Broadening Choice and Increasing Diversity in Public Schools. Currently, most families are limited to the public school in their catchment area, meaning the area in which they can afford to live. This leads to socio-economically and ethnically homogenous schools and entrenches disadvantage, as well as denying students the crucial life lessons that flow from being part of a diverse student body. This project aims to investigate a model for allocating public school places that integrates catchment ....Broadening Choice and Increasing Diversity in Public Schools. Currently, most families are limited to the public school in their catchment area, meaning the area in which they can afford to live. This leads to socio-economically and ethnically homogenous schools and entrenches disadvantage, as well as denying students the crucial life lessons that flow from being part of a diverse student body. This project aims to investigate a model for allocating public school places that integrates catchment areas. The expected outcome would be a system that gives families a wider choice, enabling them to enrol in out-of-area schools, while ensuring that allocations remain fair, equitable and balanced, and also delivering benefits such as achieving a desired level of diversity in student populations within schoolsRead moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE160100964
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$371,000.00
Summary
Understanding and designing persuasion mechanisms. The objective of this project is to understand and design persuasion mechanisms. Persuasion is about conveying information, influencing beliefs and manipulating actions. Educational campaigns and media censorship regulations are examples of persuasion mechanisms. Existing techniques from the economics of persuasion only permit analysis of specific and limited settings. This project aims to apply the classical mechanism design approach in a novel ....Understanding and designing persuasion mechanisms. The objective of this project is to understand and design persuasion mechanisms. Persuasion is about conveying information, influencing beliefs and manipulating actions. Educational campaigns and media censorship regulations are examples of persuasion mechanisms. Existing techniques from the economics of persuasion only permit analysis of specific and limited settings. This project aims to apply the classical mechanism design approach in a novel way to model persuasion in rich and realistic settings, thus providing insights into real-world situations. It is anticipated that this will allow us to answer questions such as ‘Should an educational campaign target different consumers with different information?’ and ‘When should a government censor extreme media outlets?'.Read moreRead less
Decentralised assets trading, centralised clearing and systemic risk. This project aims to study the effect of regulating over-the-counter (OTC) financial markets on economic performance. The lack of transparency of OTC financial markets may have exacerbated the severity of the 2007-09 financial crisis. In response, regulators around the world decided to mandate centralised clearing of derivatives traded OTC, believing this would reduce system-wide risk. This project will study the regulatory ch ....Decentralised assets trading, centralised clearing and systemic risk. This project aims to study the effect of regulating over-the-counter (OTC) financial markets on economic performance. The lack of transparency of OTC financial markets may have exacerbated the severity of the 2007-09 financial crisis. In response, regulators around the world decided to mandate centralised clearing of derivatives traded OTC, believing this would reduce system-wide risk. This project will study the regulatory change’s effects on market participation, volumes of trade and prices, and the behavioural effect of shifting risk from market participants to clearinghouses. It expects to suggest remedial policies clearinghouses could implement to control market participants’ risk appetite. These can help enhance future productivity and reduce unemployment in Australia.Read moreRead less
A robust approach to designing mechanisms for budget constrained agents. This project aims to study the design of robust implementable allocation mechanisms for agents who face financial constraints. Financial constraints are important for housing markets, big business auctions and government procurement. Yet their effect on the performance of allocation policies is not well understood. The project intends to develop a general and tractable framework of allocation mechanisms that are implementab ....A robust approach to designing mechanisms for budget constrained agents. This project aims to study the design of robust implementable allocation mechanisms for agents who face financial constraints. Financial constraints are important for housing markets, big business auctions and government procurement. Yet their effect on the performance of allocation policies is not well understood. The project intends to develop a general and tractable framework of allocation mechanisms that are implementable without deficits. The project will adapt this framework to the study of revenue-maximising multi-object auctions with complementarities, and to house allocation problems and related situations where efficiency and priority assignments are important considerations. The project expects to provide policy insights and implications relevant to the Australian housing market.Read moreRead less
An economic analysis of multi-period reform programs. This project aims to use a mechanism design approach to study multi-period reform programs and their use in the transition from status quo institutions. The project intends to shed light on the difficulties of introducing efficiency enhancing long-term policies. Expected outcomes include theoretical models that incorporate adjustment costs, common values, and complicated status quo institutions into models of economic reform from a mechanism ....An economic analysis of multi-period reform programs. This project aims to use a mechanism design approach to study multi-period reform programs and their use in the transition from status quo institutions. The project intends to shed light on the difficulties of introducing efficiency enhancing long-term policies. Expected outcomes include theoretical models that incorporate adjustment costs, common values, and complicated status quo institutions into models of economic reform from a mechanism design perspective as well as optimal dynamic reform policies in the presence of these frictions, focusing attention in the trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic welfare gains. Intended benefits include insights that are wildly applicable to the provision of public infrastructure and management of public resources.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE180100190
