Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE160100964
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$371,000.00
Summary
Understanding and designing persuasion mechanisms. The objective of this project is to understand and design persuasion mechanisms. Persuasion is about conveying information, influencing beliefs and manipulating actions. Educational campaigns and media censorship regulations are examples of persuasion mechanisms. Existing techniques from the economics of persuasion only permit analysis of specific and limited settings. This project aims to apply the classical mechanism design approach in a novel ....Understanding and designing persuasion mechanisms. The objective of this project is to understand and design persuasion mechanisms. Persuasion is about conveying information, influencing beliefs and manipulating actions. Educational campaigns and media censorship regulations are examples of persuasion mechanisms. Existing techniques from the economics of persuasion only permit analysis of specific and limited settings. This project aims to apply the classical mechanism design approach in a novel way to model persuasion in rich and realistic settings, thus providing insights into real-world situations. It is anticipated that this will allow us to answer questions such as ‘Should an educational campaign target different consumers with different information?’ and ‘When should a government censor extreme media outlets?'.Read moreRead less
A robust approach to designing mechanisms for budget constrained agents. This project aims to study the design of robust implementable allocation mechanisms for agents who face financial constraints. Financial constraints are important for housing markets, big business auctions and government procurement. Yet their effect on the performance of allocation policies is not well understood. The project intends to develop a general and tractable framework of allocation mechanisms that are implementab ....A robust approach to designing mechanisms for budget constrained agents. This project aims to study the design of robust implementable allocation mechanisms for agents who face financial constraints. Financial constraints are important for housing markets, big business auctions and government procurement. Yet their effect on the performance of allocation policies is not well understood. The project intends to develop a general and tractable framework of allocation mechanisms that are implementable without deficits. The project will adapt this framework to the study of revenue-maximising multi-object auctions with complementarities, and to house allocation problems and related situations where efficiency and priority assignments are important considerations. The project expects to provide policy insights and implications relevant to the Australian housing market.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE180100190
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$363,996.00
Summary
Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, ....Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, real-world auctions such as real-estate auctions or internet auctions. The project outcomes are expected to enhance the efficient allocation of resources, improve our understanding of how different rules affect buyers' well-being and help design fairer auctions.Read moreRead less
Information and market design: mediation and analogical argumentation. This project aims to increase knowledge of how judicious disclosure of information facilitates economic exchange and social interactions and to shed light on how mediation can be an effective mode of dispute resolution. The project seeks to uncover how analogical arguments can be persuasive and determine social outcomes as well as provide guidance for advocates and decision makers on the best way to persuade and counteract mi ....Information and market design: mediation and analogical argumentation. This project aims to increase knowledge of how judicious disclosure of information facilitates economic exchange and social interactions and to shed light on how mediation can be an effective mode of dispute resolution. The project seeks to uncover how analogical arguments can be persuasive and determine social outcomes as well as provide guidance for advocates and decision makers on the best way to persuade and counteract misleading persuasion practices. Besides producing significant new knowledge, the project promises to inform future innovative economic, social and cultural developments of benefit to the Australian and international community.Read moreRead less
Wicked defaults: how to overcome the dark side of choice architecture. This project aims to investigate how defaults and product complexity might be used to exploit consumers in environments like private insurance where consumers are prone to making systematic errors. Defaults are used to nudge individuals into socially beneficial actions such as increasing their retirement savings and joining organ donor lists. However, in the hands of firms, defaults can also be used to exploit consumers by en ....Wicked defaults: how to overcome the dark side of choice architecture. This project aims to investigate how defaults and product complexity might be used to exploit consumers in environments like private insurance where consumers are prone to making systematic errors. Defaults are used to nudge individuals into socially beneficial actions such as increasing their retirement savings and joining organ donor lists. However, in the hands of firms, defaults can also be used to exploit consumers by encouraging choices that help the firm but disadvantage consumers. The project intends to study experimentally whether exploitation can be reduced via competition and reputation building systems based on consumer feedback.Read moreRead less