Broadening Choice and Increasing Diversity in Public Schools. Currently, most families are limited to the public school in their catchment area, meaning the area in which they can afford to live. This leads to socio-economically and ethnically homogenous schools and entrenches disadvantage, as well as denying students the crucial life lessons that flow from being part of a diverse student body. This project aims to investigate a model for allocating public school places that integrates catchment ....Broadening Choice and Increasing Diversity in Public Schools. Currently, most families are limited to the public school in their catchment area, meaning the area in which they can afford to live. This leads to socio-economically and ethnically homogenous schools and entrenches disadvantage, as well as denying students the crucial life lessons that flow from being part of a diverse student body. This project aims to investigate a model for allocating public school places that integrates catchment areas. The expected outcome would be a system that gives families a wider choice, enabling them to enrol in out-of-area schools, while ensuring that allocations remain fair, equitable and balanced, and also delivering benefits such as achieving a desired level of diversity in student populations within schoolsRead moreRead less
Testing strategy-proofness in matching markets: an experimental study. This project seeks to test and improve matching algorithms by investigating the effect of advice on strategy-proofness. Matching algorithms are used to solve allocation problems in designed markets (eg school or house allocation problems). Many of the algorithms employed are strategy-proof: participants never gain from strategising, that is, from lying about their preferences. Strategy-proofness had been seemingly validated b ....Testing strategy-proofness in matching markets: an experimental study. This project seeks to test and improve matching algorithms by investigating the effect of advice on strategy-proofness. Matching algorithms are used to solve allocation problems in designed markets (eg school or house allocation problems). Many of the algorithms employed are strategy-proof: participants never gain from strategising, that is, from lying about their preferences. Strategy-proofness had been seemingly validated by experimental research, but new evidence suggests that participants could be prone to follow wrong advice and therefore lie. In order to improve the performance of designed markets, the project proposes to further test strategy-proofness by investigating how advice can affect truth-telling in strategy-proof algorithms and whether learning can counteract or complement the effect of advice.Read moreRead less
The effect of competition and doctor heterogeneity on prices charged by doctors. Prices charged by doctors can have important effects on health care costs, access to health care and health status. This research will examine the determinants of prices charged by doctors. The results will be important in understanding the pricing practices of doctors and their impact on health care costs.
Nobody knows anything? Applying pari-mutuel prediction markets to the motion picture industry. This project will explore the predictability of unreleased motion pictures' theatrical box office revenues using incentive rich pari-mutuel prediction markets. The mechanism will promote price discovery and associated probability estimates that will benefit those already investing in the industry as well as encouraging new investment.
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE120102640
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$375,000.00
Summary
Behavioural foundations of economic design for an uncertain world. The aim of this project is to incorporate behavioural foundations into mechanism design to improve our understanding of economic institutions in incomplete information environments. To accomplish this goal, it considers a framework where agents have reference-dependent preferences and explores implications of this assumption for economic design.
