A robust approach to designing mechanisms for budget constrained agents. This project aims to study the design of robust implementable allocation mechanisms for agents who face financial constraints. Financial constraints are important for housing markets, big business auctions and government procurement. Yet their effect on the performance of allocation policies is not well understood. The project intends to develop a general and tractable framework of allocation mechanisms that are implementab ....A robust approach to designing mechanisms for budget constrained agents. This project aims to study the design of robust implementable allocation mechanisms for agents who face financial constraints. Financial constraints are important for housing markets, big business auctions and government procurement. Yet their effect on the performance of allocation policies is not well understood. The project intends to develop a general and tractable framework of allocation mechanisms that are implementable without deficits. The project will adapt this framework to the study of revenue-maximising multi-object auctions with complementarities, and to house allocation problems and related situations where efficiency and priority assignments are important considerations. The project expects to provide policy insights and implications relevant to the Australian housing market.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE160100964
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$371,000.00
Summary
Understanding and designing persuasion mechanisms. The objective of this project is to understand and design persuasion mechanisms. Persuasion is about conveying information, influencing beliefs and manipulating actions. Educational campaigns and media censorship regulations are examples of persuasion mechanisms. Existing techniques from the economics of persuasion only permit analysis of specific and limited settings. This project aims to apply the classical mechanism design approach in a novel ....Understanding and designing persuasion mechanisms. The objective of this project is to understand and design persuasion mechanisms. Persuasion is about conveying information, influencing beliefs and manipulating actions. Educational campaigns and media censorship regulations are examples of persuasion mechanisms. Existing techniques from the economics of persuasion only permit analysis of specific and limited settings. This project aims to apply the classical mechanism design approach in a novel way to model persuasion in rich and realistic settings, thus providing insights into real-world situations. It is anticipated that this will allow us to answer questions such as ‘Should an educational campaign target different consumers with different information?’ and ‘When should a government censor extreme media outlets?'.Read moreRead less
Incomplete Information Models for Industrial Organisation. Mergers, acquisitions, and collusive conduct take place in imperfectly competitive environments where firms have incomplete information about others. Despite this, standard workhorse models for analyzing the associated competitive effects assume that firms have complete information and typically only accommodate imperfect competition on one side of the market. This project aims to remedy this deficiency by developing the economic theory ....Incomplete Information Models for Industrial Organisation. Mergers, acquisitions, and collusive conduct take place in imperfectly competitive environments where firms have incomplete information about others. Despite this, standard workhorse models for analyzing the associated competitive effects assume that firms have complete information and typically only accommodate imperfect competition on one side of the market. This project aims to remedy this deficiency by developing the economic theory and associated practical tools for the analysis of competitive effects in settings with incomplete information and market power on both sides. The project work will be presented at seminars and workshops around the globe to both academic audiences and to practitioners at competition authorities. Read moreRead less
Rank-dependent choice equilibrium. This project aims to develop and test a new statistical theory of games, Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium (RDCE), which has the potential to unify and improve on existing approaches where the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about their empirical relevance. The project intends to develop the theoretical foundations of RDCE, explore its relation with various parametric approaches, and evaluate RDCE via meta stu ....Rank-dependent choice equilibrium. This project aims to develop and test a new statistical theory of games, Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium (RDCE), which has the potential to unify and improve on existing approaches where the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about their empirical relevance. The project intends to develop the theoretical foundations of RDCE, explore its relation with various parametric approaches, and evaluate RDCE via meta studies and stress tests. Expected outcomes of RDCE include a paradigm shift in game theory, resulting in broader acceptance and adoption of statistical game theory and to more robust policy recommendations.Read moreRead less
Testing strategy-proofness in matching markets: an experimental study. This project seeks to test and improve matching algorithms by investigating the effect of advice on strategy-proofness. Matching algorithms are used to solve allocation problems in designed markets (eg school or house allocation problems). Many of the algorithms employed are strategy-proof: participants never gain from strategising, that is, from lying about their preferences. Strategy-proofness had been seemingly validated b ....Testing strategy-proofness in matching markets: an experimental study. This project seeks to test and improve matching algorithms by investigating the effect of advice on strategy-proofness. Matching algorithms are used to solve allocation problems in designed markets (eg school or house allocation problems). Many of the algorithms employed are strategy-proof: participants never gain from strategising, that is, from lying about their preferences. Strategy-proofness had been seemingly validated by experimental research, but new evidence suggests that participants could be prone to follow wrong advice and therefore lie. In order to improve the performance of designed markets, the project proposes to further test strategy-proofness by investigating how advice can affect truth-telling in strategy-proof algorithms and whether learning can counteract or complement the effect of advice.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE180100190
