Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE140101014
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$349,785.00
Summary
Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who ha ....Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who have not. Such preferences are common in many non-market settings and can have dramatic effects on the efficiency of potential mechanisms. The ultimate goal of this project is to develop applied mechanisms that are robust to heterogeneity in such intention-based preferences and which can be used in bilateral exchange, contract design and many other non-market settings.Read moreRead less
Designing for uncertainty in conservation auctions. Economic theory and case study evidence show that tenders or auctions are more efficient than grant mechanisms for encouraging landholders to produce environmental outcomes on private land. These studies have ignored the effects of uncertainty of both bidders and administrators about factors such as landholder participation and the level of environmental benefits that will be delivered. This project will test whether distributing environmental ....Designing for uncertainty in conservation auctions. Economic theory and case study evidence show that tenders or auctions are more efficient than grant mechanisms for encouraging landholders to produce environmental outcomes on private land. These studies have ignored the effects of uncertainty of both bidders and administrators about factors such as landholder participation and the level of environmental benefits that will be delivered. This project will test whether distributing environmental funds via tenders is still efficient when uncertainty about various important factors is considered. Results from this research are expected to inform the cost effective design of systems to pay landholders for the provision of environmental benefits even when there is high uncertainty.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE160101242
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$358,000.00
Summary
Market responses to behavioral consumer policy: Experimental study. This project aims to investigate the effectiveness of regulatory policies such as industry standards, optimal defaults and third-party comparison services in supporting consumer decision-making. In complex market environments, consumers often struggle to make good purchasing decisions and can be vulnerable to exploitation by firms. Understanding how regulatory consumer policy directly affects consumer decisions and the dynamic s ....Market responses to behavioral consumer policy: Experimental study. This project aims to investigate the effectiveness of regulatory policies such as industry standards, optimal defaults and third-party comparison services in supporting consumer decision-making. In complex market environments, consumers often struggle to make good purchasing decisions and can be vulnerable to exploitation by firms. Understanding how regulatory consumer policy directly affects consumer decisions and the dynamic strategies of participating firms is important to improve our markets, inform consumer policy and provide evidence-based policy recommendations. This is particularly important in the increasingly complex market domains such as health, insurance and household finance.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE180100190
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$363,996.00
Summary
Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, ....Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, real-world auctions such as real-estate auctions or internet auctions. The project outcomes are expected to enhance the efficient allocation of resources, improve our understanding of how different rules affect buyers' well-being and help design fairer auctions.Read moreRead less
Redesigning Landcare policy to better coordinate across landholders. This project aims to study how landscape-sensitive economic incentives and social norms can be leveraged to enhance the short- and long-term effectiveness of conservation programs. It will yield new knowledge for innovative designs in conservation contracting that is urgently needed to address worsening environmental threats in Australia and worldwide. In collaboration with Nobel laureate Vernon Smith’s team, new methods and pr ....Redesigning Landcare policy to better coordinate across landholders. This project aims to study how landscape-sensitive economic incentives and social norms can be leveraged to enhance the short- and long-term effectiveness of conservation programs. It will yield new knowledge for innovative designs in conservation contracting that is urgently needed to address worsening environmental threats in Australia and worldwide. In collaboration with Nobel laureate Vernon Smith’s team, new methods and protocols will improve our ability to generate better data and better understand how social and incentive mechanisms can constructively interact to facilitate collaborative environmental action. Results will help make the achievement of environmental targets and the use of public funds more cost-effective. Read moreRead less