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE160100104
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$372,000.00
Summary
Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Dynamics. This project aims to design optimal selling policies, allowing for aftermarket dynamics such as resale and inter-buyer competitions. The existence of an aftermarket greatly affects the optimal design of license auctions, procurement, franchising and the like. For instance, when market licenses are auctioned off, incumbent firms may compete fiercely for licenses they do not need simply to keep entrants out. Existing sales designs that overlook such bidd ....Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Dynamics. This project aims to design optimal selling policies, allowing for aftermarket dynamics such as resale and inter-buyer competitions. The existence of an aftermarket greatly affects the optimal design of license auctions, procurement, franchising and the like. For instance, when market licenses are auctioned off, incumbent firms may compete fiercely for licenses they do not need simply to keep entrants out. Existing sales designs that overlook such bidding incentives often underperform in practice. The project aims to examine informational policies that influence buyers’ activities to best suit the seller's objectives. It expects to help regulatory bodies to design more efficient license auctions, provide franchisors with more profitable strategies, and save taxpayers' money when procuring services.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE160100964
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$371,000.00
Summary
Understanding and designing persuasion mechanisms. The objective of this project is to understand and design persuasion mechanisms. Persuasion is about conveying information, influencing beliefs and manipulating actions. Educational campaigns and media censorship regulations are examples of persuasion mechanisms. Existing techniques from the economics of persuasion only permit analysis of specific and limited settings. This project aims to apply the classical mechanism design approach in a novel ....Understanding and designing persuasion mechanisms. The objective of this project is to understand and design persuasion mechanisms. Persuasion is about conveying information, influencing beliefs and manipulating actions. Educational campaigns and media censorship regulations are examples of persuasion mechanisms. Existing techniques from the economics of persuasion only permit analysis of specific and limited settings. This project aims to apply the classical mechanism design approach in a novel way to model persuasion in rich and realistic settings, thus providing insights into real-world situations. It is anticipated that this will allow us to answer questions such as ‘Should an educational campaign target different consumers with different information?’ and ‘When should a government censor extreme media outlets?'.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE170100340
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$311,000.00
Summary
Competition in persuasion. This project aims to develop tools to analyse situations where multiple self-interested persuaders attempt to convince a set of listeners. It will build upon recent developments in the economics of persuasion literature, and apply tools from mechanism design literature. This approach, unlike other existing work, is not limited to specific settings and has the advantage of being highly tractable. Using these tools, this project intends to provide insights into the mecha ....Competition in persuasion. This project aims to develop tools to analyse situations where multiple self-interested persuaders attempt to convince a set of listeners. It will build upon recent developments in the economics of persuasion literature, and apply tools from mechanism design literature. This approach, unlike other existing work, is not limited to specific settings and has the advantage of being highly tractable. Using these tools, this project intends to provide insights into the mechanisms behind grade inflation among universities, the optimal design of certification industries and information disclosure in clinical trials.Read moreRead less
Decentralised assets trading, centralised clearing and systemic risk. This project aims to study the effect of regulating over-the-counter (OTC) financial markets on economic performance. The lack of transparency of OTC financial markets may have exacerbated the severity of the 2007-09 financial crisis. In response, regulators around the world decided to mandate centralised clearing of derivatives traded OTC, believing this would reduce system-wide risk. This project will study the regulatory ch ....Decentralised assets trading, centralised clearing and systemic risk. This project aims to study the effect of regulating over-the-counter (OTC) financial markets on economic performance. The lack of transparency of OTC financial markets may have exacerbated the severity of the 2007-09 financial crisis. In response, regulators around the world decided to mandate centralised clearing of derivatives traded OTC, believing this would reduce system-wide risk. This project will study the regulatory change’s effects on market participation, volumes of trade and prices, and the behavioural effect of shifting risk from market participants to clearinghouses. It expects to suggest remedial policies clearinghouses could implement to control market participants’ risk appetite. These can help enhance future productivity and reduce unemployment in Australia.Read moreRead less
A robust approach to designing mechanisms for budget constrained agents. This project aims to study the design of robust implementable allocation mechanisms for agents who face financial constraints. Financial constraints are important for housing markets, big business auctions and government procurement. Yet their effect on the performance of allocation policies is not well understood. The project intends to develop a general and tractable framework of allocation mechanisms that are implementab ....A robust approach to designing mechanisms for budget constrained agents. This project aims to study the design of robust implementable allocation mechanisms for agents who face financial constraints. Financial constraints are important for housing markets, big business auctions and government procurement. Yet their effect on the performance of allocation policies is not well understood. The project intends to develop a general and tractable framework of allocation mechanisms that are implementable without deficits. The project will adapt this framework to the study of revenue-maximising multi-object auctions with complementarities, and to house allocation problems and related situations where efficiency and priority assignments are important considerations. The project expects to provide policy insights and implications relevant to the Australian housing market.Read moreRead less