue that this test for defeaters is inappropriate. What matters is not what we would but what we should endorse. The subpersonal mechanisms he identifies as defeaters enable us to track and respond to reasons. They realize agency, rather than defeating it.
Beta adrenergic blockade reduces utilitarian judgement
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 02-2013
What difference does consciousness make?
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-2009
DOI: 10.1007/BF03351310
Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 31-07-2013
Frankfurt in Fake Barn Country
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 27-03-2015
Moral character
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Date: 04-2014
DOI: 10.1086/674838
Methodological conservatism and the epistemic condition
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 20-07-2017
DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198779667.003.0014
Abstract: The claim that agents are morally responsible for actions the wrongness of which they fail to be aware of only if they are responsible for their occurrent ignorance strikes many philosophers as unacceptable, because it is too revisionary: it entails that many of the everyday judgments that we are disposed to make are false. Agents satisfy these conditions too infrequently for our everyday judgments to be vindicated. These philosophers maintain that it is a theoretical virtue to preserve as many of our everyday judgments as possible. This chapter attempts to show that we ought not to strive to preserve as many of our everyday judgments about responsibility as we might think. It offers an error theory for why we are often disposed to judge that in iduals are responsible when we are implicitly committed to thinking that they are not.
The Routledge companion to free will
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 18-11-2017
Showing our seams
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 22-06-2018
Autonomy is (largely) irrelevant
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 05-01-2009
Reproductive cloning and a (kind of) genetic fallacy
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 06-2005
DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-8519.2005.00439.X
Abstract: Many people now believe that human reproductive cloning--once sufficiently safe and effective--should be permitted on the grounds that it will allow the otherwise infertile to have children that are biologically closely related to them. However, though it is widely believed that the possession of a close genetic link to our children is morally significant and valuable, we argue that such a view is erroneous. Moreover, the claim that the genetic link is valuable is pernicious it tends to give rise to highly undesirable consequences, and therefore should be combated rather than pandered to. The emphasis on the genetic is unwarranted and unfortunate rather than giving us moral reason to support reproductive cloning in the case of infertility, the fact that cloning requests are likely to be motivated by the genetic argument gives us reason to oppose its availability.
Neuroethics
Publisher: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Date: 2013
Belie the belief?
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 07-09-2020
Symposium on free will and luck
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 06-2007
Radically socialized knowledge and conspiracy theories
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 06-2007
Abstract: The typical explanation of an event or process which attracts the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is an explanation that conflicts with the account advanced by the relevant epistemic authorities . I argue that both for the layperson and for the intellectual, it is almost never rational to accept such a conspiracy theory. Knowledge is not merely shallowly social, in the manner recognized by social epistemology, it is also constitutively social: many kinds of knowledge only become accessible thanks to the agent's embedding in an environment that includes other epistemic agents. Moreover, advances in knowledge typically require ongoing immersion in this social environment. But the intellectual who embraces a conspiracy theory risks cutting herself off from this environment, and therefore epistemically disabling herself. Embracing a conspiracy theory therefore places at risk the ability to engage in genuine enquiry, including the enquiry needed properly to evaluate the conspiracy theory.
The best of all possible paternalisms?
Publisher: BMJ
Date: 14-03-2014
The harm of intraoperative awareness
Publisher: BMJ
Date: 22-01-2014
Against sex selection
Publisher: Southern Medical Association
Date: 2007
Addiction and Compulsion
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 30-04-2010
Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 15-01-2014
Taking responsibility for health in an epistemically polluted environment
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 04-2018
Am I a racist? Implicit bias and the ascription of racism
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 03-11-2017
DOI: 10.1093/PQ/PQW070
Neuroethics and psychiatry
Publisher: Ovid Technologies (Wolters Kluwer Health)
Date: 11-2008
Fake news and free speech
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 23-05-2019
Exploring visitation at rivers to understand drowning risk.
