Double auction markets with heterogeneous boundedly rational traders. The project will study limit order markets for the formation of security prices in modern exchanges, allowing heterogeneity and bounded rationality of the economic agents who will engage in various trading strategies. The model developed will be of interest to market participants seeking to design more efficient and transparent markets.
Universal game-playing systems for randomised and imperfect-information games. This project will develop an artificial intelligence system that you can tell the rules of any new game and that then all by itself learns to play that game. The innovative aspect is that our system will be able to handle games with elements of chance, like dice, and where some information is hidden, as for example in most card games.
The effect of competition and doctor heterogeneity on prices charged by doctors. Prices charged by doctors can have important effects on health care costs, access to health care and health status. This research will examine the determinants of prices charged by doctors. The results will be important in understanding the pricing practices of doctors and their impact on health care costs.
Nobody knows anything? Applying pari-mutuel prediction markets to the motion picture industry. This project will explore the predictability of unreleased motion pictures' theatrical box office revenues using incentive rich pari-mutuel prediction markets. The mechanism will promote price discovery and associated probability estimates that will benefit those already investing in the industry as well as encouraging new investment.
A New Approach to Information-Based Securities Trading. This project develops and tests a new approach to information-based securities trading, which can effectively describe trading dynamics and accurately measure the effects of information impounded in price and trading activities. It aims to provide a novel and practical framework for studying information asymmetry, belief heterogeneity and asset pricing, and apply the new approach to address a series of financial issues. The project will mak ....A New Approach to Information-Based Securities Trading. This project develops and tests a new approach to information-based securities trading, which can effectively describe trading dynamics and accurately measure the effects of information impounded in price and trading activities. It aims to provide a novel and practical framework for studying information asymmetry, belief heterogeneity and asset pricing, and apply the new approach to address a series of financial issues. The project will make significant contributions to finance research by shedding new insights on market dynamics and creating a new stream of models and modelling techniques. Academics, practitioners and regulators can use the new approach to better analyse the Australian financial market and improve its efficiency.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE140101014
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$349,785.00
Summary
Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who ha ....Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who have not. Such preferences are common in many non-market settings and can have dramatic effects on the efficiency of potential mechanisms. The ultimate goal of this project is to develop applied mechanisms that are robust to heterogeneity in such intention-based preferences and which can be used in bilateral exchange, contract design and many other non-market settings.Read moreRead less
Information Quality in Auctions of Multiple Objects. This project aims at using both theory and laboratory experiments to analyse the formation of prices and the buyers' behaviour at auctions of multiple objects. The study focusses on the comparison of simultaneous auction procedures (in which the objects are sold at once) to sequential auction procedures (in which the objects are sold one after the other) and attention is drawn on the effects of the quality of the buyers' information about the ....Information Quality in Auctions of Multiple Objects. This project aims at using both theory and laboratory experiments to analyse the formation of prices and the buyers' behaviour at auctions of multiple objects. The study focusses on the comparison of simultaneous auction procedures (in which the objects are sold at once) to sequential auction procedures (in which the objects are sold one after the other) and attention is drawn on the effects of the quality of the buyers' information about the assets to be sold on their bidding behaviour and on the seller's revenues. The conduct of laboratory experiments will provide a useful assessment of the theoretical predictions and valuable insights into the effects of buyers' information quality on their bidding behaviour at such markets.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE120102640
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$375,000.00
Summary
Behavioural foundations of economic design for an uncertain world. The aim of this project is to incorporate behavioural foundations into mechanism design to improve our understanding of economic institutions in incomplete information environments. To accomplish this goal, it considers a framework where agents have reference-dependent preferences and explores implications of this assumption for economic design.
Banks, endogenous network formations and financial crisis. This project aims to understand how endogenous network formations affect financial crisis and how such situations can be made into a coherent microeconomic model of financial network formations using modern tools in economics. The project intends to study the properties of financial systems in the presence of possible financial crisis, conduct applied economic policy analysis and provide policy implications for lifting productivity and e ....Banks, endogenous network formations and financial crisis. This project aims to understand how endogenous network formations affect financial crisis and how such situations can be made into a coherent microeconomic model of financial network formations using modern tools in economics. The project intends to study the properties of financial systems in the presence of possible financial crisis, conduct applied economic policy analysis and provide policy implications for lifting productivity and economic growth. The projects expected outcomes would contribute to the theoretical understanding of financial crisis and consequences in financial markets as well as the economy and public policy. In the longer term, the project should benefit the health of the financial system.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE160100104
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$372,000.00
Summary
Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Dynamics. This project aims to design optimal selling policies, allowing for aftermarket dynamics such as resale and inter-buyer competitions. The existence of an aftermarket greatly affects the optimal design of license auctions, procurement, franchising and the like. For instance, when market licenses are auctioned off, incumbent firms may compete fiercely for licenses they do not need simply to keep entrants out. Existing sales designs that overlook such bidd ....Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Dynamics. This project aims to design optimal selling policies, allowing for aftermarket dynamics such as resale and inter-buyer competitions. The existence of an aftermarket greatly affects the optimal design of license auctions, procurement, franchising and the like. For instance, when market licenses are auctioned off, incumbent firms may compete fiercely for licenses they do not need simply to keep entrants out. Existing sales designs that overlook such bidding incentives often underperform in practice. The project aims to examine informational policies that influence buyers’ activities to best suit the seller's objectives. It expects to help regulatory bodies to design more efficient license auctions, provide franchisors with more profitable strategies, and save taxpayers' money when procuring services.Read moreRead less