Testing strategy-proofness in matching markets: an experimental study. This project seeks to test and improve matching algorithms by investigating the effect of advice on strategy-proofness. Matching algorithms are used to solve allocation problems in designed markets (eg school or house allocation problems). Many of the algorithms employed are strategy-proof: participants never gain from strategising, that is, from lying about their preferences. Strategy-proofness had been seemingly validated b ....Testing strategy-proofness in matching markets: an experimental study. This project seeks to test and improve matching algorithms by investigating the effect of advice on strategy-proofness. Matching algorithms are used to solve allocation problems in designed markets (eg school or house allocation problems). Many of the algorithms employed are strategy-proof: participants never gain from strategising, that is, from lying about their preferences. Strategy-proofness had been seemingly validated by experimental research, but new evidence suggests that participants could be prone to follow wrong advice and therefore lie. In order to improve the performance of designed markets, the project proposes to further test strategy-proofness by investigating how advice can affect truth-telling in strategy-proof algorithms and whether learning can counteract or complement the effect of advice.Read moreRead less
Rank-dependent choice equilibrium. This project aims to develop and test a new statistical theory of games, Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium (RDCE), which has the potential to unify and improve on existing approaches where the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about their empirical relevance. The project intends to develop the theoretical foundations of RDCE, explore its relation with various parametric approaches, and evaluate RDCE via meta stu ....Rank-dependent choice equilibrium. This project aims to develop and test a new statistical theory of games, Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium (RDCE), which has the potential to unify and improve on existing approaches where the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about their empirical relevance. The project intends to develop the theoretical foundations of RDCE, explore its relation with various parametric approaches, and evaluate RDCE via meta studies and stress tests. Expected outcomes of RDCE include a paradigm shift in game theory, resulting in broader acceptance and adoption of statistical game theory and to more robust policy recommendations.Read moreRead less
Designing Efficient and Equitable Voting Mechanisms. The most commonly used method for collective decision making, majority voting, is generally not efficient as it does not allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences. In addition, majority voting suffers from the tyranny of the majority, i.e. the risk of repeatedly excluding minority groups from representation. A final downside of majority voting is its winner-take-all nature, i.e. it provides no compensation for losing voters. T ....Designing Efficient and Equitable Voting Mechanisms. The most commonly used method for collective decision making, majority voting, is generally not efficient as it does not allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences. In addition, majority voting suffers from the tyranny of the majority, i.e. the risk of repeatedly excluding minority groups from representation. A final downside of majority voting is its winner-take-all nature, i.e. it provides no compensation for losing voters. This project concerns the design of alternative mechanisms that avoid these shortcomings and robustly deliver efficient and equitable outcomes. The project develops the theory underlying these novel mechanisms, tests them in a range of environments, and delivers an implementation for practical use.
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Market Design for the Reallocation of Land. This fellowship uses laboratory and lab-in-the-field experiments to explores how market design can be used to develop combinatorial exchanges that allow participants to exchange packages of land. Allowing for package bids can facilitate trade in situations where owning one piece of land increases the value of adjacent land and where assembling contiguous pieces of land is important. Combinatorial exchanges have the potential to increase the productivit ....Market Design for the Reallocation of Land. This fellowship uses laboratory and lab-in-the-field experiments to explores how market design can be used to develop combinatorial exchanges that allow participants to exchange packages of land. Allowing for package bids can facilitate trade in situations where owning one piece of land increases the value of adjacent land and where assembling contiguous pieces of land is important. Combinatorial exchanges have the potential to increase the productivity of agriculture land in both Australia and developing countries, encourage urban redevelopment, and help the government secure land for infrastructure and environmental protection in a cost-effective way.Read moreRead less
Introspection, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games: Theory and Experiment. Game theory is increasingly being used in the social sciences, but the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about its empirical relevance. This scepticism is reinforced by laboratory evidence showing behaviour patterns that are systematically biased away from game-theoretic predictions. This project concerns the development and testing of models more descriptive of actual huma ....Introspection, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games: Theory and Experiment. Game theory is increasingly being used in the social sciences, but the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about its empirical relevance. This scepticism is reinforced by laboratory evidence showing behaviour patterns that are systematically biased away from game-theoretic predictions. This project concerns the development and testing of models more descriptive of actual human behaviour. One aim is to deliver hybrid models able to reproduce interesting patterns of first-period play (introspection), time-series data in repeated games (learning), and systematic departures from static equilibrium. Another aim is to apply a successful hybrid to improve the design of economic and social institutions.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE140101014
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$349,785.00
Summary
Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who ha ....Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who have not. Such preferences are common in many non-market settings and can have dramatic effects on the efficiency of potential mechanisms. The ultimate goal of this project is to develop applied mechanisms that are robust to heterogeneity in such intention-based preferences and which can be used in bilateral exchange, contract design and many other non-market settings.Read moreRead less
Information Quality in Auctions of Multiple Objects. This project aims at using both theory and laboratory experiments to analyse the formation of prices and the buyers' behaviour at auctions of multiple objects. The study focusses on the comparison of simultaneous auction procedures (in which the objects are sold at once) to sequential auction procedures (in which the objects are sold one after the other) and attention is drawn on the effects of the quality of the buyers' information about the ....Information Quality in Auctions of Multiple Objects. This project aims at using both theory and laboratory experiments to analyse the formation of prices and the buyers' behaviour at auctions of multiple objects. The study focusses on the comparison of simultaneous auction procedures (in which the objects are sold at once) to sequential auction procedures (in which the objects are sold one after the other) and attention is drawn on the effects of the quality of the buyers' information about the assets to be sold on their bidding behaviour and on the seller's revenues. The conduct of laboratory experiments will provide a useful assessment of the theoretical predictions and valuable insights into the effects of buyers' information quality on their bidding behaviour at such markets.Read moreRead less
The effect of bargaining power on bargaining outcomes: the roles of institutions, earned bargaining position and social norms. Previous research has found that people exploit their bargaining power far less than economic theories predict. This project uses an economics experiment to study several factors affecting how bargaining power is used: restrictions on the bargaining process; whether and how bargaining power is 'earned' and whether equal divisions are plausible.
Are claims of transparency to be believed? This project tests if leaders, when given a choice, actually reveal a preference for transparency (that is to share all relevant information with their followers). This project analyses the circumstances under which leaders choose transparency and how their decisions and their reputations for transparency affect followers' behaviour and overall group cooperation.
Information acquisition and voting behaviour. This project aims to understand citizens’ decisions to acquire information about different policy proposals within a democracy and how such information affects their voting behaviour. Proper democracies rely on the informed participation of their citizens in the political debate and political institutions. The project intends to provide formal theories of information acquisition together with empirical evidence on how voting decisions are shaped by t ....Information acquisition and voting behaviour. This project aims to understand citizens’ decisions to acquire information about different policy proposals within a democracy and how such information affects their voting behaviour. Proper democracies rely on the informed participation of their citizens in the political debate and political institutions. The project intends to provide formal theories of information acquisition together with empirical evidence on how voting decisions are shaped by the quantity and quality of information. Understanding how citizens decide to acquire information would help devise policies to reduce polarisation and improve the quality of the political debate and the democracy.Read moreRead less