Publisher: BMJ
Date: 06-06-2019
DOI: 10.1136/INJURYPREV-2018-042819
Abstract: Globally, rivers are a common drowning location. In Australia, rivers are the leading location for fatal drowning. Limited information exists on exposure and impact on river drowning risk. Australian unintentional fatal river drowning data (sourced from coronial records) and nationally representative survey data on river visitation were used to estimate river drowning risk based on exposure for adults (18 years and older). Differences in river drowning rates per 100 000 (population and exposed population) were examined by sex, age group, activity prior to drowning, alcohol presence and watercraft usage. Between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2016, 151 people drowned in Australian rivers 86% male and 40% aged 18-34 years. Of survey respondents, 73% had visited a river within the last 12 months. After adjusting for exposure: males were 7.6 times more likely to drown at rivers female drowning rate increased by 50% (0.06-0.09 per 100 000) males aged 75+ years and females aged 55-74 years were at highest risk of river drowning and swimming and recreating pose a high risk to both males and females. After adjusting for exposure, males were more likely to drown with alcohol present (RR=8.5 95% CI 2.6 to 27.4) and in a watercraft-related incident (RR=25.5 95% CI 3.5 to 186.9). Calculating exposure for river drowning is challenging due to erse usage, time spent and number of visits. While males were more likely to drown, the differences between males and females narrow after adjusting for exposure. This is an important factor to consider when designing and implementing drowning prevention strategies to effectively target those at risk.
Not so hypocritical after all
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2021
Nudge, nudge, wink, wink
Publisher: University of Michigan Library
Date: 18-02-2019
Addiction, Autonomy, and Informed Consent
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 13-12-2016
DOI: 10.1093/JMP/JHV033
The Einstein effect provides global evidence for scientific source credibility effects and the influence of religiosity
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 07-02-2022
DOI: 10.1038/S41562-021-01273-8
Abstract: People tend to evaluate information from reliable sources more favourably, but it is unclear exactly how perceivers' worldviews interact with this source credibility effect. In a large and erse cross-cultural s le (N = 10,195 from 24 countries), we presented participants with obscure, meaningless statements attributed to either a spiritual guru or a scientist. We found a robust global source credibility effect for scientific authorities, which we dub 'the Einstein effect': across all 24 countries and all levels of religiosity, scientists held greater authority than spiritual gurus. In addition, in idual religiosity predicted a weaker relative preference for the statement from the scientist compared with the spiritual guru, and was more strongly associated with credibility judgements for the guru than the scientist. Independent data on explicit trust ratings across 143 countries mirrored our experimental findings. These findings suggest that irrespective of one's religious worldview, across cultures science is a powerful and universal heuristic that signals the reliability of information.
Expressive responding in support of Donald Trump: An extended replication of Schaffner and Luks (2018)
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 10-08-2022
Abstract: There is considerable debate about whether survey respondents regularly engage in “expressive responding” – professing to believe something that they do not sincerely believe to show support for their in-group or hostility to an out-group. Nonetheless, there is widespread agreement that one study provides compelling evidence for a consequential level of expressive responding in a particular context. In the immediate aftermath of Donald Trump’s 2017 presidential inauguration rally there was considerable controversy about whether this inauguration crowd was the largest ever. At this time, a study was conducted which found that Donald Trump voters were more likely than Hillary Clinton voters or non-voters to indicate that an unlabeled photo of Donald Trump’s 2017 presidential inauguration rally showed more people than an unlabeled photo of Barack Obama’s 2009 presidential inauguration rally, despite the latter photo clearly showing more people. However, this study was not pre-registered, suggesting that a replication is needed to establish the robustness of this important result. In the present study, we conducted an extended replication over two years after Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration rally. We found that despite this delay the original result replicated, albeit with a smaller magnitude. In addition, we extended the earlier study by testing several hypotheses about the characteristics of Republicans who selected the incorrect photo.
Nudges in a post-truth world
Publisher: BMJ
Date: 19-05-2017
Author Correction: A multi-country test of brief reappraisal interventions on emotions during the COVID-19 pandemic
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 24-08-2022
Dissolving the puzzle of resultant moral luck
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 04-2016
Enhancing Authenticity
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-06-2011
Epistemic responsibility in the face of a pandemic
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 2020
DOI: 10.1093/JLB/LSAA033
Abstract: Should non-experts defer to epidemiologists with regard to the response to the coronavirus pandemic? We argue that deference is required with regard to settled science: non-experts (that is, people who may possess expertise of their own but whose expertise is not relevant to a particular question) ought to defer with regard to climate science and the efficacy of vaccines. However, we suggest that this deference is warranted because these questions have been appropriately probed many times by many different kinds of people. While non-experts should defer to epidemiologists with regard to matters within the sphere of epidemiology specifically, responding to the pandemic requires expertise from many fields. We best build a consensus worth deferring to by contributing our expertise now. Ethicists and philosophers are not epistemically arrogant if they question policy responses. Rather, they play a responsible role in building a reliable consensus.
