Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE160100104

Funding Activity

Website
http://dataportal.arc.gov.au/NCGP/Web/Grant/Grant/DE160100104

Funding Status
Closed

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Funded Activity Summary

Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Dynamics. This project aims to design optimal selling policies, allowing for aftermarket dynamics such as resale and inter-buyer competitions. The existence of an aftermarket greatly affects the optimal design of license auctions, procurement, franchising and the like. For instance, when market licenses are auctioned off, incumbent firms may compete fiercely for licenses they do not need simply to keep entrants out. Existing sales designs that overlook such bidding incentives often underperform in practice. The project aims to examine informational policies that influence buyers’ activities to best suit the seller's objectives. It expects to help regulatory bodies to design more efficient license auctions, provide franchisors with more profitable strategies, and save taxpayers' money when procuring services.

Funded Activity Details

Start Date: 01-01-2016

End Date: 31-12-2019

Funding Scheme: Discovery Early Career Researcher Award

Funding Amount: $372,000.00

Funder: Australian Research Council

Research Topics

ANZSRC Field of Research (FoR)

Microeconomic Theory | Industry Economics and Industrial Organisation | Applied Economics

ANZSRC Socio-Economic Objective (SEO)

Market-Based Mechanisms | Industrial Organisations |

Other Keywords

Applied Economics | Industrial Organisations | Industry Economics and Industrial Organisation | Market-Based Mechanisms | Microeconomic Theory

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