Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE160100104
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$372,000.00
Summary
Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Dynamics. This project aims to design optimal selling policies, allowing for aftermarket dynamics such as resale and inter-buyer competitions. The existence of an aftermarket greatly affects the optimal design of license auctions, procurement, franchising and the like. For instance, when market licenses are auctioned off, incumbent firms may compete fiercely for licenses they do not need simply to keep entrants out. Existing sales designs that overlook such bidd ....Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Dynamics. This project aims to design optimal selling policies, allowing for aftermarket dynamics such as resale and inter-buyer competitions. The existence of an aftermarket greatly affects the optimal design of license auctions, procurement, franchising and the like. For instance, when market licenses are auctioned off, incumbent firms may compete fiercely for licenses they do not need simply to keep entrants out. Existing sales designs that overlook such bidding incentives often underperform in practice. The project aims to examine informational policies that influence buyers’ activities to best suit the seller's objectives. It expects to help regulatory bodies to design more efficient license auctions, provide franchisors with more profitable strategies, and save taxpayers' money when procuring services.Read moreRead less
Incomplete Information Models for Industrial Organisation. Mergers, acquisitions, and collusive conduct take place in imperfectly competitive environments where firms have incomplete information about others. Despite this, standard workhorse models for analyzing the associated competitive effects assume that firms have complete information and typically only accommodate imperfect competition on one side of the market. This project aims to remedy this deficiency by developing the economic theory ....Incomplete Information Models for Industrial Organisation. Mergers, acquisitions, and collusive conduct take place in imperfectly competitive environments where firms have incomplete information about others. Despite this, standard workhorse models for analyzing the associated competitive effects assume that firms have complete information and typically only accommodate imperfect competition on one side of the market. This project aims to remedy this deficiency by developing the economic theory and associated practical tools for the analysis of competitive effects in settings with incomplete information and market power on both sides. The project work will be presented at seminars and workshops around the globe to both academic audiences and to practitioners at competition authorities. Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE160101242
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$358,000.00
Summary
Market responses to behavioral consumer policy: Experimental study. This project aims to investigate the effectiveness of regulatory policies such as industry standards, optimal defaults and third-party comparison services in supporting consumer decision-making. In complex market environments, consumers often struggle to make good purchasing decisions and can be vulnerable to exploitation by firms. Understanding how regulatory consumer policy directly affects consumer decisions and the dynamic s ....Market responses to behavioral consumer policy: Experimental study. This project aims to investigate the effectiveness of regulatory policies such as industry standards, optimal defaults and third-party comparison services in supporting consumer decision-making. In complex market environments, consumers often struggle to make good purchasing decisions and can be vulnerable to exploitation by firms. Understanding how regulatory consumer policy directly affects consumer decisions and the dynamic strategies of participating firms is important to improve our markets, inform consumer policy and provide evidence-based policy recommendations. This is particularly important in the increasingly complex market domains such as health, insurance and household finance.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE180100190
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$363,996.00
Summary
Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, ....Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, real-world auctions such as real-estate auctions or internet auctions. The project outcomes are expected to enhance the efficient allocation of resources, improve our understanding of how different rules affect buyers' well-being and help design fairer auctions.Read moreRead less
Information and market design: mediation and analogical argumentation. This project aims to increase knowledge of how judicious disclosure of information facilitates economic exchange and social interactions and to shed light on how mediation can be an effective mode of dispute resolution. The project seeks to uncover how analogical arguments can be persuasive and determine social outcomes as well as provide guidance for advocates and decision makers on the best way to persuade and counteract mi ....Information and market design: mediation and analogical argumentation. This project aims to increase knowledge of how judicious disclosure of information facilitates economic exchange and social interactions and to shed light on how mediation can be an effective mode of dispute resolution. The project seeks to uncover how analogical arguments can be persuasive and determine social outcomes as well as provide guidance for advocates and decision makers on the best way to persuade and counteract misleading persuasion practices. Besides producing significant new knowledge, the project promises to inform future innovative economic, social and cultural developments of benefit to the Australian and international community.Read moreRead less
Economic efficiency and the provision of incentives for information acquisition and disclosure: a mechanism design approach. By uncovering what determines information acquisition, highlighting what allows experts and insiders to manipulate market outcomes, and studying the efficiency gains obtainable with the use of a variety of incentives schemes, this research will provide valuable insights for public policy concerning information diffusion and market transparency.