Addiction as a disorder of belief
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 23-02-2014
Choices without choosers
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 15-02-2018
DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190460723.003.0007
Abstract: Existentialists are often accused of painting a bleak picture of human existence. In this chapter, Neil Levy contends that, in the light of contemporary cognitive science, the picture is not bleak enough. And, although there are grounds for thinking the picture bleaker than existentialists suggest, he argues that it is not hopeless. The unified self that serves as the ultimate source of value in an otherwise meaningless universe may not exist, but we can each impose a degree of unity on ourselves. The existentialists were sociologically naïve in supposing a degree of distinction between agents and their cultural milieu that was never realistic. We are thrown into history, culture, and a biological and evolutionary history which we never fully understand and can only inflect, all without foundations and lacking even the security of knowing the extent to which or what we choose. Existentialism must face ontological, epistemological, and axiological insecurity.
National identity predicts public health support during a global pandemic
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 26-01-2022
DOI: 10.1038/S41467-021-27668-9
Abstract: Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national s les. Study 2 ( N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic ( r = −0.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics.
No-Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No-Platforming
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2019
DOI: 10.1017/APA.2019.29
Abstract: No-platforming—the refusal to allow those who espouse views seen as inflammatory the opportunity to speak in certain forums—is very controversial. Proponents typically cite the possibility of harms to disadvantaged groups and, sometimes, epistemically paternalistic considerations. Opponents invoke the value of free speech and respect for intellectual autonomy in favor of more open speech, arguing that the harms that might arise from bad speech are best addressed by rebuttal, not silencing. In this article, I argue that there is a powerful consideration in favor of no-platforming some speakers: allowing them a platform generates genuine higher-order evidence in favor of their claims. When that higher-order evidence would be misleading, we may reasonably believe it should not be generated.
It might not matter very much whether insects are conscious
Publisher: WellBeing International Publications
Date: 2020
Skepticism and Sanction
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 17-02-2012
Naturalism and Free Will
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 28-01-2016
The regulation of cognitive enhancement devices: refining Maslen et al.'s model
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 14-07-2015
DOI: 10.1093/JLB/LSV029
Doxastic responsibility
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-2007
Obsessive–compulsive disorder as a disorder of attention
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 02-2018
DOI: 10.1111/MILA.12172
Free will and implicit attitudes
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-06-2023
Zimmerman's The Immorality of Punishment: A Critical Essay
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 14-03-2013
Embodied savoir-faire: knowledge-how requires motor representations
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 13-11-2015
It's our epistemic environment, not our attitude toward truth, that matters
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 06-03-2023
Is Neurolaw Conceptually Confused?
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 07-05-2014
Putting the luck back into moral luck
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 11-07-2019
DOI: 10.1111/MISP.12104
Talking to our selves
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 28-09-2016
Justice for Psychopaths
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 04-2013
Going beyond the evidence
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 13-10-2008
Scientists and the folk have the same concepts
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 08-2010
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X10001809
Abstract: If Knobe is right that ordinary judgments are normatively suffused, how do scientists free themselves from these influences? I suggest that because science is distributed and externalized, its claims can be manipulated in ways that allow normative influences to be hived off. This allows scientists to deploy concepts which are not normatively suffused. I suggest that there are good reasons to identify these normatively neutral concepts with the folk concepts.
The wisdom of the pack
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-2006
Framing provides reasons
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2022
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X22000875
Abstract: Framing effects are held to be irrational because preferences should remain stable across different descriptions of the same state of affairs. Bermúdez offers one reason why this may be false. I argue for another: If framing provides implicit testimony, then rational agents will alter their preferences accordingly. I show there is evidence that framing should be understood as testimonial.
Searle's wager
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 09-03-2011
The neuroethics of non-invasive brain stimulation
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 02-2012
Moore on Twin Earth
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 23-12-2011
History as struggle
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 11-1998
What (if anything) is wrong with bestiality?
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-2003
Distinguishing social cynicism from belief in a zero sum game: Confirmatory factor analysis of the social axioms scale
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 09-2022
Abstract: Social axioms – generalized beliefs about the social world – have been a prominent topic in cross-cultural psychology for decades. Recent research has expanded the taxonomy of social axioms from the original five axioms to include a sixth axiom, Belief in a Zero Sum Game (BZSG). As yet, however, there exist no studies evaluating the empirical separability of BZSG from the conceptually similar social axiom of Social Cynicism (SC). Here, we present the first factor analytic investigation of the separability of SC and BZSG in the short form of the Social Axioms Survey in a s le of 730 United States residents. Across all analyses, we find that the two axioms are factor analytically separable, yet strongly positively correlated, suggesting that researchers can (with care) proceed with research using the short form Social Axioms Survey to disentangle the causes, consequences and correlates of these two social axioms.
