Market Design for the Reallocation of Land. This fellowship uses laboratory and lab-in-the-field experiments to explores how market design can be used to develop combinatorial exchanges that allow participants to exchange packages of land. Allowing for package bids can facilitate trade in situations where owning one piece of land increases the value of adjacent land and where assembling contiguous pieces of land is important. Combinatorial exchanges have the potential to increase the productivit ....Market Design for the Reallocation of Land. This fellowship uses laboratory and lab-in-the-field experiments to explores how market design can be used to develop combinatorial exchanges that allow participants to exchange packages of land. Allowing for package bids can facilitate trade in situations where owning one piece of land increases the value of adjacent land and where assembling contiguous pieces of land is important. Combinatorial exchanges have the potential to increase the productivity of agriculture land in both Australia and developing countries, encourage urban redevelopment, and help the government secure land for infrastructure and environmental protection in a cost-effective way.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE140101014
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$349,785.00
Summary
Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who ha ....Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who have not. Such preferences are common in many non-market settings and can have dramatic effects on the efficiency of potential mechanisms. The ultimate goal of this project is to develop applied mechanisms that are robust to heterogeneity in such intention-based preferences and which can be used in bilateral exchange, contract design and many other non-market settings.Read moreRead less
The effect of bargaining power on bargaining outcomes: the roles of institutions, earned bargaining position and social norms. Previous research has found that people exploit their bargaining power far less than economic theories predict. This project uses an economics experiment to study several factors affecting how bargaining power is used: restrictions on the bargaining process; whether and how bargaining power is 'earned' and whether equal divisions are plausible.
Are claims of transparency to be believed? This project tests if leaders, when given a choice, actually reveal a preference for transparency (that is to share all relevant information with their followers). This project analyses the circumstances under which leaders choose transparency and how their decisions and their reputations for transparency affect followers' behaviour and overall group cooperation.