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$363,996.00
Summary
Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, ....Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, real-world auctions such as real-estate auctions or internet auctions. The project outcomes are expected to enhance the efficient allocation of resources, improve our understanding of how different rules affect buyers' well-being and help design fairer auctions.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE210101085
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$323,692.00
Summary
Stability of Multilateral Agreements and the Limits to Cooperation. This project aims to analyze the stability of multilateral agreements. This is expected to be done by building upon the cooperative approach in game theory that focuses on groups as the primary decision makers. Moving the unit of analysis from an individual to a group has the advantage of widening the applicability of game theoretic methods to social issues. Consequently, the project is expected to enhance our understanding of h ....Stability of Multilateral Agreements and the Limits to Cooperation. This project aims to analyze the stability of multilateral agreements. This is expected to be done by building upon the cooperative approach in game theory that focuses on groups as the primary decision makers. Moving the unit of analysis from an individual to a group has the advantage of widening the applicability of game theoretic methods to social issues. Consequently, the project is expected to enhance our understanding of how and why cooperation can be sustained in some of the most pressing challenges faced by the society today that require extensive international collaboration to overcome, such as environmental change, trade disputes, and arms-control.
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An economic analysis of multi-period reform programs. This project aims to use a mechanism design approach to study multi-period reform programs and their use in the transition from status quo institutions. The project intends to shed light on the difficulties of introducing efficiency enhancing long-term policies. Expected outcomes include theoretical models that incorporate adjustment costs, common values, and complicated status quo institutions into models of economic reform from a mechanism ....An economic analysis of multi-period reform programs. This project aims to use a mechanism design approach to study multi-period reform programs and their use in the transition from status quo institutions. The project intends to shed light on the difficulties of introducing efficiency enhancing long-term policies. Expected outcomes include theoretical models that incorporate adjustment costs, common values, and complicated status quo institutions into models of economic reform from a mechanism design perspective as well as optimal dynamic reform policies in the presence of these frictions, focusing attention in the trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic welfare gains. Intended benefits include insights that are wildly applicable to the provision of public infrastructure and management of public resources.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE200100590
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$416,154.00
Summary
Optimal policy and mechanism design in education and labour markets. This project aims to investigate the optimal design and efficiency implications of education and labour market policies such as differential treatment in school assignment, university admissions, hiring and promotions within organisations. The project expects to develop novel theoretical models of public policy using techniques from information economics and mechanism design. The expected outcomes of this project include an enh ....Optimal policy and mechanism design in education and labour markets. This project aims to investigate the optimal design and efficiency implications of education and labour market policies such as differential treatment in school assignment, university admissions, hiring and promotions within organisations. The project expects to develop novel theoretical models of public policy using techniques from information economics and mechanism design. The expected outcomes of this project include an enhanced capacity to design policies and a new conceptual framework to assess their efficiency. This should enable policymakers and organisations to implement more efficient policies, and inform public debates on the merits of preferential treatment, gender equity policies and other education and labour market policies. Read moreRead less
Social Network Analysis: Social Media, Peer Effects and the Environment. The aims of this proposal are to better understand the role of networks in different activities such as social media, education, crime and environment-friendly behaviour. The project expects to help inform the design and practice of policies for education and environmental authorities, police and media markets. Social networks are pervasive in Australia. The project tackles issues of criminal gangs in Australian cities, the ....Social Network Analysis: Social Media, Peer Effects and the Environment. The aims of this proposal are to better understand the role of networks in different activities such as social media, education, crime and environment-friendly behaviour. The project expects to help inform the design and practice of policies for education and environmental authorities, police and media markets. Social networks are pervasive in Australia. The project tackles issues of criminal gangs in Australian cities, the political system and environment-friendly behaviours. This project is at the frontier of work in the economics of networks, with expected outcomes to include new models and methods to better understand the impact of social networks. Benefits include clear policy recommendations to improve welfare in Australian society.Read moreRead less