Honesty and efficiency in the provision of expert services: doctors and other experts as participants in economic experiments. Experts serve us when we see the doctor, the financial planner or the car mechanic. In all these case the expert can take advantage of his superior knowledge and sell us something we do not need. This research will inform policy makers about the underlying motives of real world experts and allow them to design better institutions.
Are claims of transparency to be believed? This project tests if leaders, when given a choice, actually reveal a preference for transparency (that is to share all relevant information with their followers). This project analyses the circumstances under which leaders choose transparency and how their decisions and their reputations for transparency affect followers' behaviour and overall group cooperation.
Rank-dependent choice equilibrium. This project aims to develop and test a new statistical theory of games, Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium (RDCE), which has the potential to unify and improve on existing approaches where the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about their empirical relevance. The project intends to develop the theoretical foundations of RDCE, explore its relation with various parametric approaches, and evaluate RDCE via meta stu ....Rank-dependent choice equilibrium. This project aims to develop and test a new statistical theory of games, Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium (RDCE), which has the potential to unify and improve on existing approaches where the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about their empirical relevance. The project intends to develop the theoretical foundations of RDCE, explore its relation with various parametric approaches, and evaluate RDCE via meta studies and stress tests. Expected outcomes of RDCE include a paradigm shift in game theory, resulting in broader acceptance and adoption of statistical game theory and to more robust policy recommendations.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE140101014
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$349,785.00
Summary
Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who ha ....Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who have not. Such preferences are common in many non-market settings and can have dramatic effects on the efficiency of potential mechanisms. The ultimate goal of this project is to develop applied mechanisms that are robust to heterogeneity in such intention-based preferences and which can be used in bilateral exchange, contract design and many other non-market settings.Read moreRead less
Testing strategy-proofness in matching markets: an experimental study. This project seeks to test and improve matching algorithms by investigating the effect of advice on strategy-proofness. Matching algorithms are used to solve allocation problems in designed markets (eg school or house allocation problems). Many of the algorithms employed are strategy-proof: participants never gain from strategising, that is, from lying about their preferences. Strategy-proofness had been seemingly validated b ....Testing strategy-proofness in matching markets: an experimental study. This project seeks to test and improve matching algorithms by investigating the effect of advice on strategy-proofness. Matching algorithms are used to solve allocation problems in designed markets (eg school or house allocation problems). Many of the algorithms employed are strategy-proof: participants never gain from strategising, that is, from lying about their preferences. Strategy-proofness had been seemingly validated by experimental research, but new evidence suggests that participants could be prone to follow wrong advice and therefore lie. In order to improve the performance of designed markets, the project proposes to further test strategy-proofness by investigating how advice can affect truth-telling in strategy-proof algorithms and whether learning can counteract or complement the effect of advice.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE180100190
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$363,996.00
Summary
Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, ....Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, real-world auctions such as real-estate auctions or internet auctions. The project outcomes are expected to enhance the efficient allocation of resources, improve our understanding of how different rules affect buyers' well-being and help design fairer auctions.Read moreRead less
Effective and efficient corporate tax enforcement. This project uses economic theory and experimental tests in order to inform tax authorities on how to best audit tax receipts from corporations. The project will result in advice on how audit resources should be allocated across firms, if minimising corporate tax evasion and at the same time maximising social welfare are the authority's objective.
Information Quality in Auctions of Multiple Objects. This project aims at using both theory and laboratory experiments to analyse the formation of prices and the buyers' behaviour at auctions of multiple objects. The study focusses on the comparison of simultaneous auction procedures (in which the objects are sold at once) to sequential auction procedures (in which the objects are sold one after the other) and attention is drawn on the effects of the quality of the buyers' information about the ....Information Quality in Auctions of Multiple Objects. This project aims at using both theory and laboratory experiments to analyse the formation of prices and the buyers' behaviour at auctions of multiple objects. The study focusses on the comparison of simultaneous auction procedures (in which the objects are sold at once) to sequential auction procedures (in which the objects are sold one after the other) and attention is drawn on the effects of the quality of the buyers' information about the assets to be sold on their bidding behaviour and on the seller's revenues. The conduct of laboratory experiments will provide a useful assessment of the theoretical predictions and valuable insights into the effects of buyers' information quality on their bidding behaviour at such markets.Read moreRead less
Legitimacy and representation: A comprehensive study of electoral systems and strategic voting behaviour. What makes a good electoral system? How can it reflect the preference of the majority while guaranteeing representation to minorities? Should voting be voluntary or mandatory? These are very relevant questions for any democracy, but particularly so for Australia: a country which has always been at the forefront of the electoral debate, that proudly strives to represent with fairness all sect ....Legitimacy and representation: A comprehensive study of electoral systems and strategic voting behaviour. What makes a good electoral system? How can it reflect the preference of the majority while guaranteeing representation to minorities? Should voting be voluntary or mandatory? These are very relevant questions for any democracy, but particularly so for Australia: a country which has always been at the forefront of the electoral debate, that proudly strives to represent with fairness all sectors of its very diverse society and where voting is not only a citizen's right, but also her duty. By approaching these issues in a game theoretic framework, this project proposes to investigate the strategic nature of voting through a comprehensive study of electoral systems. The project will then test our theoretical predictions through a series of laboratory experiments. Read moreRead less
The effect of bargaining power on bargaining outcomes: the roles of institutions, earned bargaining position and social norms. Previous research has found that people exploit their bargaining power far less than economic theories predict. This project uses an economics experiment to study several factors affecting how bargaining power is used: restrictions on the bargaining process; whether and how bargaining power is 'earned' and whether equal divisions are plausible.