Cognitive scientific challenges to morality
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 10-2006
Restoring control: Comments on George Sher
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 23-08-2008
The Role of Task-Related Learned Representations in Explaining Asymmetries in Task Switching
Publisher: Public Library of Science (PLoS)
Date: 16-04-2013
Regulation of devices for cognitive enhancement
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 09-2013
Moral significance of phenomenal consciousness
Publisher: Elsevier
Date: 2009
Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 14-12-2011
Do-it-yourself brain stimulation: a regulatory model
Publisher: BMJ
Date: 30-07-2013
Rationalization enables cooperation and cultural evolution
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2020
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002061
Abstract: Cushman argues that the function of rationalization is to attribute mental representations to ourselves, thereby making these representations available for future planning. I argue that such attribution is often not necessary and sometimes maladaptive. I suggest a different explanation of rationalization: making representations available to other agents, to facilitate cooperation, transmission, and the ratchet effect that underlies cumulative cultural evolution.
Imaginative resistance and the moral/conventional distinction
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 04-2005
The case for physician assisted suicide
Publisher: BMJ
Date: 06-2006
Empirically informed moral theory
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 20-12-2009
Introducing neuroethics
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 14-02-2008
Luck and free will
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2010
The importance of awareness
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 06-2013
Neuroscience, free will, and responsibility: The current state of play
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 29-09-2015
Ecological engineering: Reshaping our environments to achieve our goals
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 27-01-2012
Registered Replication Report: A Large Multilab Cross-Cultural Conceptual Replication of Turri, Buckwalter, & Blouw (2015)
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 15-10-2018
Abstract: According to the Justified True Belief account of knowledge (JTB), a person can only truly know something if they have a belief that is both justified and true (i.e., knowledge is justified true belief). This account was challenged by Gettier (1963), who argued that JTB does not explain knowledge attributions in certain situations, later called Gettier-type cases, wherein a protagonist is justified in believing something to be true but their belief was only correct due to luck. Lay people may not attribute knowledge to protagonists with justified but only luckily true beliefs. While some research has found evidence for these so-called Gettier intuitions (e.g., Machery et al., 2017a), Turri et al. (2015) found that participants attributed knowledge in Gettier-type cases at rates similar to cases of justified true belief. In a large-scale, cross-cultural conceptual replication of Turri and colleagues’ (2015) Experiment 1 (N = 4724), we failed to replicate this null result using a within-subjects design and three vignettes across 19 geopolitical regions. Instead, participants demonstrated Gettier intuitions they were 1.86 times more likely to attribute knowledge to protagonists in standard cases of justified true belief than to protagonists in Gettier-type cases. These results suggest that Gettier intuitions may be common across different scenarios and cultural contexts. When assessing the knowledge of others, lay people may rely on a shared set of epistemic intuitions (i.e., a core folk epistemology) that requires more than simply justification, belief, and truth. However, the size of the Gettier intuition effect did vary by vignette, and the Turri et al. (2015) vignette produced the smallest effect. Thus, epistemic intuitions may also depend on contextual factors unrelated to the criteria of knowledge, such as the characteristics of the protagonist being evaluated.
Consciousness and morality
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 09-07-2020
DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198749677.013.30
Abstract: This chapter considers three connections between consciousness and issues in ethics: first, the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding an entity’s moral status second, the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding moral responsibility for action and third, the relevance of consciousness for the acquisition of moral knowledge. This is a disparate set of connections, prompting a question: is there anything about consciousness these connections have in common? One might expect the answer to be no. But debate in each area has thus far failed to settle just what about consciousness is so intuitively important for moral status, moral responsibility, and moral knowledge. Given this fact, it remains possible that there is some common connection of these different issues in ethics to consciousness. The chapter takes up this possibility in its conclusion.
Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 07-2011
Rethinking neuroethics in the light of the extended mind thesis
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 14-09-2007
DOI: 10.1080/15265160701518466
Abstract: The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics.
