Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE140101014
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$349,785.00
Summary
Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who ha ....Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who have not. Such preferences are common in many non-market settings and can have dramatic effects on the efficiency of potential mechanisms. The ultimate goal of this project is to develop applied mechanisms that are robust to heterogeneity in such intention-based preferences and which can be used in bilateral exchange, contract design and many other non-market settings.Read moreRead less
Information Quality in Auctions of Multiple Objects. This project aims at using both theory and laboratory experiments to analyse the formation of prices and the buyers' behaviour at auctions of multiple objects. The study focusses on the comparison of simultaneous auction procedures (in which the objects are sold at once) to sequential auction procedures (in which the objects are sold one after the other) and attention is drawn on the effects of the quality of the buyers' information about the ....Information Quality in Auctions of Multiple Objects. This project aims at using both theory and laboratory experiments to analyse the formation of prices and the buyers' behaviour at auctions of multiple objects. The study focusses on the comparison of simultaneous auction procedures (in which the objects are sold at once) to sequential auction procedures (in which the objects are sold one after the other) and attention is drawn on the effects of the quality of the buyers' information about the assets to be sold on their bidding behaviour and on the seller's revenues. The conduct of laboratory experiments will provide a useful assessment of the theoretical predictions and valuable insights into the effects of buyers' information quality on their bidding behaviour at such markets.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE120102640
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$375,000.00
Summary
Behavioural foundations of economic design for an uncertain world. The aim of this project is to incorporate behavioural foundations into mechanism design to improve our understanding of economic institutions in incomplete information environments. To accomplish this goal, it considers a framework where agents have reference-dependent preferences and explores implications of this assumption for economic design.
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE160100104
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$372,000.00
Summary
Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Dynamics. This project aims to design optimal selling policies, allowing for aftermarket dynamics such as resale and inter-buyer competitions. The existence of an aftermarket greatly affects the optimal design of license auctions, procurement, franchising and the like. For instance, when market licenses are auctioned off, incumbent firms may compete fiercely for licenses they do not need simply to keep entrants out. Existing sales designs that overlook such bidd ....Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Dynamics. This project aims to design optimal selling policies, allowing for aftermarket dynamics such as resale and inter-buyer competitions. The existence of an aftermarket greatly affects the optimal design of license auctions, procurement, franchising and the like. For instance, when market licenses are auctioned off, incumbent firms may compete fiercely for licenses they do not need simply to keep entrants out. Existing sales designs that overlook such bidding incentives often underperform in practice. The project aims to examine informational policies that influence buyers’ activities to best suit the seller's objectives. It expects to help regulatory bodies to design more efficient license auctions, provide franchisors with more profitable strategies, and save taxpayers' money when procuring services.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE170100340
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$311,000.00
Summary
Competition in persuasion. This project aims to develop tools to analyse situations where multiple self-interested persuaders attempt to convince a set of listeners. It will build upon recent developments in the economics of persuasion literature, and apply tools from mechanism design literature. This approach, unlike other existing work, is not limited to specific settings and has the advantage of being highly tractable. Using these tools, this project intends to provide insights into the mecha ....Competition in persuasion. This project aims to develop tools to analyse situations where multiple self-interested persuaders attempt to convince a set of listeners. It will build upon recent developments in the economics of persuasion literature, and apply tools from mechanism design literature. This approach, unlike other existing work, is not limited to specific settings and has the advantage of being highly tractable. Using these tools, this project intends to provide insights into the mechanisms behind grade inflation among universities, the optimal design of certification industries and information disclosure in clinical trials.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE180101452
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$357,996.00
Summary
Strategic interaction with limited memory: A theoretical approach. This project aims to propose a theoretical framework that would allow economists to explore and uncover the behavioural and welfare effects of memory constraints. By integrating cognitive constraints into existing economic theory, this project is expected to enhance economists’ future capacity to inform a diverse range of economic policies. Incorporating cognitive constraints into economic research can reduce unintended conseque ....Strategic interaction with limited memory: A theoretical approach. This project aims to propose a theoretical framework that would allow economists to explore and uncover the behavioural and welfare effects of memory constraints. By integrating cognitive constraints into existing economic theory, this project is expected to enhance economists’ future capacity to inform a diverse range of economic policies. Incorporating cognitive constraints into economic research can reduce unintended consequences of policy recommendations and is especially important in in complex markets such as health or household finance.Read moreRead less
Economic efficiency and the provision of incentives for information acquisition and disclosure: a mechanism design approach. By uncovering what determines information acquisition, highlighting what allows experts and insiders to manipulate market outcomes, and studying the efficiency gains obtainable with the use of a variety of incentives schemes, this research will provide valuable insights for public policy concerning information diffusion and market transparency.
Tertiary admissions: towards a healthier university system. The project aims to identify the demand for university places, quantify the gains from the Australian semi-centralised admissions system and propose measures to increase these gains. The effectiveness of any tertiary education system depends critically on the quality of the match between students and courses, with mismatches resulting in millions of dollars of wasted public resources and life dissatisfaction of graduates in occupations ....Tertiary admissions: towards a healthier university system. The project aims to identify the demand for university places, quantify the gains from the Australian semi-centralised admissions system and propose measures to increase these gains. The effectiveness of any tertiary education system depends critically on the quality of the match between students and courses, with mismatches resulting in millions of dollars of wasted public resources and life dissatisfaction of graduates in occupations misaligned with their interests. Using an Australian tertiary admissions dataset containing both student preferences and rankings of students by courses, the project aims to empirically assess the trade-off between the efficiency of a match, an equitable welfare distribution and equal access to higher education. It then plans to propose the best system to balance these objectives.Read moreRead less