Understanding phenomenal experience as a natural part of our world. The natural sciences?physics, chemistry and biology?provide compelling accounts of our world. They contain, however, no overt mention of mental states and in particular the mental states with a phenomenology: states like itches and colour experiences. The challenge for naturalists is locate these states within the naturalist picture. This project develops and draws on representationalist accounts of mind to explain how to locate ....Understanding phenomenal experience as a natural part of our world. The natural sciences?physics, chemistry and biology?provide compelling accounts of our world. They contain, however, no overt mention of mental states and in particular the mental states with a phenomenology: states like itches and colour experiences. The challenge for naturalists is locate these states within the naturalist picture. This project develops and draws on representationalist accounts of mind to explain how to locate mental states that have a phenomenology within the naturalist's picture. This will yield new perspectives on the mental lives of machines.Read moreRead less
Conscious Experience and the Hegemony of Representation. Many things make humans special but three stand out: the possession of a moral sense, rationality, and consciousness. This project aims to explain consciousness in a way fully comppatible with the aspirations of cognitive science to see humans as a natural part of the physical world.
Belief singular versus beliefs plural. Research on the brain and how it represents the environment has the potential to reconfigure our ordinary conceptions of belief and rationality. This project explores the impact of the changes and their implications.
Perception, interpretation, and the explanation of delusional beliefs. The occurrence of bizarrely false beliefs, called delusions, presents challenges, not only for clinical psychiatric practice, but also for psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. The aim of this project is to make a distinctively philosophical contribution to our understanding of delusional beliefs by addressing three philosophical questions raised by the study of delusions, questions about perception, interpretation, and e ....Perception, interpretation, and the explanation of delusional beliefs. The occurrence of bizarrely false beliefs, called delusions, presents challenges, not only for clinical psychiatric practice, but also for psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. The aim of this project is to make a distinctively philosophical contribution to our understanding of delusional beliefs by addressing three philosophical questions raised by the study of delusions, questions about perception, interpretation, and explanation. Answers to these questions will constitute substantial contributions to three central areas of philosophy, but their significance also extends beyond philosophy. They will impact on the scientific investigation of delusions and will contribute indirectly to the treatment and rehabilitation of sufferers.
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The Structure of Moral Reasoning: Hume, Kant and the Evidence from Psychopathology and Neuroscience. What can moral philosophers hope to learn from the sciences of the mind? Recent work on the disorders of autism and psychopathy, has promised to reshape a longstanding philosophical debate between Kantians and Humeans on the role of empathy (sympathy) in moral thinking. This project will draw out the implications of a range of neuroscientific findings for key questions in moral theory and also co ....The Structure of Moral Reasoning: Hume, Kant and the Evidence from Psychopathology and Neuroscience. What can moral philosophers hope to learn from the sciences of the mind? Recent work on the disorders of autism and psychopathy, has promised to reshape a longstanding philosophical debate between Kantians and Humeans on the role of empathy (sympathy) in moral thinking. This project will draw out the implications of a range of neuroscientific findings for key questions in moral theory and also consider how the normative and conceptual claims made by such theories, about what must be true of a moral judgment, are connected to descriptive claims about the psychology of the moral agents who make them.Read moreRead less