Downshifting and meaning in life
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 06-2005
Luck and Manipulation Cases: A Response to Professor Haji
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 09-11-2015
DOI: 10.1017/S0012217315001018
Abstract: In his paper published in this issue, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that the challenge to compatibilism from luck is not novel. Rather, the challenge is identical to that from manipulation cases, and compatibilists already have responses to that challenge. In response, I distinguish two different luck problems for compatibilism. One challenge is seen in manipulation cases, but the challenge he identifies is different from the challenge from manipulation. The luck problem is therefore novel, and the existing solutions to the challenge from manipulation fail to address it.
Bad beliefs – a precis
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 26-08-2023
Narrowing the scope of virtue epistemology
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 10-06-2022
Echoes of covid misinformation
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 27-11-2023
Are we agents at all? Helen Steward's agency incompatibilism
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-2013
Introduction: Appiah's experiments in ethics
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 18-05-2010
Why nudging is no more paternalistic than arguing
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2018
DOI: 10.5840/TPM201883102
Confirmatory factor analysis of the Brief Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET-10) in three large samples reveals strong evidence of unidimensionality
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 19-12-2022
Abstract: The 36-item Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) is an extensively administered behavioral measure of cognitive empathy (and emotion perception in particular). Numerous brief forms of the RMET have been developed in attempts to both improve its psychometric properties and reduce testing burden. Notably, little systematic validation work exists in the literature for one of the most promising brief forms proposed: the abbreviated 10-item RMET scale developed by Olderbak et al. (2015 which we refer to as the RMET-10). To this end, we present Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) of the RMET-10 in three independent s les of American adults (total N = 3,121). CFAs in each s le consistently indicated that the RMET-10 exhibits excellent factorial validity and moderate levels of internal consistency despite its substantially reduced length. Overall, our results support the use of the RMET-10 as a brief but effective (if narrow) measure of cognitive empathy.
What, and where, luck is: A response to Jennifer Lackey
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 07-2009
Addiction, Responsibility, and Ego Depletion
Publisher: The MIT Press
Date: 13-05-2011
Why Frankfurt examples don't beg the question: A reply to Woodward
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 06-2004
Conversation and responsibility
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 04-2013
DOI: 10.1093/MIND/FZT065
Descriptive Relativism
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 2003
Social and moral psychology of COVID-19 across 69 countries
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 11-05-2023
DOI: 10.1038/S41597-023-02080-8
Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic has affected all domains of human life, including the economic and social fabric of societies. One of the central strategies for managing public health throughout the pandemic has been through persuasive messaging and collective behaviour change. To help scholars better understand the social and moral psychology behind public health behaviour, we present a dataset comprising of 51,404 in iduals from 69 countries. This dataset was collected for the International Collaboration on Social & Moral Psychology of COVID-19 project (ICSMP COVID-19). This social science survey invited participants around the world to complete a series of moral and psychological measures and public health attitudes about COVID-19 during an early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (between April and June 2020). The survey included seven broad categories of questions: COVID-19 beliefs and compliance behaviours identity and social attitudes ideology health and well-being moral beliefs and motivation personality traits and demographic variables. We report both raw and cleaned data, along with all survey materials, data visualisations, and psychometric evaluations of key variables.
Luck and Agent-Causation
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 26-03-2015
Culture by nature
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 09-2011
The moral significance of being born
Publisher: BMJ
Date: 05-2013
DOI: 10.1136/MEDETHICS-2012-100734
Abstract: This paper is a response to Giubilini and Minerva's defence of infanticide. I argue that any account of moral worth or moral rights that depends on the intrinsic properties of in iduals alone is committed to agreeing with Giubilini and Minerva that birth cannot by itself make a moral difference to the moral worth of the infant. However, I argue that moral worth need not depend on intrinsic properties alone. It might also depend on relational and social properties. I claim that the in principle availability of neonates to participate in scaffolded interactions with carers might plausibly be seen as contributing to their moral worth.
Strong-willed but not successful
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2016
In praise of outsourcing
Publisher: Brill
Date: 31-08-2018
DOI: 10.1163/18758185-01503005
Abstract: What explains the context sensitivity of some (apparent) beliefs? Why, for ex le, do religious beliefs appear to control behaviour in some contexts but not others? Cases like this are heterogeneous, and we may require a matching heterogeneity of explanations, ranging over their contents, the attitudes of agents and features of the environment. In this paper, I put forward a hypothesis of the last kind. I argue that some beliefs (religious and non-religious) are coupled to cues, which either trigger an internal representation or even partially constitute the beliefs. I show that such coupling will give rise to the context-sensitivity, without entailing that religious believers take a different attitude to belief content.