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$363,996.00
Summary
Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, ....Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, real-world auctions such as real-estate auctions or internet auctions. The project outcomes are expected to enhance the efficient allocation of resources, improve our understanding of how different rules affect buyers' well-being and help design fairer auctions.Read moreRead less
Information and market design: mediation and analogical argumentation. This project aims to increase knowledge of how judicious disclosure of information facilitates economic exchange and social interactions and to shed light on how mediation can be an effective mode of dispute resolution. The project seeks to uncover how analogical arguments can be persuasive and determine social outcomes as well as provide guidance for advocates and decision makers on the best way to persuade and counteract mi ....Information and market design: mediation and analogical argumentation. This project aims to increase knowledge of how judicious disclosure of information facilitates economic exchange and social interactions and to shed light on how mediation can be an effective mode of dispute resolution. The project seeks to uncover how analogical arguments can be persuasive and determine social outcomes as well as provide guidance for advocates and decision makers on the best way to persuade and counteract misleading persuasion practices. Besides producing significant new knowledge, the project promises to inform future innovative economic, social and cultural developments of benefit to the Australian and international community.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE200100590
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$416,154.00
Summary
Optimal policy and mechanism design in education and labour markets. This project aims to investigate the optimal design and efficiency implications of education and labour market policies such as differential treatment in school assignment, university admissions, hiring and promotions within organisations. The project expects to develop novel theoretical models of public policy using techniques from information economics and mechanism design. The expected outcomes of this project include an enh ....Optimal policy and mechanism design in education and labour markets. This project aims to investigate the optimal design and efficiency implications of education and labour market policies such as differential treatment in school assignment, university admissions, hiring and promotions within organisations. The project expects to develop novel theoretical models of public policy using techniques from information economics and mechanism design. The expected outcomes of this project include an enhanced capacity to design policies and a new conceptual framework to assess their efficiency. This should enable policymakers and organisations to implement more efficient policies, and inform public debates on the merits of preferential treatment, gender equity policies and other education and labour market policies. Read moreRead less
Testing strategy-proofness in matching markets: an experimental study. This project seeks to test and improve matching algorithms by investigating the effect of advice on strategy-proofness. Matching algorithms are used to solve allocation problems in designed markets (eg school or house allocation problems). Many of the algorithms employed are strategy-proof: participants never gain from strategising, that is, from lying about their preferences. Strategy-proofness had been seemingly validated b ....Testing strategy-proofness in matching markets: an experimental study. This project seeks to test and improve matching algorithms by investigating the effect of advice on strategy-proofness. Matching algorithms are used to solve allocation problems in designed markets (eg school or house allocation problems). Many of the algorithms employed are strategy-proof: participants never gain from strategising, that is, from lying about their preferences. Strategy-proofness had been seemingly validated by experimental research, but new evidence suggests that participants could be prone to follow wrong advice and therefore lie. In order to improve the performance of designed markets, the project proposes to further test strategy-proofness by investigating how advice can affect truth-telling in strategy-proof algorithms and whether learning can counteract or complement the effect of advice.Read moreRead less
Redesigning Landcare policy to better coordinate across landholders. This project aims to study how landscape-sensitive economic incentives and social norms can be leveraged to enhance the short- and long-term effectiveness of conservation programs. It will yield new knowledge for innovative designs in conservation contracting that is urgently needed to address worsening environmental threats in Australia and worldwide. In collaboration with Nobel laureate Vernon Smith’s team, new methods and pr ....Redesigning Landcare policy to better coordinate across landholders. This project aims to study how landscape-sensitive economic incentives and social norms can be leveraged to enhance the short- and long-term effectiveness of conservation programs. It will yield new knowledge for innovative designs in conservation contracting that is urgently needed to address worsening environmental threats in Australia and worldwide. In collaboration with Nobel laureate Vernon Smith’s team, new methods and protocols will improve our ability to generate better data and better understand how social and incentive mechanisms can constructively interact to facilitate collaborative environmental action. Results will help make the achievement of environmental targets and the use of public funds more cost-effective. Read moreRead less