Bad luck once again
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 23-10-2008
Virtues Have Deeply Cultural Roots
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-04-2015
Charles Taylor on overcoming incommensurability
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 09-2000
DOI: 10.1177/019145370002600503
Abstract: As he recognizes, Taylor's view of practical reasoning commits him to the existence of incommensurable world-views. However, he holds that it is in principle possible to overcome these incommensurabilities. He has two major arguments for this conclusion, which I label the argument from the human condition, and the transition argument. I show that the first argument, though perhaps successful in the case Taylor takes as an ex le, cannot be generalized. The second argument is even less successful, since all the evidence it produces is compatible with a thoroughgoing relativism. I point out, moreover, that even if Taylor's arguments were successful, they would not demonstrate that someone who chose to continue to reject the practice that had been vindicated would be irrational to do so. I conclude that there seems no way to circumvent the relativism to which Taylor's picture of practical reasoning leads.
Neuroethics
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 24-01-2012
DOI: 10.1002/WCS.1157
Abstract: Neuroethics is a new sub‐discipline of philosophy, with two broad focuses. The first, which has come to be called the ethics of neuroscience, concerns the assessment of ethical issues arising from neuroscience, its practice and its applications the second, which has come to be called the neuroscience of ethics, concerns the ways in which the sciences of the mind can illuminate longstanding issues within philosophy. Especially in its guise as the neuroscience of ethics, neuroethics cannot sharply be distinguished from the naturalistic trend in philosophy which attempts to bring to bear data to the resolution of philosophical problems. It is distinctive only inasmuch as it is motivated by practical, and especially moral, concerns to a greater degree than empirical philosophy more generally. This article illustrates the practice and typical concerns of neuroethics with two case studies, one from each of its branches. The ethics of neuroscience is illustrated with the issue of cognitive enhancement, and the neuroscience of ethics is illustrated by discussion of free will. With regard to both issues, neuroethicists hope to advance beyond intuition and armchair argument by careful attention to the data emerging from the cognitive sciences. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012, 3:143–151. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1157 This article is categorized under: Philosophy Action
Capacities and counterfactuals
Publisher: Verein philosophie.ch
Date: 12-2012
Neuroethics and the Extended Mind
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 07-04-2011
Response to commentators
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 20-03-2023
Too humble for words
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 11-09-2023
Bad beliefs
Publisher: Oxford University PressOxford
Date: 09-12-2022
DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780192895325.001.0001
Abstract: Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We’ve missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we’ve failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher-order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging—at least usually—changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn’t rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency.
A many-analysts approach to the relation between religiosity and well-being
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 06-07-2022
What is neuroethics?
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 2015
There May Be Costs to Failing to Enhance, as Well as to Enhancing
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 07-2013
Free Will Doesn't Come For Free
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 10-2013
Evolutionary psychology human universals, and the standard social science model
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-2004
The cognitive science of fake news
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 19-03-2021
Hodgson, David., Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 22-11-2012
In defence of entrapment in journalism (and beyond)
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 2002
Amputees by choice
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 03-2005
DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-5930.2005.00293.X
Abstract: Should surgeons be permitted to utate healthy limbs if patients request such operations? We argue that if such patients are experiencing significant distress as a consequence of the rare psychological disorder named Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID), such operations might be permissible. We examine rival accounts of the origins of the desire for healthy limb utations and argue that none are as plausible as the BIID hypothesis. We then turn to the moral arguments against such operations, and argue that on the evidence available, none is compelling. BIID sufferers meet reasonable standards for rationality and autonomy: so as long as no other effective treatment for their disorder is available, surgeons ought to be allowed to accede to their requests.
Knowledge From Vice: Deeply Social Epistemology
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 14-04-2019
DOI: 10.1093/MIND/FZZ017
Abstract: In the past two decades, epistemologists have significantly expanded the focus of their field. To the traditional question that has dominated the debate — under what conditions does belief amount to knowledge? — they have added questions about testimony, epistemic virtues and vices, epistemic trust, and more. This broadening of the range of epistemic concern has coincided with an expansion in conceptions of epistemic agency beyond the in idualism characteristic of most earlier epistemology. We believe that these developments have not gone far enough. While the weak anti-in idualism we see in contemporary epistemology may be adequate for the kinds of cases it tends to focus on, a great deal of human knowledge production and transmission does not conform to these models. Furthermore, the dispositions and norms that are knowledge-conducive in the familiar cases may not be knowledge-conducive generally. In fact, dispositions that, at an in idual level, count as epistemic vices may be epistemic virtues in common social contexts. We argue that this overlooked feature of human social life means that epistemology must become more deeply and pervasively social.
Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning
Publisher: Psychology Press
Date: 04-05-2012
In Trust We Trust: Epistemic Vigilance and Responsibility
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 28-02-2022
The Neuroethics of Transcranial Electrical Stimulation
Publisher: Elsevier
Date: 2014
Responsibility as an Obstacle to Good Policy: The Case of Lifestyle Related Disease
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-06-2018
Forced to be free? Increasing patient autonomy by constraining it
Publisher: BMJ
Date: 08-02-2014
Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 26-08-2015
DOI: 10.1111/NOUS.12074
Are free will believers nicer people? (Four studies suggest not)
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 28-06-2019
Philosophy's other climate problem
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-02-2021
DOI: 10.1111/JOSP.12396
Free will in the brain?
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-02-2021
The cognitive science of fake news
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 23-08-2020
Abstract: In this chapter, we provide a necessarily brief and partial survey of recent work in the cognitive sciences directly on or closely related to the psychology of fake news, in particular fake news in the political domain. We focus on whether and why people believe fake news. While we argue that it is likely that a large proportion of people who purport to believe fake news really do, we provide evidence that this proportion might be significantly smaller than is usually thought (and smaller than is suggested by surveys). Assertion of belief is inflated, we suggest, by insincere report, whether to express support for one side of political debate or simply for fun. It is also inflated by the use of motivated inference of one sort or another, which lead respondents to report believing things about which they had no opinion prior to being probed. We then turn to rival accounts that aim to explain why people believe in fake news when they do. While partisan explanations, turning on motivated reasoning, are probably best known, we show they face serious challenges from accounts that explain belief by reference to analytic thinking.
The Einstein effect: Global evidence for scientific source credibility effects and the influence of religiosity
Publisher: Center for Open Science
Date: 12-2020
Abstract: People tend to evaluate information from reliable sources more favourably, but it is unclear exactly how perceivers' worldviews interact with this source credibility effect. In a large and erse cross-cultural s le (N = 10,195 from 24 countries), we presented participants with obscure, meaningless statements attributed to either a spiritual guru or a scientist. We found a robust global source credibility effect for scientific authorities, which we dub `the Einstein effect': across all 24 countries scientists hold greater authority than spiritual source, even among highly committed religious people, who are relatively also more credulous of nonsense from scientists than they are of nonsense from spiritual gurus. Additionally, in idual religiosity predicted a weaker relative preference for the statement from the scientist vs. the spiritual guru, and was more strongly associated with credibility judgments for the guru than the scientist. Independent data on explicit trust ratings across 143 countries mirrored the experimental patterns. These findings suggest that irrespective of religious worldview, science is a powerful and universal heuristic that signals the reliability of information.
Strength in cognitive self-regulation.
Publisher: Frontiers Media SA
Date: 2013
Expressing who we are
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-2011
RDoC and shift of reference
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 10-07-2016
Abstract: This paper aims to analyse in a philosophically informed way the recent National Institute of Mental Health proposal for the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) framework. Current classification systems have helped unify psychiatry and the conditions that it is most concerned with. However, by relying too much on syndromes and symptoms, they too often do not define stable constructs. As a result, inclusions and removals from the manuals are not always backed by sound reasons. The RDoC framework is an important move towards ameliorating matters. This paper argues that it improves the current situation by re-referencing constructs to physical properties (biomarkers for disorders, for ex le), by allowing theoretical levels within the framework, and by treating psychiatry as a special case of the cognitive sciences.
The Consciousness Thesis
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 06-03-2014
Does Consciousness Matter?
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 06-03-2014
Virtue signalling is virtuous
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 16-04-2021
DOI: 10.1007/S11229-020-02653-9
Abstract: The accusation of virtue signalling is typically understood as a serious charge. Those accused usually respond (if not by an admission of fault) by attempting to show that they are doing no such thing. In this paper, I argue that we ought to embrace the charge, rather than angrily reject it. I argue that this response can draw support from cognitive science, on the one hand, and from social epistemology on the other. I claim that we may appropriately concede that what we are doing is (inter alia) virtue signalling, because virtue signalling is morally appropriate. It neither expresses vices, nor is hypocritical, nor does it degrade the quality of public moral discourse. Signalling our commitment to norms is a central and justifiable function of moral discourse, and the same signals provide (higher-order) evidence that is appropriately taken into account in forming moral beliefs.
'My Name is Joe and I'm an Alcoholic'
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 06-2016
DOI: 10.1111/MILA.12105
Building Better Beings
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 24-07-2014
DOI: 10.1093/PQ/PQU042
Corrigendum to ‘Beta adrenergic blockade reduces utilitarian judgement’ [Biol. Psychol. 92 (2013) 323–328]
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2014
Expressive Responding in Support of Donald Trump: An Extended Replication of Schaffner and Luks (2018)
Publisher: University of California Press
Date: 2023
Abstract: There is considerable debate about whether survey respondents regularly engage in “expressive responding” – professing to believe something that they do not sincerely believe to show support for their in-group or hostility to an out-group. Nonetheless, there is widespread agreement that one study provides compelling evidence for a consequential level of expressive responding in a particular context. In the immediate aftermath of Donald Trump’s 2017 presidential inauguration rally there was considerable controversy about whether this inauguration crowd was the largest ever. At this time, a study was conducted which found that Donald Trump voters were more likely than Hillary Clinton voters or non-voters to indicate that an unlabeled photo of Donald Trump’s 2017 presidential inauguration rally showed more people than an unlabeled photo of Barack Obama’s 2009 presidential inauguration rally, despite the latter photo clearly showing more people. However, this study was not pre-registered, suggesting that a replication is needed to establish the robustness of this important result. In the present study, we conducted an extended replication over two years after Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration rally. We found that despite this delay the original result replicated, albeit with a smaller magnitude. In addition, we extended the earlier study by testing several hypotheses about the characteristics of Republicans who selected the incorrect photo.
Due deference to denialism
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 30-06-2019
Contrastive explanations: a dilemma for libertarians
Publisher: Verein philosophie.ch
Date: 07-2005
Punishing the Addict: Reflections on Gene Heyman
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 29-03-2013
Introduction
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 07-2011
Deafness, culture, and choice
Publisher: BMJ
Date: 10-2002
DOI: 10.1136/JME.28.5.284
Abstract: The recent controversy surrounding the choice, by a deaf lesbian couple, to have children who were themselves deaf, has focused attention on the ethics of choosing (apparent) disabilities for children. Deaf activists argue that deafness is not a disability, but instead the constitutive condition of access to a rich culture. Being deaf carries disadvantages with it, but these are a product of discrimination, not of the condition itself. It is, however, implausible to think that all the disadvantages which stem from deafness are social in origin. Moreover, though it may be true that being deaf carries with it the important compensation of access to a rich culture, no physical condition is required for such access. Cultures are simply the kind of things to which we are born, and therefore to which the children of deaf parents, hearing or deaf, normally belong. Thus these parents are making a mistake in choosing deafness for their children. Given their own experience of isolation as children, however, it is a mistake which is understandable, and our reaction to them ought to be compassion, not condemnation.
Taking responsibility for responsibility
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 11-02-2019
DOI: 10.1093/PHE/PHZ001
Abstract: Governments, physicians, media and academics have all called for in iduals to bear responsibility for their own health. In this article, I argue that requiring those with adverse health outcomes to bear responsibility for these outcomes is a bad basis for policy. The available evidence strongly suggests that the capacities for responsible choice, and the circumstances in which these capacities are exercised, are distributed alongside the kinds of goods we usually talk about in discussing distributive justice, and this distribution significantly explains why people make bad health choices. These facts suggest that we cannot justifiably hold them responsible for these choices. We do better to hold responsible those who determine the ways in which capacities and circumstances are distributed: they are indirectly responsible for these adverse health outcomes and possess the capacities and resources to take responsibility for these facts.
What in the world is collective responsibility?
Publisher: Verein philosophie.ch
Date: 06-2018
The myth of zero-sum responsibility
Publisher: Brill
Date: 07-09-2023
The regulation of cognitive enhancement devices: extending the medical model
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 25-02-2014
DOI: 10.1093/JLB/LST003
Consciousness, implicit attitudes and moral responsibility
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 28-04-2014
How addicts lose control
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 08-12-2017
Addiction, autonomy and ego-depletion: A response to Bennett Foddy and Julian Savulescu
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 02-2006
Related Organisations
University Of Oxford
Location: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
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Discovery Projects - Grant ID: DP110101810
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Amount: $159,000.00
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Amount: $220,000.00
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Amount: $376,267.00
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Amount: $185,354.00
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Amount: $10,000.00
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Amount: $797,225.00
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Amount: $87,570.00
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